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# ***Daily Report***

## **East Asia**

FBIS-EAS-88-229  
Tuesday  
29 November 1988

# Daily Report

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FBIS-EAS-88-229

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29 November 1988

**NOTICE TO READERS:** An \* indicates material not previously disseminated in electronic form.

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## Japan

### U.S. To Investigate Construction Market

OW2311114788 Tokyo KYODO in English 0712 GMT  
23 Nov 88

[Text] Washington, Nov. 23 KYODO—U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter announced on Tuesday that he is initiating an investigation into possible trade barriers in the Japanese construction market under a new trade bill enacted last August.

The office said in a statement Yeutter is initiating an investigation into the "acts, policies and practices of the Government of Japan that are barriers to U.S. architectural, engineering and construction services and related consulting services."

It also said, "during the investigation, the U.S. Government will consult with the Government of Japan on these issues as well as seek advice from private sector advisory committees and the public."

In Tokyo, Japanese Construction Ministry sources said Tuesday that Japan will ask the U.S. to stop such a probe at a bilateral committee meeting to be held in Tokyo in December to monitor how far the Japanese construction market has been opened to foreign firms.

The sources said the U.S. move comes despite bilateral negotiations on the matter held in May. They said Tokyo maintains that the Japanese construction market is basically open.

### U.S. Military Urged To Exercise Caution

OW2511151588 Tokyo KYODO in English 1359 GMT  
25 Nov 88

[Text] Naha, Nov. 25 KYODO—Strong demands for an early investigation of a recent series of stray bullet incidents and establishment of effective security measures to ensure the safety of residents living close to U.S. military bases in Okinawa were conveyed to American military authorities by senior Foreign Ministry officials Friday.

Atsushi Tokinoya, counselor of the North American Affairs Bureau, and Toshimitsu Mori, senior assistant of the bureau, visited Maj. Gen. [Major General] Norman H. Smith, commander at the U.S. Marine Corp's Camp Courtney in Gushikawa, 29 kilometers northeast of Naha.

The two told Gen. Smith the ministry was gravely concerned by a series of incidents involving bullets straying into residential areas last month from the U.S. Marine Corp's Range 6 shooting ground at Camp Hansen and a tear-gas bomb explosion in a heavily-populated area on November 20 among others, which could affect the security system in Okinawa based on the Japan-U.S. security pact.

The security pact allows the U.S. military to maintain bases and operate within Japanese territory.

Other than the two incidents cited were a mountain fire and a helicopter crash in exercise grounds in the mid-western section of the island.

The two Foreign Ministry officials pointed out that two of at least nine stray bullets found in a gasoline station and its vicinity in the Igei section of Kin on October 15 were proven by the local police to be the U.S. Marine Corps issue and strongly demanded that the U.S. investigate the cases thoroughly and take concrete measures to prevent such mishaps from recurring.

Smith told the two that the U.S. takes the matter very seriously and will undertake improvements in the security measures. He said security conditions at all shooting ranges are now being reviewed. He also explained that the stray bullets were not intentionally turned toward the residential area.

### Hokkaido Governor Urges Soviet Negotiations

OW2211091388 Tokyo KYODO in English 0725 GMT  
22 Nov 88

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 22 KYODO—Hokkaido Gov. Takahiro Yokomichi called on Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno Tuesday to further promote negotiations with the Soviet Union for the return to Japan of the four Soviet-held islands off Hokkaido.

Yokomichi, meeting Uno at the Foreign Ministry for 20 minutes, also asked him to make efforts to realize visits by former Japanese residents of the northern islands to family graves on all four islands and to develop Japan-Soviet fishery relations, ministry officials said.

The Soviet Union has allowed former Japanese residents to visit family graves on the Habomai Island group and on Shikotan Island but not on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands.

The Hokkaido governor made the request prior to a meeting between Uno and his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze scheduled in mid-December.

In response, Uno was quoted as saying he will frankly exchange views on the territorial dispute with Shevardnadze.

### South Korea Expected To Promote Democratization

OW231114588 Tokyo KYODO in English 0718 GMT  
23 Nov 88

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 23 KYODO—Japan expects South Korean President No Tae-u will promote democratization following his predecessor Chon Tu-hwan's apology Wednesday for corruption during his administration, government sources said Wednesday.

A top government official welcomed Chon's apology, saying No can now promote his own political programs.

Chon apologized to the nation in a statement for corruption and abuse of power allegedly committed by him and his relatives during his administration.

Chon said he will turn over his property to the state and left his residence in Seoul, reportedly to begin a life of seclusion.

A high-ranking Japanese Foreign Ministry official declined comment on Chon's apology, saying it is an internal affair in South Korea.

But the sources said Tokyo expects Chon's apology to satisfy most of the South Korean people and to put an end to the controversy surrounding him.

The sources said No is expected to promote and develop his democratization process in the future.

In the diplomatic field, No is expected to promote dialogue with North Korea and push his proposal for Korean peace talks involving South and North Korea, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan, the sources said.

**Role in Cambodia Issue Explained to Vietnam**  
*OW2611015088 Tokyo KYODO in English 0048 GMT*  
26 Nov 88

[Text] Bangkok, Nov. 26 KYODO—Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama said Friday he had explained to Vietnam that Japan would play an independent diplomatic role in helping to resolve the nine-year-old Kampuchean war.

He made the remark when briefing reporters here on his five-and-half-hour-long meeting with Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Trang Quang Co in Hanoi.

Kuriyama, who visited Vietnam for three days from last Wednesday, said he had told Co about Japan's diplomatic role in the Kampuchean problem.

Kuriyama, the first Japanese deputy foreign minister to visit the country since its unification in 1976, also said he had had talks with Co on bilateral relations between the two countries.

He returns to Japan from Bangkok Saturday.

**Pakistan, Bangladesh Visa Exemption To End**  
*OW2611053488 Tokyo KYODO in English 0502 GMT*  
26 Nov 88

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 26 KYODO—Japan will suspend a visa exemption for citizens of Pakistan and Bangladesh beginning next January due to the increasing number of those from the two countries who have illegally worked in Japan, government officials said Saturday.

The government has decided to temporarily suspend separate agreements between Japan and the two countries that visitors do not need visas for stays of up to three months which do not involve employment.

The visa exemption agreement between Japan and Pakistan took effect in January 1961 while the agreement between Japan and Bangladesh went into effect in August 1973.

A total of 12,214 Pakistanis visited Japan in 1987 and 10,637 of these were exempt from carrying a visa, while 5,854 Bangladeshis visited during the same year and all but 677 received the exemption, the officials said.

The government will make the measures public in mid-December and later notify the countries, which officials said have been dissatisfied with the Japanese move.

The Japanese Government has also urged its nationals to apply for visas before visiting either Pakistan or Bangladesh.

The officials said their move was caused by the increasing number of Pakistani and Bangladesh workers who visited Japan in the past couple of years to work illegally, due to the rising value of the yen against the dollar and the sluggish prices of crude oil.

Japanese immigration authorities have taken action against 905 Pakistani illegal workers in 1987, a 25-fold increase from 1985, and 438 Bangladeshis, up from only one in 1985, the officials said.

**GATT Panel Hears Timber Dispute With Canada**  
*OW2311083088 Tokyo KYODO in English 1456 GMT*  
22 Nov 88

[Text] Geneva, Nov. 22 KYODO—A dispute-settling panel of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) finished hearing submissions from Japan and Canada on Tuesday on their dispute concerning Japan's imposition of import duties on Canadian timber, GATT sources said.

The sources said the panel will draw up a statement of its findings and submit it to the GATT Council for final decision as early as next spring.

In the course of the panel's hearings, Canada insisted that Japan's 8 percent duties on some timber imported from Canada violate Article I of the GATT Regulations providing for most favored treatment among GATT member countries, as similar U.S. timber is imported by Japan tax-free.

But Japan countered by saying Canadian and U.S. timber, including pine trees, are different in kind and are used for different purposes.

#### **Electric Power Industry To Import U.S. Uranium**

*OW2311125488 Tokyo NHK General Television  
Network in Japanese 0300 GMT 20 Nov 88*

[Text] The electric power industry will import uranium concentrates for nuclear power generation from the United States for the first time when their present contracts with South Africa expire.

Regarding the import of uranium concentrates, used as fuel for nuclear power generation, the electric power corporations have decided to discontinue transactions with South Africa when their respective contracts expire. They are considering imports from the United States as replacement. As of this moment, the Tokyo, Kansai, Chubu, and Kyushu Power Corporations and the Japan Nuclear Power Corporation have decided on importing from the United States and are conducting negotiations for signing contracts before the year ends. The contracts involve purchase of 6,350 tons over a period of 10 years from 1990. This accounts for around 10 percent of the total volume used for nuclear power generation in Japan.

#### **Tokyo To Investigate Namibia Uranium Imports**

*OW2411094488 Tokyo KYODO in English 1342 GMT  
21 Nov 88*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 21 KYODO—The Tokyo Metropolitan Government will investigate the case of alleged uranium imports by Tokyo Electric Power Co. from Namibia, a metropolitan government official said Monday.

Tsuneatsu Ochi of the metropolitan government's Transportation Bureau made the statement when Metropolitan Assembly member Mariko Mitsui of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) raised the question at the assembly's special committee meeting on the account settlements of public firms.

Mitsui said that the metropolitan government had moral responsibility for the uranium imports from Namibia, now under South Africa's occupation, pointing out that the Transportation Bureau owns 3.2 percent of the stocks of Tokyo Electric Power.

Mitsui demanded that the metropolitan government request Tokyo Electric Power to submit records of their past and planned imports.

Ochi said that although he believed it was a problem for the central government to investigate, the metropolitan government would look into it as well. This is the first time a prefectural or municipal body has expressed its intention to investigate the case.

Trading of uranium from Namibia is prohibited by a United Nations decree in order to prevent the South African apartheid government from seizing Namibia's mineral resources. Namibia is presently under military occupation by South Africa. The Japanese Government has assented to the decree.

Five Japanese electric power companies announced on November 1 that they were cutting off all imports of uranium which may be from Namibia, following criticisms that the companies were allegedly importing Namibian uranium for their atomic energy plants.

Tokyo Electric Power, however, rejected requests to stop the uranium imports.

#### **Diet Approves Revision of Testimony Law**

*OW2111062188 Tokyo KYODO in English 0452 GMT  
21 Nov 88*

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 21 KYODO—The House of Councillors on Monday approved by an overwhelming majority a bill revising the Diet testimony law to strengthen protection of the rights of witnesses.

Only the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Niin Club voted against the bill, which was passed by the lower house, the House of Representatives, last Thursday.

The revised law will become effective in mid-December.

Under the revised bill, witnesses summoned to testify in the Diet will have the right to be accompanied by an attorney or other adviser, intimidatory or accusatory questioning will not be allowed, no televised broadcasts or photographing of the proceedings will be allowed during the questioning, and at least two-thirds of Diet members present must vote in favor of bringing charges of false testimony against a witness, against one-half under the present law.

The JCP opposed the provision against televising the proceedings, saying it infringed on the people's right to know what went on in the Diet.

This is the first revision of the Diet testimony law since it was enforced in December 1947.

The present bill has been criticized by members of both the ruling and opposition parties as lacking in measures to protect witnesses' basic human rights. Some people described questioning of witnesses under the present bill as being like a "kangaroo court."

The revised bill also provides for questioning witnesses in places other than the Diet when they have valid reasons for not being able to attend there.

The opposition parties other than the JCP and the Niin Club had strongly demanded the revision of the testimony bill, saying that summoning witnesses to the Diet was essential to solving the Recruit Cosmos stock scandal.

Although the new bill is not yet effective, a questioning session of witnesses in the lower house that began at 10 a.m. Monday was conducted in accordance with its provisions.

Monday's questioning of former Recruit Co. Chairman Hiromasa Ezoe and of two former high government officials was not televised, although a radio broadcast was allowed.

**\* Liberal-Socialist Forum's Foresight Noted**

41050015 Tokyo ZAIKAI in Japanese  
27 Sep 88 pp 122-123

[Text] The Liberal-Socialist Forum is one of several political groups within the LDP. Political groups like the Onchi Club, represented by Michio Watanabe, and the Shinsei Club, chaired by Takao Funjinami, are organized around new leaders and aim to become factions in the future. In contrast to these groups, the Liberal-Socialist Forum is a genuine policy study committee. The forum's representative, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Takujiro Haneda, is but 46 and has only been elected to the Diet three times. Most of the 17 members are also young, having been elected but two or three times.

This small group has attracted the attention of the LDP as well as a section of the financial world. When the group was formed 6 years ago as the Liberal Economic Promotion Organization, the LDP considered it simply a group of like-minded members. Today, however, the forum has a research facility on the eighth floor of a building located at the rear of the Diet, it includes a conference room, and a staff of about 10 full time researchers, including Americans who are graduates of Harvard University. Each year it publishes timely policy proposals. The current large factions, the Takeshita, Nakasone, Abe, and Miyazawa factions, are also officially known as policy factions, but none of these have their own independent research staff.

In the past the Liberal-Socialist Forum published proposals related to financial reconstruction, pension reform, and Asian policy. Its recent "Plan for a Green Japan" has attracted the attention of large general construction companies, the real estate industry, and various leisure-oriented industries.

Haneda explains: "Four years ago when Miyazawa announced his asset doubling plan, there were few people calling for progressive financing, and few factions

that thought Japan's resources should be given important consideration, or that attention should be turned to the quality of life. Today, however, a national consensus exists behind these ideas. The "Plan for a Green Japan" is a multifaceted extension of this. First, Japan is being forced to change its industrial structure both internationally and domestically. We must determine how to build up the status of the Japanese archipelago in conjunction with the development of the entire country. Second, the people are demanding a higher quality of life and are becoming more leisure and health oriented. Furthermore, although Japan has come so far economically, it still is not a world center for conventions. In the United States, on the other hand, the convention industry has grown into a Y40 trillion industry."

Haneda and his group have responded with sensitivity to the demands of this age. They established a Large-Scale Resort Construction Promotion Association within the LDP. Chief Secretary Kobuchi Keizo was appointed chairman, and Haneda was installed as secretary general. Last year the Comprehensive Health Resort Area Maintenance Law (the Resort Law) was implemented and in July basic plans for resorts in Fukushima, Mie, and Miyazaki Prefectures were approved. Under this law these areas can obtain favorable tax and financial measures; regulations are to be eased; and the maintenance of the infrastructure (roads, transportation, harbor facilities, and so forth) is to be prioritized.

Haneda, however, has expressed dissatisfaction with this resort law, which he considers to be inadequate. "Although the basic plans have been approved, the resort law is nothing more than an expression of the desire to promote investment. It is purposed to put specifics into this plan. Our proposal considers project budget plans, self-governing bodies, project directions, and concrete policies for procuring finances. This is probably what has attracted the attention of various industries."

Under the current system when the public works system's total budget increases, operation costs end up being divided because of the fixed distribution system. Consequently, despite the resort law, when estimates are received for a resort, development of the infrastructure in the area must be dealt with in the annual plan of each respective government agency that has jurisdiction over some aspect of the infrastructure. Thus, the Ministry of Construction deals with roads, and the Ministry of Transportation with harbors. This makes it very difficult for the concerned area to promote simultaneous development.

This proposal demands that the budget system be reconsidered, and that infrastructure maintenance be determined by area rather than by item. Furthermore, the proposal calls for revision of fiscal laws in the long term, changing of the general accounting system from a fiscal year base to a strategic base, and the development of a budget system that makes continuous public works investment possible.

Furthermore, the proposal suggests that profits that come from resort development be reinvested by the self-governing body. This kind of circulatory system is necessary to assure continuous development in the area. The proposal also demands that special taxes be levied on industries that use the resort area and a room tax be placed on hotel rooms as is done in British Columbia and Nevada. Money from these taxes can be used for basic area maintenance. In addition the proposal demands that the self-governing body and project directors be given the right to issue area use dividend debentures.

Until now resort area maintenance plans have been limited to the prefectural level, but larger development plans that span several prefectures are necessary. Because there is no central coordination window for the various ministries, the proposal also demands that a resort bureau be established within the National Planning Agency.

The proposal also urges that complete resort transportation networks be established by building resort airports, maintaining highways and rest-area facilities, installing a seasonal transportation cost system, and developing and making use of a system that should help alleviate disorder and even out resort usage. Furthermore, the proposal suggests that the current housing development guideline and the regulations on the construction of facilities within the park be relaxed.

According to Haneda: "The model for this proposal was the system used to develop the large French health resort, Languedoc Roussillon. The 'third sector,' which was composed of cooperative public and private ventures, was given the right to collect taxes and to issue debentures. Through centralized investment and efficient development 8 cities of 100,000 inhabitants were built in a 200 kilometer stretch along the coast of southern France.

"In Japan the only real health resorts are in Karuizawa and Hakone. Therefore, everyone tends to congregate there, and this leads to overcrowding and high costs. It would be good if resorts were also constructed along the Seto Inner Sea, in Hokkaido, and in the Tohoku region.

"Because the idea is to accommodate long-term stays, a single house in the mountains is insufficient, no matter how pleasant the environment may be. The purpose of the proposal is to encourage the building of resorts with areas set aside for amusement parks, simple pleasures, shopping, and good restaurants."

Older Diet members are taking their hats off to this young group, which is currently preparing new agriculture and national strategy proposals. The Liberal-Socialist Forum represents a new current in the LDP and will be something to watch in the future.

## North Korea

### MAC Security Officers Meet in Panmunjom

SK2811153888 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
1528 GMT 28 Nov 88

[Text] Kaesong November 28 (KCNA)—A meeting of the security officers of the Military Armistice Commission was held on the spot at Panmunjom today.

At the meeting, our side lodged a strong protest with the enemy side and called it to task for the fact that the U.S. imperialist aggressors were making the situation in the Panmunjom meeting hall area strained by throwing a stone at our side there.

According to the security officer of our side, at around 18 hrs 25 min. November 27, a jeep of the U.S. imperialist aggression troops pulled into the eastern part of the meeting hall area and a guard of the U.S. imperialist aggression army who put a heavy oil can on the jeep, glared at our side's post several times before committing the grave provocative act of picking up a stone and throwing it at a guard of our side on his routine duty.

The security officer of our side showed to the enemy side the stone thrown by the soldier of the U.S. imperialist aggression army and said that such provocation would only cause confrontation and conflict between the two sides.

Sternly protesting against the grave provocative act committed by the U.S. imperialist aggressors in crude violation of the armistice agreement and the agreed points between the two sides, the security officer of our side strongly demanded it to severely punish the provocateur and take a responsible measure so that such provocation would not be committed again.

The enemy side, however, refused to comply with our demand to stop provocative acts with unreasonable subterfuge.

Saying it was ill-boding for the enemy side to commit provocations unceasingly at a time when the secretaries of the two sides were discussing the question of guaranteeing the security in the joint security area, the security officer of our side sternly warned that if the U.S. imperialist aggressors again committed a provocation against us in the area, we would take a proper countermeasure.

### Daily Calls for U.S. Troops Pullout From South

SK2511151688 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
1506 GMT 25 Nov 88

[Text] Pyongyang November 25 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today comes out with a signed article titled "U.S. Troops Pullout From South Korea is Urgent Demand of Times."

The paper says:

It is now an irresistible demand of the times to withdraw imperialist aggression troops from the territories of other countries.

Nevertheless, the U.S. imperialists, going against this demand, are trying to perpetuate their military occupation of South Korea, far from intending to withdraw their aggression forces.

This is an open challenge to the world people who are calling for the U.S. troops' pullout from South Korea for the sake of peace in Korea and her peaceful reunification and for peace in Asia and the rest of the world.

At present, the U.S. imperialists are further consolidating the fascist dictatorial rule of the traitor No Tae-u under the cloak of "democracy" and, on this basis, they are zealously urging their puppets on to the "two Koreas" plot and moves to provoke a war.

The presence of the U.S. imperialists in South Korea is the root cause of the colonial rule forced upon the people in violation of the sovereignty of the nation in South Korea and the main obstacle in the way of the struggle of the South Korean people for independence, democracy and reunification and the main factor of the aggravation of tensions and increase of the danger of war on the Korean peninsula.

In South Korea, almost every day, students and people of all strata are waging anti-U.S. rallies and demonstrations demanding the unconditional withdrawal of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces from South Korea. They attack the "U.S. Cultural Centres" under the slogan "Drive out the U.S. troops".

All this tells that the call for the U.S. troops pullout is becoming an irresistible trend of the times.

There is no ground for the U.S. imperialists to keep South Korea under its occupation.

**Peace Proposal Supported by U.S. Group**  
*SK2611151688 Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
1502 GMT 26 Nov 88

[Text] Pyongyang November 26 (KCNA)—The U.S. Get Out of Korea Committee in New York made public a statement on November 20 supporting the comprehensive peace overture set forth at the joint meeting of the Central People's Committee, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly and the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, according to a report.

It says:

As long as the U.S. forces over 40,000 strong and more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons are present in the South of Korea, the Korean nation cannot be reunified. The U.S. Get Out of Korea Committee fully favours the

communique of the joint meeting November 7 which said the danger of war exists as long as U.S. imperialism occupies a part of the Korean peninsula by force of arms and the Korean nation cannot be reunified as long as the danger of war exists and supports the reasonable overture put forward by the joint meeting, such as proposals for the phased withdrawal of the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons, the phased reduction of the armed forces in the North and the ultimate information and verification of the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the arms reduction in the North and the South, tripartite talks involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States of America and South Korea, the participation of the member nations of the neutral nations supervisory commission in tripartite talks as observers, and the proposal for easing the present political and military confrontation between the North and the South.

Considering that this overture is reasonable and just and will enjoy strong support of people who love peace and justice in the world, the committee condemns U.S. imperialism and its Seoul puppet regime as war fanatics and cruel exploiters.

The U.S. Get Out of Korea Committee will continue to struggle to make U.S. imperialism withdraw its troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea and support the Korean people's struggle for the reunification of the country.

**Seoul Students, Monks Denounce Chon 'Apology'**  
*SK2611051888 Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
0451 GMT 26 Nov 88

[Text] Pyongyang November 26 (KCNA)—Some 2,000 students from over 10 universities and colleges in Seoul under the Seoul District Federation of General Student Councils (Sochongryon) staged an anti-U.S., anti-"government" rally and demonstration on November 25 in denunciation of the deceptive "apology statement" of the traitor Chon Tu-hwan and in demand of his arrest and punishment, according to reports.

They gathered first at the plaza of Tongguk University and held a meeting urging the decisive check of the political suppression by the fascist clique, arrest of the Chon Tu-hwan and his wife and the resignation of the present "regime".

They branded Chon's "apology statement" as a deceptive drama to equivocate his 8-year tyranny and the massacre of Kwangju citizens and ridicule the people and strongly demanded that the Chon couple be arrested and punished forthwith in order to brighten the spirit of the nation.

The students demanded the punishment of the traitor No Tae-u, denouncing his treacherous crimes in backing the traitor Chon Tu-hwan and indulging in fraud and corruption.

They also demanded that the No Tae-u "regime" resign promptly and, at the same time, urged the opposition parties to discard their compromising attitude and side with the national struggle for democratic politics.

Amid the cheers of the crowds, they burnt an effigy of the traitor No Tae-u.

At the end of the rally, they went over to a street demonstration, holding a placard and shouting "Arrest Chon Tu-hwan," "punish No Tae-u" and "Yankee go home."

Dismayed at this, thousand of riot police fired tear gas canisters at the protesters to stop their demonstration.

Enraged protesters continued their struggle valiantly for one and half hours, hurling stones at the police.

When the students were fiercely clashing with the riot police, Buddhist monks in Seoul joined the demonstration.

The monks said that the fleeing of the traitor Chon Tu-hwan to the temple in the deep mountain on the east coast is an insult to the holy land and shouted in high spirits that the traitor must be expelled from the temple.

**Article Terms No's UN Speech 'Flunkeyist'**  
*SK2511152488 Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
1512 GMT 25 Nov 88

[Text] Pyongyang November 25 (KCNA)—The October 30 issue of "CHUNGDAE SINMUN," the gazette published at Chungang University in South Korea, came out with an article entitled "Estimation of No Tae-u's Speech at the United Nations—'Cross Recognition' Based on 'Northern Diplomacy' is Conception of Flunkeyist Treachery."

The paper said that No's "speech" is, in the final analysis, a stratagem aimed at permanent division and we may regard it as the second-stage move following the single-hosted Olympic games.

Stressing that one must have the independent consciousness that all problems of a nation should be resolved by its members, the gazette deplored: "No Tae-u manipulated by the United States is going to put our nation on a chopping board and completely cut it into halves."

As regards the "proposal on construction plan of a peace town," it is a far cry to the essential kernel of the reunification problem, the gazette said, and continued:

Those who had all along walked sideways in dealing with the reunification of the nation over the past 40 years are again evading the essence of the matters, meanly behaving to confine efforts for practically achieving reunification to such sentimental dimensions as mutual visits of separated families or the construction of a "peace town" in the Demilitarized Zone.

How is it possible to build a "peace town" when the "National Security Law" is in force?

Branding the traitor No Tae-u's "proposal for North-South summit talks" as one for propaganda effect, the gazette further said:

It is no more than a castle in the air when there is no clear expression of the will to carry into practice the preconditions of reunification which had been called for by the North.

And a look at the "proposal for Northeast Asian peace consultative meeting" draws one's attention to the feeble independent consciousness to resolve the question of national reunification independently and a typical form of flunkeyism and treachery. As had been presumed, we can get a glimpse of an intention to create "two Koreas" unhindered through "cross recognition" with the "success" of the "northern policy."

**Papers View Revelations on South Press Merger**  
*SK2611100788 Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
1002 GMT 26 Nov 88

["Criminal Cannot Conceal His Traces"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang November 26 (KCNA)—Papers here today comment on the disclosure of the fact that the puppet security command played the main role in the "forcible dismissal of pressmen and merger and closure of press organs" which was forced by the traitor Chon Tu-hwan in 1980.

This indicates that this case in question was conceived and carried into practice by the puppet security planning board and "security command" on the instructions of the traitor Chon Tu-hwan, NODONG SINMUN says, and goes on:

When it is taken into account that the traitor No Tae-u was the puppet security commander, it is plain that the case was a co-product of Chon Tu-hwan and No Tae-u.

The traitor Chon Tu-hwan and the No Tae-u group dismissed en masse pressmen who went against the grain with them, or threw them behind bars and reduced many press organs to waiting maids of fascism.

Now it is publicly recognized that they are fascist tyrants and political gangsters with no equal in the world.

The No Tae-u group must apologize for its indelible crimes which it committed in conspiracy with the traitor Chon Tu-hwan and face judgment by history as demanded by the people. A signed commentary of MINJU CHOSON says that the crime of the traitor No Tae-u in directly involving himself in the merger and

closure of press organs and forcible dismissal of pressmen whereby to blindfold the people and stuff their ears and mouths can never be pardoned.

**O Chin-u Meets, Fetes Outgoing Cuban Envoy**  
*SK2411043788 Pyongyang KCNA in English*  
*0423 GMT 24 Nov 88*

[Text] Pyongyang November 24 (KCNA)—O Chin-u, minister of People's Armed Forces, met and conversed with Cuban Ambassador to Korea Ricardo Danza Sigas, who paid a farewell call on him on November 23.

O Chin-u arranged a dinner for the ambassador in the evening.

**SKNDF Denounces No Statement on Chon**  
*SK2811111588 (Clandestine) Voice of National*  
*Salvation in Korean to South Korea 0300 GMT*  
*27 Nov 88*

[“Full text” of the SKNDF spokesman's 26 November statement—read by Announcer]

[Text] In a so-called special statement to cope with the recent political situation, No Tae-u announced today follow-up measures on Chon Tu-hwan's statement of apology. His follow-up measures are nothing but a fraud concocted beforehand together with Chon Tu-hwan's house in Yonhui-dong in a bid to grant a political pardon to him and to patch up the crisis in the military rule. In his special statement, No Tae-u declared a political pardon for Chon Tu-hwan, babbling that dragging a former president, who has already stepped down, into court is an act of political retaliation and announced so-called five-point follow-up measures, including the release of those detained for political reasons and large-scale reorganization of the ruling party and the cabinet.

This is a scheme for appeasement designed not only to cool off and dampen the mounting anger and indignation of the people against the irregularities of the Fifth Republic and their struggle for democratization, but also to patch up the crisis in the military rule of the Sixth Republic. Therefore, it is a revision of the deceptive 29 June declaration. Such a fraudulent drama by the No Tae-u ring is an intolerable insult to our people's struggle to reveal and punish the irregularities of the Fifth Republic and an unpardonable challenge to their struggle for democratization.

As has already been recognized among the people, democratization in South Korea cannot be achieved without investigating into and punishing the irregularities of the Fifth Republic. Because these evils are left as they are without uprooting them, the regime of the Kwangju murderer has emerged again and military rule still continues.

To liquidate the legacies of the Fifth Republic, it is imperative to arrest and detain the main culprit of the republic and to bring him before the justice of the people. Without such measures, a new start for democratization cannot be expected. This is why our people have strongly called for arresting and punishing Chon Tu-hwan and his wife first in their struggle to liquidate the legacies of the Fifth Republic.

This notwithstanding, the No Tae-u ring enticed Chon Tu-hwan away after having him briefly stand on the stage of apology while babbling that arresting and detaining the former president is undesirable for future interests, would create more misfortune, and the like. Thus, it patronized and stood by Chon Tu-hwan. This is indeed a surprising act of betrayal of the people. Chon Tu-hwan did not leave, giving up everything. His departure is nothing but an escape leaving all his evils and irregularities untouched. Therefore, arresting and detaining him for legal punishment would not become a factor creating more misfortune, but allowing him to get off without imposing legal punishment is precisely a factor that will create misfortune.

That No Tae-u is desperately running wild to grant a pardon to the criminal while disregarding this patent truth is because he himself is the same dictator as Chon Tu-hwan, he was an accomplice who perpetrated the irregularities of the Fifth Republic and the Kwangju massacre, and he is the heir of the Fifth Republic.

The so-called follow-up measure that the No Tae-u ring announced this time is not a measure to sever itself from the Fifth Republic but is nothing but a trick designed to hide the concealed circumstances which are closely related to the Fifth Republic and to maintain the vicious corruption and irregularities of the republic as they are. No Tae-u's so-called follow-up measures, including the issue of releasing detainees and revising the evil laws, are a version of the 29 June declaration that he already pledged before the people. Therefore, the follow-up measures should have already been implemented. Nevertheless, No Tae-u has failed to implement any of these follow-up measures, and, rather, has delayed implementing them. However, in the face of the renewed crisis in his power, this time No Tae-u tried to patch things up with so-called follow-up measures. This is an act of mockery and deception of our people.

The problem of releasing detainees and revising the evil laws should be implemented unconditionally. Therefore, it cannot become the object of a bargain to grant a political pardon to Chon Tu-hwan, the main culprit of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic, under any circumstances. The No Tae-u ring is also attempting to use the follow-up measures as a (cornerstone) in reorganizing and further strengthening the foundation of military rule through deceptive reformation and reorganization of the party and the government. Therefore, the follow-up measures are by no means measures for democratization.

Furthermore, in his statement No Tae-u openly laid bare to the world his wicked maneuvers to brand the struggle of youths, students, and the masses of workers and farmers against the military rule and for genuine democratic politics as an act of radical elements and to destroy them one by one. This shows that as long as we leave the No Tae-u ring alone we cannot liquidate the legacies of the Fifth Republic nor can we achieve democratic politics.

Our people have been deceived by No Tae-u's deceptive pledges so often. The No Tae-u ring frustrated our people's June struggle with the deceptive 29 June declaration, and, thus, blocked their struggle for establishing a civilian government. The No Tae-u ring has entered the road of seeking the two-Koreas policy by brutally suppressing our students' struggle for North-South student talks on 10 June and 15 August and by announcing the deceptive 7 July declaration. No Tae-u's special statement issued this time is a smear scheme designed to frustrate the people's struggle to liquidate the legacies of the Fifth Republic and to achieve the cause of the June struggle.

If our people retreat from their struggle after being deluded by the deceptive follow-up measures of the No Tae-u ring, the poisonous weed will revive, the vicious military rule will continue infinitely, and our masses will become the victims of this. The struggle that we have started should be fought to the end. Our people will struggle against the No Tae-u ring to the end and will liquidate the evils of the Fifth Republic.

The irregularities of the Fifth Republic and the truth of the Kwangju massacre should not be concealed and the criminals should not be tolerated. Chon Tu-hwan, the main culprit of the irregularities of the Fifth Republic and the Kwangju massacre should be punished by law unconditionally, and No Tae-u, an accomplice, should also step down from power and receive the people's justice.

[Dated] 26 November 1988

### South Korea

#### Special Amnesty for 200 Political Prisoners

SK2911012088 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English  
29 Nov 88 p 3

[Text] A total of about 200 political prisoners will be released and about 800 people will have their civil rights restored under a sweeping amnesty the government plans to announce shortly.

The Justice Ministry has started the classification of prisoners since President No Tae-u announced the government plan to pardon all those who were imprisoned for anti-government activities in a special statement on Nov. 26.

According to the ministry sources, such famous dissidents as Chang Ki-pyo, Kim Hyon-chang and Mun Pu-sik will be released under the special amnesty.

Chang Ki-pyo, former staff member of "Mintongyon," the now defunct dissident organization, was imprisoned in connection with the so-called "Inchon Riot" on May 3, 1986, while Kim and Mun were arrested for their leading roles in the seizure of the U.S. Cultural Center in Pusan in 1985.

Pak Chong-yol, convicted for the "Anti-Imperialist League" case, and Choe Min and Yun Song-ku, both imprisoned for involvement in the "Constitutional Assembly Group" case, will also be included in the list of political prisoners to be freed soon, the ministry sources said.

Kwon Yong-mok, former leader of the labor unions affiliated with Hyundai business group, will be released too, according to the sources.

About 30 Korean residents in Japan, serving prison terms on spying charges, will also benefit from the grand amnesty, it was learned.

As for the 230 people whose cases are still pending at courts, the Justice Ministry plans to ask the judiciary to take the necessary steps in order to have them released on stay of execution.

At the same time, the prosecution was ordered to withhold indictment of those who were arrested in connection with anti-government activities in the past.

According to the sources, big names subject to civil rights restoration this time are Kim Kun-tae, former chairman of "Minchongnyon," Yi Tae-pok, Yi Pu-yong, Yi Sin-pom, Kim Ok-tu, Han Hwa-gap, Chang Yong-tal, Pak Mun-sik and Mun Yong-sik. In addition, the government will restore civil rights of about 800 people, the sources said.

The sources said that the announcement of the amnesty will be made around mid-December, adding that the scale of the special pardon will be "most extensive."

After the special amnesty, subsequent measures will be taken for the restoration of civil rights of those to be released this time, the sources said.

Meanwhile, it was learned that the judiciary is preparing several steps on its own in step with the upcoming special amnesty.

A high-ranking court official reportedly said that the courts will cooperate in taking lenient steps for the political prisoners in the face of the "era of reconciliation."

**Yonsei Conducts Opinion Poll on North Korea**  
*SK2911070288 Seoul YONHAP in English*  
0648 GMT 29 Nov 88

[By Chae Sung-hui]

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 29 (YONHAP)—A majority of South Koreans say there is a need to unify the Korean peninsula while also expressing reluctance toward accepting North Korea's long-held proposal for a "Koryo confederal republic" as an interim step before unification, a university opinion survey team here said Tuesday.

Prof. Choe Pyong-kil of Yonsei University's Government Administration Department and his survey team also said, while revealing the results of an opinion poll conducted last July among 3,000 people across the country, that more than half of the South Korean people hold an optimistic view about the prospects of reunification of the divided country.

The opinion poll was commissioned by the National Unification Board, a government agency concerned with inter-Korea policies, while the respondents were selected from among those who are known to be opinion-makers in all walks of society.

As for the necessity of unification, the survey found that 81.6 percent of the respondents felt that unification must be achieved and 14.9 percent said it would be good for South and North Korea to reunite.

On the other hand, 1.6 percent said that unification would damage the situation on the peninsula while 1.4 percent said unification is unnecessary. A scanty percentage of the respondents, 0.4 percent, said they feel unification has nothing to do with them.

When asked what benefits unification would bring to the Korean peninsula, 48.9 percent replied "Korean people's progress and prosperity," 25 percent said "restoration of the Korean people's homogeneity," 18.4 percent "achievement of a state of one national identity," 6.1 percent "liquidation of the fear of war," and 1.5 percent "reunion of separated families."

Noteworthy here is that younger respondents showed a tendency to answer "restoration of the Korean people's homogeneity" while respondents 50 years or older were inclined to answer "liquidation of the fear of war."

On the likelihood of reunification, 52.4 percent said that it can be achieved if both sides of the peninsula seek it while 8.3 percent said that unification would be achieved in the not too distant future. On the other hand, 13.6 percent replied that achieving unification would be "slightly difficult," 24.1 percent said "very difficult" and 1.6 percent replied "impossible." On this topic, respondents with a higher educational background tended to show negative views.

Asked to assess the positiveness of the two Koreas' respective efforts for unification, 36.4 percent said South Korea's efforts were more positive while 10.7 percent said the northern side's efforts were more positive. However, nearly half or 48.9 percent said the efforts of both Koreas are all negative.

As for the major factor hampering Korea's unification, 23.1 percent pointed to "ideological confrontation," 22.8 percent the "conflicts of interests of such world powers as the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan," and 19.2 percent the "mutual distrust between the two Koreas." Respondents in their 20s, students and politicians were more inclined to put the blame on the "conflicts of interests of the world powers."

More than half or 56.1 percent of the respondents said they have an impression that North Korea must be a "closed society devoid of basic human rights" while 26.5 percent said North Korea may be a developing country which places emphasis on economic development.

When asked to compare the national strengths of the two Koreas, 67.3 percent said South Korea was superior.

As for Pyongyang's proposal for a "Koryo (Korea) confederate republic," 41 percent said they regard it as a "propagandistic proposal." About 24.6 percent said the South should refuse the proposal since it imposes some preconditions. However, 24.6 percent held the view that the South should accept a revised version of the proposal.

The concept of a "Koryo confederation," which Pyongyang has long held as an initial step toward reunification of the Korean peninsula, features the idea that the South and the North become two autonomous states under one confederation and retain their respective political and economic systems.

Of those surveyed, 83 percent favored "gradual reunification through mutual exchanges and cooperation" as a procedure for unification of the peninsula. A mere 7.6 percent called for the establishment of a confederal government and 6 percent favored the idea of holding a free South-North general election.

As for student activists' attempt to hold talks with their North Korean counterparts, 41.5 percent called it "unrealistic" while 27.3 percent labeled it a "perilous idea." About 48.9 percent replied that North Korea is reluctant to accept meaningful South-North talks seemingly out of fear that the talks might trigger a violent change inside its establishment.

More than half of the respondents, 63.6 percent, said they would not flee from their present responsibilities even if another Korean war breaks out.

About 90 percent expressed a negative assessment toward the actual performance of communist countries.

More than nine out of every 10 people, 91.5 percent, favored the idea that U.S. forces should remain stationed in Korea, or even if circumstances demand their withdrawal, that such a pullout should be conducted on a gradual basis.

**\* HANGYORE Criticizes No Tae-u's UN Speech**  
*41070022 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean*  
*10 Oct 88 p 6*

[Editorial: "Secure Domestic Peace Before International Peace—Duality of President No's UN Address"]

[Text] President No Tae-u's 18 October UN General Assembly speech was a laudable first-time UN address delivered by an ROK head of state. It is of great significance that this speech was the first one made in the 13 years since the UN General Assembly passed the 1975 resolution calling for the "dissolution of the UN Command." This resolution was passed after successive annual debates on the issue of the Korean peninsula, and was sponsored by countries siding with North Korea.

President No Tae-u's speech came at a time when Korea is basking in favorable conditions, such as the successful staging of the Olympiad, the expansion of exchanges with the socialist camp, and the improvement of the economic position of the South. Viewed separately, or as a whole, there are both positive and negative aspects in the speech proposals. To see the reaction of North Korea, the other party directly concerned, we must wait for an upcoming speech by the North Korean representative. However, as far as our people are concerned, President No's speech needs both a coolheaded and a fair appraisal.

We appreciate the fact that President No clearly declared that the South will shift its stance from the hitherto bellicose posture of placing primary emphasis on military power to a line oriented toward peace. This means a reorientation of the military philosophy toward peace, and this is evident from that part of his speech that stressed the readiness to adopt a declaration renouncing the use of arms and which pledged nonaggression. He said, "We clearly declare that we will never use the force of arms first against the North," and this statement in particular constitutes an international pledge which he is obligated on to honor from now. He expressed his willingness to work for "national harmony." Compared with this basic line, some of his new proposals like one calling for the creation of "a peace city inside the DMZ" are nothing more than cosmetic.

On the other hand, his speech includes some elements which cast a doubt on his real intentions. Profession of a readiness to sign a peace treaty is welcome, but it is not clear whether the proposed treaty is based on Article 60 of the armistice agreement or whether it will be concluded through "6-nation talks" without regard to this agreement. If his proposal for a "Northeast Asian peace conference" is an idea in agreement with the Gorbachev overture, the call for peace on the Korean peninsula

based on this treaty is interpreted as an intention either to shun or circumvent the obligations required by the armistice agreement. President No's attitude on this question is not clear.

It is impossible to solve military problems between the North and the South, such as those of reducing the military strength and adopting a declaration of nonaggression, unless the present system based on the military relationship between South Korea and the United States is revamped. It will be difficult to allay the suspicions of North Korea without making concrete statements in reference to the U.S. operational control of the ROK forces, the continued stationing of U.S. forces, and the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is an open question how much persuasive power will be evident in expressions of peaceful intentions to the North, while keeping intact the unlimited U.S. right to use the territorial land, airspace, and waters of South Korea for military purposes for an indefinite period of time as stipulated in Article 4 of the "ROK-U.S. Defense Treaty."

But the most important question is: Is it really meaningful to express an intention of peaceful reunification to the outside world while keeping behind bars in the ROK those prisoners of conscience who demand peace, reunification, and democracy and who oppose war?

To make his speech sound convincing to North Korea and the world, President No should first take steps to repeal the State Security Law, a notoriously undemocratic law, and release prisoners of conscience.

**\* History of Presence of U.S. Troops**  
*41070020 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean*  
*10, 12, 13, 14, 15 Oct 88*

[10 October 88 p 5]

[Article by reporter Ko Sung-u]

[Text] The American troops stationed in Korea have been an important part in the Korea-U.S. relationship during the past 40-odd years. They have had an influence on Korean society as a whole.

Through the Korean war, the U.S. forces came to hold the operational control over the Korean Armed Forces. And through the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, they have been guaranteed the exceptional privileges unprecedented in the history of foreign troops stationed anywhere.

Since the early eighties, especially since the Kwangju incident, the U.S. troops in Korea seem to be losing the absolute "confidence" they have long enjoyed in Korea. Anti-American feelings have risen, and the Korea-U.S. trade friction is causing the anti-American movement to spread even further. Koreans have strongly demanded limits on the U.S. troops' privileges in Korea.

In some quarters of the opposition and campuses, they have shown deep interest and concern about nuclear weapons held by the U.S. Forces in Korea and the question regarding relocation of U.S. military bases. Some have even attempted to produce some concrete measures for solution. It appears that the issue concerning the U.S. troops in Korea may emerge as the major dispute.

The operational control over the Korean Army was turned over by President Syngman Rhee to General Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander of the Allied Powers in July 1950. With the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty in October 1953, it was possible for the U.S. forces to carry nuclear weapons into this country and build military bases in Korea.

The operational command on the Korean Armed Forces was partially revised following the 16 May coup d'etat in 1961. The operational control of the United Nations Command was taken from the Korean units "which took part in the coup."

The public belief that the United States played a role in the "Kwangju uprising" triggered anti-American feelings. With U.S. trade pressure on Korea and Gen Wickham's remarks about "lemmings," anti-Americanism spread widely.

The United States expressed its intention to review the problems either by turning back the operational control to Korea or by withdrawing U.S. troops from Korea. However, those who ruled Korea, refrained from discussing the matter, saying, "If that should happen, there will be the possibility of war because Korean security will be endangered."

[12 Oct 88 p 5]

[Article by reporter Yun Sok-in]

[Text] With the rapidly changing situation surrounding the Korean peninsula in the eighties and the increasing popular awareness of national independence, the U.S. troop withdrawal and operational control over the Korean Armed Forces have surfaced as major pending political issues between the two nations.

There have been frequent remarks made by ranking U.S. Administration officials concerning the question of withdrawing American troops from Korea. The question of operational control was put on the agenda of the 20th Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting held in Seoul last June. Recently, the question regarding operational control over the 20th Division, which moved to Kwangju in May 1980, again emerged as a political issue.

On 7 October, Defense Minister O Cha-pok testified at the National Assembly to the effect that the 20th Division at that time was under the operational control of the Korean Armed Forces. At that time, the 20th Division

belonged to the Capital Area Army Command. The experts generally pointed out that since the Capital Area Army Command is structured as part of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), the 20th Division should be regarded as being under the CFC's operational control, as a matter of course.

At any rate, the units of the Korean Armed Forces which currently belong to the CFC are all placed directly under the operational control of the commander in chief of the CFC, the post which is supposed to be filled by the Commanding General of the U.S. Forces in Korea. Since the commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea receives the "strategic directives" from the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, it may be said that the Korean Armed Forces are placed under the operational command and control of the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command.

In reality, the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command is supposed to belong to the CFC Military Committee, consisting of five members including the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the two countries, and commander in chief of the CFC. Viewed among the strategic systems, he has the operational command and control authority over all units which belong to the CFC.

With the inauguration of the CFC on 7 November 1978, operational control, which had been solely exercised by the UNC (concurrently assumed by the commander in chief of the U.S. Forces in Korea), was transferred to the CFC jointly formed by the Korean Armed Forces and the U.S. forces.

Concerning this problem, Mr Kim Chae-hun, director of the Hangyore Social Affairs Research Institute, pointed out that the CFC was inaugurated "in order to positively respond to the 1969 Nixon doctrine, the 1971 withdrawal of the U.S. 7th Division under the doctrine, and the 1974 UN General Assembly's resolution on disbanding of the UN forces." Kim says that "The operational control is actually held by the commander in chief of the U.S. Forces in Korea, who is supposed to concurrently assume the post of CFC commander in chief and UNC commander."

Whether the 2d Army and special units such as the Capital Defense Command and the Special Forces Command are excluded from the CFC organization, Kim had this to say: "As long as the Korean chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff participates in the CFC Military Committee, there will be no other way but for his independent operational control to be restricted. Generally speaking, we should regard all operational control as belonging to the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command."

The U.S. Government has reportedly reviewed the possibility of turning over operational control to the Korean Armed Forces "during normal times" but keeping control "in war time," because of the spread of anti-Americanism which has begun to grow in Korea. Secretary of State George Shultz and other ranking U.S.

officials, however, have been negative about this and link it with the question of American troop withdrawals. It remains to be seen how it will develop.

[13 Oct 88 p 5]

[Article by reporter Ko Sung-u]

[Text] Today, American forces in Korea play the military role needed in securing and increasing the U.S. political and economic interests in Northeast Asia. They are among the key forces carrying on the U.S. strategy against the Soviet Union in this region. Disregarding the mood of detente promoted between the United States and the Soviet Union last year, the American troops in Korea show a trend toward restraint of their striking power against North Korea and the Soviet Union.

The U.S. forces in Korea are an important part of the defense system against the Soviet Union, established in cooperation with Japan, and the PRC. They also have the complex function of restrain and adjusting the military power of Japan and the PRC so that it is in accord with the U.S. interests.

The U.S. regards the strategic value of Korea as being a vital area on which U.S. interests depend, and has placed the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force in a position to defend Korea. At one point, the United States mentioned that it would not hesitate to become involved in a nuclear war to protect its interests (according to minutes No 11 of the 125th plenary session of the National Assembly). Therefore, the objective value of the American troops in Korea is indirectly verified.

Both the Korean and U.S. Governments have chiefly emphasized the role of the American troops in Korea as a deterrent force on the Korean peninsula. But in the U.S. Congress late last May, the strategic value of the U.S. forces in Korea was evaluated. Commander in Chief Menetrey of the U.S. Forces in Korea testified, at the U.S. Senate hearings of the Subcommittee on Military Affairs and at the Appropriations Committee on the defense of the Pacific coasts, that "The American forces in Korea are maintained to contribute to the security of the Republic of Korea and for the national interests and security of the United States."

At the Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting held in Seoul last June, the continued stationing of American troops in Korea was emphasized, along with the following points: namely, the strengthening of the early warning and monitoring systems and the stockpiling of up-to-date weapons in order to be prepared against any war provocations. On 2 October, Admiral Hays, newly appointed commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command declared that the United States will continue to maintain its strong Pacific military strength, despite the Soviet call for reduction of forces.

Following the effectuation of the INF abolition treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, the question of withdrawing American troops from Korea was raised both at home and abroad. At a seminar held in Seoul in September, under the cosponsorship of the Korea Institute of Defense Strategies, the Ministry of National Defense, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which is run by a conservative group in the United States, a theory of withdrawing American troops and nuclear weapons from Korea was mentioned.

The Soviet Union has recently launched its peace offensive in multilateral ways, aiming at American military strength deployed in Northeast Asia. On the eve of opening the Seoul Olympics, Soviet leader Gorbachev proposed multilateral negotiations including North and South Korea to freeze the reduction of military strength in the Asian and Pacific region, and the opening of direct economic relations between Korea and the Soviet Union. During the Olympic period, the Soviets showed their positive attitude toward promoting the relationship with Korea as seen in the following events: The Soviet Union sent its artistic troupes for public performances; three Soviet reporters were sent to Seoul to visit Panmunjom; and some plans were promoted for Korea's participation in the Siberian development projects and for opening trade offices in Korea and the Soviet Union.

Such Soviet moves are construed as intending to weaken the American influence in Korea, and aimed at reducing the intermediate-range nuclear force in the sea areas surrounding the peninsula.

The United States considers Korea's Nordpolitik, now actively promoted in its relations with the Soviet Union, Hungary, and other communist bloc countries, beneficial to the ROK's future Northeast Asian strategy, presupposing the continued division of the peninsula through the cross recognition of North and South Korea. The United States has missed no opportunity in supporting the No Tae-u regime's northern diplomacy. Under Secretary of State Armacost, who visited Korea early this month, also said that "The United States holds the view that the Korea-Soviet relationship will develop more rapidly than the Korea-PRC relationship."

To promote its strategy in Northeast Asia, the United States has maintained the unified military systems, which have been formed by combining the operational command systems and communications systems of the U.S. forces in Korea and its allies such as the Korean Armed Forces and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Typical military exercises conducted under these systems are "Team Spirit" in Korea and the joint U.S.-Japan military exercise in Japan.

The triangular defense systems mentioned in the U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia today refers to the U.S.-Japan-PRC or Korea-U.S.-Japan military relationships. These have been construed as an intermediate course aimed at forming the quadrilateral Korea-U.S.-Japan-PRC defense systems.

Since the early 1980's, American troops in Korea have been allowed to travel to the China mainland on their leaves. Since then Korea-PRC exchanges have increased rapidly. The prevailing opinion is that the undercurrent of these trends is the military structure in Northeast Asia chiefly led by the United States

[14 Oct 88 p 5]

[Article by reporter Yun Sok-in]

[Text] At the turn of the eighties, the Korean peninsula was elevated to a higher status in the U.S. global strategy. The United States termed it "a vital area of interest" which needs to be defended even at the risk of a nuclear war. Under the so-called simultaneous multiple war strategy, tensions have gradually mounted in Northeast Asia. As a result, with concern about a possibility of nuclear war on the peninsula, public interest has grown concerning the actual combat capabilities of the American forces in Korea.

Under Article 4 of the "Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty" signed in October 1954, the U.S. forces in Korea are entitled to use areas within the Korean territories for American military bases.

Recently, the United States released, through the press, its one-sided plan which considered the relocation and deployment of American bases on the peninsula in case American troops are withdrawn from the Philippines. There was a report last mid-August that the U.S. Senate approved a plan to move the U.S. forces stationed in the Philippines to Japan or Korea if the United States failed to renew the agreement on the U.S. military bases in the Philippines.

Under the principle of sharing the local defense costs and the concept of unified allied forces embodied in the Nixon doctrine of 1969, the U.S. 7th Division was pulled out in 1979 from the forward deployment areas. And the I Corps (present ROK-U.S. Combined Field Army) was inaugurated as the Korea-U.S. combined army, which was, using a broad definition, placed under operational control. In 1978, a significant change occurred in the strategy system with the forming of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) covering most of the Korean and U.S. armies, navies, and air forces.

Still, Korea is excluded from participating in the U.S. nuclear strategy plans. In this connection, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on his Korea visit last July refused to confirm the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, because of "the U.S. Government's strategic position and principle," at his meeting with the representatives of the Korean political parties.

The main strength of the U.S. forces in Korea now consists of the U.S. Second Infantry Division under the CFC and the U.S. 7th Air Force under the U.S. Pacific command. For naval strength, the U.S. forces in Korea

are supposed to receive support from the U.S. 7th Fleet now headquartered in Yokohama, Japan. No Navy combat unit has been deployed in Korea.

With its division command established in Tongduch'on, the 2d Division, according to the latest data, is composed of three combat brigades, eight combat battalions, and three artillery battalions. Some 15,000 men and officers, accounting for about a half of the 31,000 U.S. ground troops in Korea, are assigned to this division. The 8 combat battalions are armed with about 120 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, and over 100 Cobra and Hughes helicopters.

The artillery battalions have 54 self-propelled artillery, capable of delivering nuclear warheads, and vehicle-carried artillery pieces, as well as eight up-to-date MLRS' [multiple launch rocket system], which have been imported recently.

The U.S. 7th Air Force in Korea has 2 Combat Air Divisions with a troop strength reaching some 12,000 and over 100 up-to-date fighter planes, such as F-4 Phantom, A-10 "Tank Killers," and F-16's, as well as a considerable number of supporting aircraft, such as U-2 reconnaissance planes. The F-16 fighter-bombers are not only equipped with ECM [electronic countermeasures], radar disrupting devices, but also they are capable of carrying nuclear arms.

In addition to those main units, the U.S. forces also have early warning systems and nuclear weapons deployed on the peninsula. The early warning systems refer to U-2 and SR-71 spy planes and E-3A advance warning and air control planes which take off from the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. They gather intelligence on military moves and trends in North Korea and convey it to the Korean Armed Forces. Korea is almost entirely dependent on intelligence from these missions, according to reports.

As compared with the present conditions of other U.S. military strength, the deployment of nuclear arms on the peninsula is far more concealed. In 1975, the then Defense Secretary Schlesinger confirmed the deployment of nuclear weapons in Korea and suggested a possibility of "a pre-emptive strike" with the use of nuclear weapons. Ever since, the amount of nuclear weapons deployed on the Korean peninsula (including warheads, bombs, shells, and mines) has varied greatly, depending on who announces it. For instance, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Center estimates it at between 669 and 694 pieces (as of February 1976); U.S. columnist Jack Anderson gave a figure of 248 pieces (in May 1983); and Peter Hayes, an American military expert who visited Korea last year, estimated it at 151 pieces (in 1985).

What has been confirmed by the U.S. Congress or the authorities of the U.S. Forces in Korea concerns nuclear fighter-bombers and Lance missiles. The nuclear fighter-bombers are on round-the-clock standby, with nuclear bombs loaded, at a west coast air base. One artillery-size

unit of Lance missiles, the surface-to-surface movable missiles with a firing range of 120 kilometers and capable of mounting even neutron bombs, was deployed in March 1987.

All told, since the emergence of the Reagan administration in the 1980's, the modernization plan for military equipment in Korea has been implemented rapidly. And new weapons series are imported according to the limited nuclear war scenario. This being the case, the general opinion is that the equipment or actual fighting strength of the CFC might be rapidly upgraded far more than before.

[15 Oct 88 p 5]

[Article by reporter Ko Sung-u]

[Text] What will become of the U.S. Forces in Korea in the future? If the pertinent pacts or agreements between the Governments of Korea and the United States remain in force, the present status of American forces in Korea may remain unchanged until the 2000's. Amid the rapidly changing situation both at home and abroad, the significance and value of American troops in Korea are also undergoing change; and the possibility of their withdrawals can hardly be ruled out.

The United States itself is driven into a political and economic position that requires a reappraisal of the ability and need to maintain troops in Korea. There is also a move in Korea to look at U.S. forces in Korea from a different viewpoint than before.

The United States has become worried about the upkeep of 400,000 American troops stationed overseas, including those in Korea, probably for several reasons. Among these are the weakening influence of the United States worldwide, fiscal deficits, mood of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and some host countries' unfriendly attitude toward the American troops.

In particular, there has been friction in Spain and Portugal, mainly because of the different evaluation of the strategic values of the American troops stationed there and the U.S. demand for a share of costs of maintaining those troops.

In the Philippines, Greece, and Turkey, there have been demands for U.S. troop withdrawals or for the United States to pay to keep the troops stationed there. In the case of American troops in Korea, Korea has been sharing as much as \$1.9 billion annually or 45 percent of the total cost of maintaining the American troops. The United States, however, has lost no opportunity to request increases in the Korean share of the defense costs.

In spite of the fast-spreading anti-American sentiment in Korea, the United States plans to continue to keep the American forces stationed here. This is supported by the

statement issued by U.S. Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci, who arrived in Seoul to attend the annual Security Consultative Meeting [SCM] last 7 June. "The United States will maintain the allied war-deterrence posture with Korea. American forces will stay on the Korean peninsula as long as the Korean people want. The Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty is the cornerstone for the security relationship between our two countries."

It reveals the U.S. intention to maintain its vested right on the peninsula. This was reflected in Item 12 of the joint communique issued after the Korea-U.S. SCM, as follows: Korea and the United States "recognized the continuing importance of the United Nations Command's peacekeeping role, particularly in maintaining the Armistice agreement until an effective and enduring mechanism is established to ensure lasting peace on the Korean peninsula."

This clause, which drives a wedge into the assertion that the Armistice agreement should be replaced with a peace pact, etc., appears to be the best logic guaranteeing the continued stationing of the American forces in Korea. Together with this theory of fixing the status quo, scholars and military experts of the two countries cautiously raise the theory of withdrawing American troops from Korea.

The American theory of withdrawing troops from Korea is chiefly voiced by the related conservative research bodies or by some liberal intellectuals' groups. The American conservatives particularly stress the point that the U.S. troops in Korea are the war deterrence on the peninsula.

The American intention was clearly disclosed at the Korea-U.S. seminar on defense affairs held in Seoul shortly before the 1988 Olympics in September. "The American forces in Korea make it inescapable that there would be automatic U.S. intervention in the event of war on the Korean peninsula, and they have become an easy mark for North Korea's propaganda. While the surplus figures in Korea's trade with the United States have been rising, why does the United States have to support Korea's national security?" (unattributed quotation)

In Korean academic circles, discussions regarding the division and reunification of the peninsula, which had been taboo are now common place following the June struggles of last year. The level of discussions has been raised to include the theory of American troop withdrawals from Korea.

Professor Ha Yong-son of Seoul National University says that in case the Armistice agreement is converted into a peace pact, the question of withdrawing American troops and tactical nuclear weapons must be dealt with. "However," he cautiously adds, "the aspects of independence, reunification, and democracy must be taken into consideration in dealing with this question."

With the reunification issue, the question about American troops in Korea appears likely to be the major points of dispute in Korea. In the rapidly changing situation both at home and abroad—characterized by progress in Nordpolitik and the weakening and qualitative change of ideological confrontation—opinion has spread widely that the whole Korea-U.S. relationship including American forces in Korea should be reestablished.

Dr Pak Chae-kyu of Kyongnam National University says, "Following the Liberation in 1945, the United States was recognized as the protector of the free world and the military and economic aid giver. But this U.S. role is now changing. Anti-Americanism based on emotionalism is now gradually changing into one based on reason. As such, the Korea-U.S. relationship should be reestablished as a partnership, discarding the subordinate relationship."

**\* North's Second '200-Day Battle' Analyzed**

41070016 Seoul NAEWOE TONGSIN in Korean  
No 608 30 Sep 88 pp 1c-8c

[Article: "Trends of Agitation in the Second '200-Day Battle'—Stirring up a Sense of Tension Through a System of Unlimited Manpower Mobilization"]

[Text] Seoul, NAEWOE TONGSIN—North Korea launched the so-called "new 200-day battle" in September, again mobilizing workers and all other North Korean inhabitants in socialist construction sites on a large scale.

Earlier, from early February through 9 September, the first 200-day battle had been carried out. So, the current one is the second round of the planned 200-day battles.

Upon completion of the first 200-day battle, North Korea released statistics in different economic sectors claiming that the original goals of the planned economic tasks had been successfully fulfilled.

However, the North Korean inhabitants and workers who were subjected to hard work under ruthless labor mobilization in the first 200-day battle, are once again being pressed into the second 200-day battle without a respite.

When North Korea initiated the first 200-day battle, it adopted the political propaganda slogan "Let us greet the 9 September national day as a grand festival of the victors!" as a means of justifying it. The slogan to justify the current second 200-day battle is "Let us bring about a new great advancement in response to the call of the National Conference of Heroes!"

The immediate tasks that should be accomplished in the period of the second 200-day battle are the fulfillment of the Third 7-Year Plan and the completion of preparations for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students

scheduled for next summer. The ultimate goal, according to the North Korean propaganda, is to consummate the chuche revolutionary cause under the leadership of Kim Il-song and his son.

It was at the 2-day session of the "National Conference of Heroes" in Pyongyang that the second 200-day battle was proposed. At this meeting, there were a number of moves in the nature of political agitation aimed at spurring on all the North Korean populace, including the workers, to stand in the van of the socialist revolution and construction with infinite loyalty to Kim Il-song and his son, and to bring the self-sacrificial revolutionary fighting spirit into play.

The meeting urged not only those present who were holders of the title of "labor hero" but also all North Korean workers to behave like "war heroes," and went further and presented a basic theme defining what constitutes such behavior. To be specific, the meeting urged that under any and all complex circumstances, they think and behave in accordance with the demands of Kim Il-song's chuche ideology, preserve the purity of the revolutionary tradition, make the party's line and policy their creed and bring mass heroism into full play in the struggle for economic construction.

Accordingly, North Korean workers are being mobilized on construction sites throughout North Korea on a large scale, on the assumption that everyone participating in the 200-day battle should give full play to the spirit of boundless devotion and sacrifice so as to put into practice that basic theme.

Since the second 200-day battle was launched, mass meetings and rallies have been held in factories, enterprises, and cooperative farms throughout North Korea in a mass propaganda campaign to whip up the workers' enthusiasm to redouble their efforts. The proceedings of these meetings and rallies have followed a stereotype pattern of agitation. Under the slogan "in response to the national conference of heroes, let us vigorously carry out another 200-day battle to bring about a new advancement," the workers were urged to redouble their revolutionary spirit and combat strength; and the participants adopted statements pledging their efforts to implement this slogan.

For example, at a workers meeting held on 6 September at Kimchaek Iron and Steel Complex, attended by the North Hamgyong provincial party secretary and other concerned cadres, a pledge to vigorously carry out the 200-day battle was adopted as part of an agitation campaign. At the meeting, a propaganda claim was made, on the one hand, to the effect that this complex has increased the steel and rolled steel output by 20 percent, and on the other, a feverish effort was made to whip up passion for the collective labor struggle by appealing to mass psychology with such expressions as "this enterprise is pulsating with the revolutionary spirit and brimming over with fervent loyalty...."

On the 20 September rally of the employees of Komdok Mining Complex, the participants adopted the resolution that "the workers of Komdok will bring about a great upswing in production and construction, instilling deep in their hearts the intention of the party to continue the 200-day battle into a 2,000-day battle, a 20,000-day battle." In this way, the endless prolongation of the 200-day battle has become an established fact. Meanwhile, at the 24 September Rolling Stock Complex mass rally, a pledge to "bring about a continuing upswing in the production of freight cars" was adopted in a move to spur on the workers to redouble their efforts.

In September similar meetings and rallies designed to stir up enthusiasm for the new 200-day battle have been held, one after another, throughout North Korea. Particularly, at the Kim Il-song Plaza in Pyongyang, the so-called "rally for pledges of loyalty" was held on 20 September, attended by the youth in the forefront from across the country to express their determination to stand in the van of the new 200-day battle. The rally was attended by the local League of Socialist Working Youth leaders from various parts of North Korea, and over 20,000 youth and students sent by universities, higher technical schools, factories, and enterprises in Pyongyang. It was also attended by North Korean Premier Yi Kun-mo; Kang Hui-won, responsible secretary of the Pyongyang Municipal Party Committee; and even WPK Secretary Ho Chong-suk, to give a high profile to the rally. Choe Yong-hae, chairman of the League of Socialist Working Youth, delivered a report at the rally.

In brief, the basic premise of the Choe Yong-hae speech boils down to an appeal to youths and students to act as the vanguard of the 200-day battle. In his speech, Choe exhorted: "Youths should arm themselves with the immortal chuche ideology; live in accordance with the demands of the chuche ideology; support the line and policy of the party; become the embodiment of the chuche ideology, at the risk of their lives; and become the first protectors and executors of party policy by demonstrating their spirit of boundless devotion and sacrifice without any pretext or hesitation." At the same time, he called for a demonstration of heroism when he urged members of the League of Socialist Working Youth to "carry on and develop the tradition of heroic struggle, upholding the slogan 'Let us become the Kim Chaek and the Cha Kwang-su of the eighties,'" adding that they "should all of them become the creators of miracles in the fervent struggle for human remolding and massive innovation."

As implied in the tone of the Choe Yong-hae speech, in the process of unfolding the new 200-day battle, North Korea first of all aims at spreading the spirit of "heroism" mainly through North Korean youths and students who have a strong revolutionary zeal and intense loyalty to the collective, and ultimately at turning all North Korean workers into heroes.

The ultimate goal of this campaign for the popularization of heroism is to create people who will demonstrate

the sacrificial spirit of the labor struggle, as well as the mentality of blind political obedience to Kim Il-song and his son.

In other words, hidden in this campaign is a calculation to secure justification for Kim Chong-il's succession to Kim Il-song and the development of the future Kim Chong-il regime, through a societywide mass movement.

Against this background, the North Korean propaganda machinery seizes every opportunity to repeat as frequently as possible Kim Chong-il's instructions for the successful completion of the 200-day battle, thereby calling the attention of all workers to these instructions.

The 26 September NODONG SINMUN editorial calling for victory in the 200-day battle recalled that the basic duty of workers participating in this battle is to "struggle with infinite loyalty to the party and the leader" and this editorial stressed as follows: "All party members and workers, upholding the slogan presented by Comrade Kim Chong-il 'Let us live and struggle like a hero, create a new norm, set new records each day by combating indolence, conservatism, and stagnation.'"

The editorial stressed that "to win victory in the 200-day battle, it is important to bring heroism, the spirit of devotion, and the revolutionary ethos of self-reliance and fortitude into full play." It stated that "standing at the van of this formidable combat is the great party that has always led our people on the one ever victorious road," thus intimating that the 200-day battle is commanded by Kim Chong-il.

This theme of the North Korean propaganda machinery is being rehashed almost daily in all media, including newspapers and broadcasts.

In the final analysis, it may be said that North Korea has a hidden intent to seek, through the process of expanding a mass labor campaign, in the name of the 200-day battle, into a society-wide movement over an extended period of time, to lay the cumulative groundwork for building the foundations of the future Chong-il rule. Such a rule would be lacking in revolutionary achievements, but would demonstrate at home and abroad an atmosphere of unity and solidarity of the workers.

However, with the North Korean authorities intimating their intention to follow up the current second 200-day battle with an interminable labor struggle of its populace in the name of a 2,000-day or 20,000-day battle as advocated by their propaganda, it has become very difficult for the North Korean populace to find any justification for further sacrifice. The North Korean authorities, while ignoring the limits of human ability and spiritual power, are attempting to find a way out of the dismal morass into which they have sunk, because of their closed-door economic policy, through an unlimited labor mobilization of the populace. Deplorable indeed is their thinking.

**\* First Victory for Northern Policy**

**\* Man Behind Scene**

41070010 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean  
14 Sep 88 p 3

[Interview with Pak Chol-on by reporter Yi Sang-chol:  
"Blue Danube" Operation...First Victory in Northern  
Diplomacy"; date and place not given]

[Text]

**"Now a Small Beginning"**

The man who played the behind-the-scene leading role in the top secret negotiations for establishing permanent missions between the ROK and Hungary was Pak Chol-on, presidential aide in charge of policies. He has been the commander in chief responsible for carrying out the policies of the Sixth Republic, but has been hidden under a veil of secrecy due to the delicate nature of his business. He has now come onto center stage for the first time in the wake of the success of the recent diplomatic negotiation.

He returned home on the evening of 12 September 1988 after putting the finishing touches on the negotiations with Hungary. We interviewed him at the Chongwadae on the morning of the 13th.

[Yi] How do you feel after successfully finishing your recent work?

[Pak]] The enormous wall of socialism lay before us, but we have now destroyed this high wall through diplomatic negotiation and that gives me a joyous satisfaction about the resources of our nation. I regard it as a task accomplished through President No's announced intention concerning the northern policy which is based on the inner strength and resources of the nation—a product of the sweat and hard work of all our people. However, establishing permanent missions between the ROK and Hungary is but a small beginning not only in the relations between the two countries but also in the evolution of our northern policy.

[Yi] Why is it that Hungary was chosen as a foothold for our penetration into the East European bloc?

[Pak]] In order to break down the walls of socialist countries, it is above all important to make an opening at a certain point. Hungary is similar to us in many aspects. It has a long history of suffering invasions by strong adjacent powers while all it sought was peace. It is similar to us in food, language, thought, and emotion. In particular, Hungary is a member of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. It is a unique East European country which holds close economic relations with the EC-Scandinavian countries. Therefore, establishing diplomatic relations with Hungary is not only meaningful, politically and symbolically, as a bridgehead

for expansion of the northern policy, but also even more significant in carrying out our economic infiltration abroad. This is a background review of the development of relations with Hungary.

[Yi] In what way and through which window did the secret negotiations with Hungary begin?

[Pak]] It is traditional international etiquette governing diplomatic negotiations that matters be kept secret except those already made public. I have nothing special to add except for the information which the Foreign Ministry has officially announced.

[Yi] As we understand, you had already gone to Hungary for the first time when the 7 July declaration was made public at home. What was your status at this time?

**Status as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary**

[Pak]] I had the rank of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary carrying President No's letter entrusting me with full power.

[Yi] What kind of person is Premier Grosz, general secretary of Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, who reportedly made a decision that had a far-reaching effect on the development of ROK-Hungarian relations?

[Pak]] He is a person who is full of conviction and who is independently pushing the open door policy and reform. While talking with him, I found that his policy was in line with the basic theme of the northern policy which we had been seeking. Thus, I explained in detail to him the significance of President No's 7 July declaration and the details of the northern policy. In that process, I suppose, we discovered something in common and developed mutual trust in regard to the policy of both sides.

[Yi] How fast do you believe that ROK-Hungarian relations will develop from now on?

[Pak]] The permanent mission is arranged to be a substantial diplomatic mission on a par with that of an ambassador level mission. However, each country has its own domestic and international guidelines and must negotiate under certain circumstantial considerations, including existing relations with friendly nations. Thus it was concluded that each country would see to it that the formal establishment of diplomatic relations would be concluded in a short period of time. I suppose that will not be too far off.

[Yi] What effect, if any, would the improvement of relations between the ROK and Hungary have on our relations with other East European countries, the PRC, and the Soviet Union?

[Pak]] As is the recent case with Hungary, we are making continuing efforts, with all sincerity and integrity, to improve relations with other countries to which our northern policy could be applied. I see a bright prospect in our efforts to improve relations with those various countries. Since a breakthrough has been made in the case of ROK-Hungarian relations, I would think it is a natural proposition that the breakthrough would serve to accelerate the improvement of relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union also.

#### To Push With Medium and Long-Range Objectives

[Yi] In particular, we think that the improvement of relations with East European countries, including Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, would be accomplished rapidly.

[Pak]] Such a consequence is also possible. However, if we simultaneously move to such a stage too rapidly, there might be an adverse fallout. Thus, first taking this into consideration, we will approach the task of improving relations with medium and long range objectives.

[Yi] How about the prospect of improving relations with North Korea after the Olympic games in terms of direction and speed?

[Pak]] I think that North Korea, too, would not turn its face against international trends. If we patiently continue sincere efforts, there will also be rapid and good progress in the relations between the South and the North, I believe.

Presidential Assistant Pak is a cousin of Madame Kim Ok-suk, wife of President No. He is a genius who graduated from the Law School of Seoul National University with highest grades. Passing the 8th state examinations for candidates for judicial court positions, he became a public prosecutor. However, since the founding of the Fifth Republic, he has been in charge of behind the scenes maneuvering to set government policies in the Chongwadae and the National Security Planning Agency. He is one of those persons who has been a target of concerns and rumors in political circles due to his roles and positions within the government.

[Yi] What do you think about various observations and views going around concerning yourself?

[Pak]] I wanted to become a professor or an ordinary lawyer. But, unexpectedly, I have been given a job with a heavy burden. I have been hearing many rumors; they are all due to a lack of communication skill on my part in both public and private affairs. Nevertheless, my answer to these rumors is that I am unable to speak out concerning these things because of their sensitive nature. I think the truth will out sooner or later as history unfolds; so I will continue to carry out faithfully the duties assigned to me.

#### \* Story Behind Negotiations

41070010 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean  
14 Sep 88 p 3

[Excerpts]

#### Contacts Were Made Under Thorough Security Controls

"Blue Danube" was an "operational name" our side gave to the diplomatic negotiation secretly conducted between the ROK and Hungary.

However, this operational name was a secret word used only among the officials from our side who were dispatched to Budapest. It was not an official code name given by the government. [passage omitted]

The negotiation for establishing permanent missions between the ROK and Hungary was conducted under tight security conditions because of North Korea's presence there and Hungary's circumstances. It was crystal clear that if facts about the secret negotiations between the ROK and Hungary became known in advance, North Korea would have mobilized all its channels to obstruct them, and Hungary would have been embarrassed.

Therefore, it may be said that "tight security" also played a role in bringing about an agreement to establish permanent missions between the ROK and Hungary.

#### Negotiations Were Conducted Beyond the Date Designated for Departure

It is reported that signs of top secret negotiations between the ROK and Hungary began appearing in March [1988] when a trade office was established in Hungary and Sandor Demenyi, president of the Hungarian Credit Bank, visited the ROK. Both countries cautiously tried to fathom each other's intentions. They approached each other about reaching an agreement to exchange secret missions for official negotiations. In compliance with that agreement a top secret official negotiation got underway on 6 July [1988], when our six-man delegation, which was headed by Pak Chol-on, presidential assistant for policy, and which included the business staff of those government offices concerned including Min Hyong-ki, director of the European Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Budapest.

It was reported that, for security reasons, six members of our delegation landed at the Budapest airport in teams of two on separate flights.

Members of our delegation stayed in hotels disguised as ordinary tourists. They stayed there for a week until 12 July, and conducted marathon negotiations with more than 10 meetings. And the secret talks between the two countries used to continue until 2 or 3 am daily. Partners

of the negotiations were Varkonyi, foreign minister, and Horn, deputy foreign minister; and for some pending issues, contacts were made even with the deputy premier, it is reported.

However, despite the fact that such a series of meetings were held, negotiations remained unsettled. It was reported by those involved that the talks sort of skirted the issues. Whereas our side requested that official diplomatic relations be established or, otherwise, that at least permanent missions be established, the Hungarian side was said to have persistently stuck fast to the establishment of a sort of simple trade mission.

In the long run, our delegation headed by Presidential Assistant Pak repeatedly and persistently requested direct talks with Premier Grosz, the most powerful man in Hungary. Thus "an agreement in principle" for establishing permanent missions was finally reached through an ultimate dialogue with Premier Grosz, it was reported later. At first the Hungarian side laughed at our request for direct talks with Premier Grosz. However, our side did not withdraw the request even up to the end, postponing the date of departure by 2 days. Having received a report about the situation, Premier Grosz finally accepted the request for a talk with him.

#### **North Korean Ambassador Suddenly Shifted**

After the talk with Premier Grosz was held successfully, the top secret negotiations proceeded comparatively smoothly.

After our side's delegation returned home, the Hungarian side sent Premier Grosz's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Seoul in the middle of August, and eight or nine meetings were held, and the unfinished talks were completed. Then came a complete agreement on establishing the permanent missions, as explained by those who were involved in the matter. Thus Presidential Assistant Pak and the delegation from our side again flew to Budapest on 23 August [1988] and finished the work of documenting those agreed upon matters.

However, around the time when the secret negotiation between the ROK and Hungary was nearing completion, North Korea replaced in a blitzkrieg its ambassador to Hungary with Kim Pyong-il, stepbrother of Kim Chong-il on 23 August [1988]; this caused a tenseness in the situation for both the ROK and Hungary. Because of that, Presidential Assistant Pak and his party became more nervous about keeping the matter secret. They stayed in an ordinary house located in the suburbs of Budapest, which was not a hotel, conducting the final negotiations. Then at last on 26 August [1988] came the signing of an agreement on establishing the permanent missions between the governments of the two countries.

During the first visit, Presidential Assistant Pak was the head of the delegation. However, on the second visit, Min, director of the European Bureau, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, headed the delegation, while Presidential Assistant Pak directed the operation as an adviser to the delegation. This was done in view of the fact that the Foreign Ministry had to be in charge of signing the agreement.

#### **Kim Il-song Was Notified About It on 12 September 1988**

At first the two countries planned to make the content of the agreement public on 31 August or 1 September at the latest. However, because of the 9 September national day activities in Pyongyang, it was postponed until 13 September.

The Hungarian side dispatched Imre Katona, member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Party and secretary general of the standing committee of the party, to the 9 September national day event of North Korea. If "the establishing of permanent missions between the ROK and Hungary" had been made public either before that mission entered North Korea or while it was in Pyongyang, there would have been some embarrassment on the Hungarian side. That was the reason that Hungary wished to postpone the making public of the matter.

After all, the Hungarian side notified Kim Il-song on the afternoon of 12 September 1988, the day on which its mission left Pyongyang, of the agreement on establishing permanent missions between the ROK and Hungary. Thus the making public of the matter, too, came for the first time at 10 a.m., 13 September, a day after the mission's departure from Pyongyang. Our side's official announcement to our friendly nations, including the United States and Japan, was made for the first time on 12 September in compliance with the diplomatic etiquette governing security matters, as explained by the informed sources.

#### **\* Assessment by TONG-A ILBO**

41070010 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean  
13 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by reporter Kim Chae-hong: "The Opening of the Era of Establishing Diplomatic Relations with the Communist Bloc; First Fruit of the Northern Policy"]

[Text] An agreement on establishing permanent missions was signed on the 26th of last month between the ROK and Hungary; and it went through legal formalities in each country. Then it was made public in both countries simultaneously on the morning of 13 September 1988. The agreement can be seen as the first fruition of the northern policy of the government of the Sixth Republic and of the 7 July Presidential Declaration. At the same time, this can be recorded as the beginning of the second phase of diplomatic relations in that it opened the way of establishing diplomatic relations with the communist bloc. The normalization of relations between the ROK and Japan in 1965 was regarded as the beginning of the first phase.

In his 7 July declaration, which mainly dealt with the relations between North and South Korea, President No made clear that "the ROK is ready to undertake cooperation to help North Korea improve relations with our friendly countries, including the United States and Japan, in order to establish conditions in which peace may take root on the Korean peninsula." He then declared that "furthermore, we will seek the improvement of relations with socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and the PRC."

Here, as we have to cite our government's northern policy, so we also have to cite the open door policy of General Secretary Grosz of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party as a factor in effecting success in the recent event. General Secretary Grosz is a man of real power who was appointed premier in May of last year and who was elected general secretary of the party in May of this year. He has been leading Hungary's "glasnost" (open door) by pushing promotion of economic and trade relations with the West. Recently, Hungary was the first communist country which made a decision to take part in the Seoul Olympic games; and in March of this year it established a trade office in Seoul for the first time. All these may be regarded as measures that reflected the open door policy of the Grosz government.

Of course, even before that, exchanges between the ROK and Hungary were made consecutively in various fields. To begin with, in February 1987 Demjan, president of the Hungarian Credit Bank, and his party visited the ROK to hold a talk on joint investment; and in August of the same year Pak Yong-su, president of the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation, and his party visited Hungary to talk over the matter of business cooperation with the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce. After that, in December 1987, the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation established a permanent office in Budapest; and the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce established a trade office in Seoul in May of this year.

The recent agreement with Hungary has another significance as the trigger for successful implementation of the northern policy toward diplomatic relations. In order to get started, the government chose a single objective, concentrated efforts on it, and scored success. The Foreign Ministry authorities foresee that the East European bridgehead secured in Hungary will produce "a far-reaching effect like a domino effect" on other East European countries' establishing relations with the ROK. The objective is to aim at other countries including Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. As for the Soviet Union, however, there are still two alternatives. Since the agreement with Hungary was made public immediately before the Olympic games, some observers believed the domino effect on those East European countries which were taking part in the Olympic games would become greater.

A behind-the-scene reason for the fact that the government's northern policy has been accepted in the international society seems to be that North Korea's ebb tide

phenomenon in the international society favorably affected that. An authority of the Foreign Ministry pointed out that after the Burmese bombing incident of 1983 North Korea's voice among the nonaligned nations weakened, and that at the time of the bombing incident of a Korean Air plane in 1987, Yugoslavia investigated the movements of North Korean bombing accomplices and provided the U.S. side with the data. He then said that following such a series of incidents, the way East European countries' looked at North and South Korea changed. He noted that when North Korea denounced President No's 7 July declaration, East European countries saw North Korea as "an irrational country."

In line with the present world trend of putting real profit over ideology, Hungary's desire for exchanges with our country seems to be for the purpose of establishing trade, technological cooperation, and joint investments with us. Hungary is getting interested in our Import and Export Bank loans, too.

Meanwhile, some observers try to correlate North Korea's recent appointment of Kim Pyong-il, step-brother of Kim Chong-il, to the position of ambassador to Hungary with any possible feud which might arise among relatives in the power struggle for succession. However, on the other hand, the appointment attests to the fact that North Korea attaches great importance to its relations with Hungary.

In June 1972 North Korea established its trade mission in France, its only trade mission in a Western country. And in December 1984 it raised the status of the mission to the level of general permanent mission. At that time the ROK Government recalled Yun Sok-hon, then ambassador to France, protesting to the French Government. North Korea built a hotel in Pyongyang, as a joint venture with France, a present rarely given by North Korea, in an attempt to secure a bridgehead in a Western nation. However, the recent agreement between the ROK and Hungary is not likely to cause any change in the relations between North Korea and Hungary.

The permanent mission that is scheduled to be established this time is a diplomatic office, an office substantially identical to an embassy in terms of its status, functions, and diplomatic privileges. It is on a higher level than the ROK mission in Japan established before relations between the ROK and Japan were finalized in 1965, or the liaison mission established between the United States and the PRC in 1973. Thus the ROK and Hungary have established official relations one step lower than the diplomatic relations, prior to the establishment of embassies. (As for official relations between nations, a trade mission is the lowest and the consular relations next and the general permanent mission comes next.)

In this connection, the Foreign Ministry authorities have called the establishment of missions between the ROK and Hungary a big diplomatic event which is similar to the normalization of relations between the ROK and

Japan in 1965. They have attached great significance to that event as a prelude to the movement of our diplomacy from the free world periphery into the communist bloc arena.

**\* HANGYORE's First 30 Days Examined**

41070003 Seoul WOLGAN KYONGHYANG in Korean  
Aug 88 pp 284-299

[Article by Prof Kim Min-hwan, Chonnam National University: "The Impact of the First 30 Days of the HANGYORE"]

[Text] It has been 2 months since the HANGYORE SINMUN made its first appearance. This paper was launched with the funds collected from the people, and those news media people who participated in the June struggle and were dismissed from their employment played a central role in launching it. The impact of the HANGYORE SINMUN, which is dissimilar in origin from other existing newspapers, on the state and society has not been insignificant. The historical significance of the appearance of this newspaper and its character as it has been reflected in the paper are analyzed by comparing it with existing newspapers.

**Power of the Press**

Some time ago, people called the press "the fourth branch of the government" in the belief that the press exerts an enormous influence rivaling the three branches of the government—legislative, judiciary, and executive. Recently, people have called contemporary society a military-industrial-press complex control system. In other words, contemporary society is controlled by the military, big business, and press in collusion. As the fourth branch of the government and as a key component of the complex control system, the press is in fact wielding extraordinary power.

Then, what is the power base of the press? Generally, those who stress the dimension of structural functions try to seek the answer in them. They say that the functions discharged by the press, that is, watchdog of the environment, suggestions for answers to problems, continuity of cultural legacies, and providing recreation, constitute the base of its power. They maintain that it is natural for the press to enjoy power because without the press which provides information analysis, culture, and recreation a highly specialized contemporary society cannot function.

On the other hand, those who stress the historical dimension see the power base of the press in advanced capitalist countries from the historical perspective rather than the functional dimension. From the early stage of capitalism when the newly emerged bourgeoisie engaged in intense struggles with the pre-capitalist capital under a feudal system, the press played the role of vanguard in the struggle for a capitalist revolution. For this reason,

the press has come to wield an enormous power. It is quite natural for the press to exercise its share of power resulting from its contributions during the course of the struggle.

But, what has been said so far is generally relevant only to the advanced capitalist countries. As compared with the advanced nations, the power of the press in the underdeveloped or developing countries is relatively quite limited. There have been many cases where the press was degraded to the status of the maid or the bridesmaid of the administration under forceful political control rather than being the fourth branch of the government comparable to the three branches of government—legislative, judiciary, and executive. As far as the functional aspect of the press is concerned, despite the fact that there is little difference between advanced nations and underdeveloped or developing nations, the press in the underdeveloped or developing countries was unable to find its rightful place. Wherein lies the reason? Its cause must be sought in the historical foundation of the press.

In the case of underdeveloped countries, an entirely different process from that of the advanced capitalist countries is noticeable. As most of these countries fell victims to the imperialist invasion and became colonies at a time when capitalism began to develop, their nationalist press run by their existing bourgeois intelligentsia was altogether shut down and banned, and the press industry run by the subservient capital came to control the press. The press enterprise of this sort was placed under severe restrictions in reflecting the special conditions of colonial people. This was a natural consequence when the press was owned and operated by the subservient capital.

After World War II, as the underdeveloped countries, though they were outwardly liberated, were drawn into the center stage of the world system as dependent states in the cold war system, the same press industry which had been under the control of the subservient capital during the colonial period continued to enjoy its dominance over the press on the basis of its vested rights. Accordingly, no matter what type it may be, the press is bound to be on the opposite side of the nationalist forces or the people. Accordingly, such a press enjoys unrivaled power functionally in disseminating information, providing ideas, and transmitting and providing cultures and recreations, but they are bound to be very meek in dealing with national or class contradictions. It also maintains either hostile or deceptive or opportunistic attitudes toward the popularly based activist forces. The causes of the press' failure to be true to its functions in the underdeveloped or developing countries, and to be relatively insignificant lie in its historicity.

**Historical Significance**

To state it briefly, the appearance of the HANGYORE SINMUN is historically very significant. It might be boring but to understand the reason, it is essential to trace how our press history has evolved.

In our country, the press was controlled by the subservient capital in the colonial period, and our case is a typical example of such a press, which based on its vested interests, has played a central role even after the liberation of the country.

With the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan wiped out the previously existing newspapers which had been under the control of the new intelligentsia. As the Japanese imperialists imposed an unprecedentedly ruthless military rule, they banned the national press.

Then, with the outbreak of the 1 March Movement, the military rule was replaced by a civil government, and popular newspapers began to reappear. The forces behind the publication of these popular newspapers did not come from the leadership ranks of the 1 March Movement. The SHITAE ILBO and the CHOSON ILBO were published by the leading pro-Japanese elements, and the TONG-A ILBO, also was published by elements who were by nature not quite free from the control of the struggle and those who enjoyed the fruit of the struggle. On the business operations by the capitalist, Yi Kap-ki commented in the No 16 issue of PIPAN (CRITICISM), which was published during the Japanese rule, as follows: "When a newspaper, a merchandise, is produced by the capitalist method...the basic significance of the newspaper is inevitably dismissed in favor of the rationalization of the business of the enterpriser...by rejecting the social consciousness, it is not likely to focus on the societal interest."

In the article, he pointed out that as a result of turning the popular newspapers into large-scale business enterprise in the form of incorporations, the nature of the newspapers underwent a basic change from the editorial-centered to the business-oriented, from the criticism-oriented to the reporting-focused, and from the role of the spokesman of the people to that of the ideology of the business and industrial class. The Korean people then sought to reject such a business-like operation of the press and strongly demanded that "the special conditions of the oppressed people" (Yi Kap-ki's expression) be reflected in the press. Having been aware of such a demand of the people, who were the consumers, occasionally the producers of the merchandise, responded to the popular demand, but they generally stuck to the true features of commercialism.

At the end of World War II when Korea was liberated, there was a flood of newspapers. These newspapers can be divided into three groups by management method and ideology. There were the left-wing organs of the Communist Party, which played the role of propagandizing, instigating, and organizing the people. The second group consisted of the centrist papers which were privately owned and operated, and advocated progressive democracy. Last, there were right-wing papers, primarily owned and operated by right-wing capitalists

or prominent people, and they followed the conservative line. Among the three, the centrist papers had enjoyed relatively stronger popular base than the others.

But, the U.S. military government, as it pushed for a single governmental system for South Korea, shut down, one after another, the communist newspapers and the centrist newspapers which advocated a progressive democratic line, and laid the foundation for monolithic press system centering around the right-wing newspapers, particularly the TONG-A ILBO and the CHOSON ILBO. After the creation of a central single government, as cleavage developed gradually between the Syngman Rhee regime and these papers, they launched antidictatorship struggles. But, from the basic standpoint of building a system of divided ideology, it is a historical fact that these papers shared common interests with the ruling power. [passage omitted]

But, now, an entirely new situation is unfolding. Since the June 1987 struggle, the government by military force has ended and another civilian rule has emerged. Consequently, a good number of newspapers have made their appearance. As was seen during the Japanese rule, these new papers are controlled by the people who were either on the opposite side of the dissident struggle or those who were spectators rather than by the people who were on the side of the struggle.

But, under such circumstances, an entirely new newspaper called the HANGYORE SINMUN, run by the group of journalists who stood out in the forefront of the struggle and were dismissed from their employment for their stand, has made its appearance. Especially, the fact that this paper raised needed funds from the ordinary people as it pursued not only freedom from the ruling power but also freedom from capital was indeed an epochal development. The fact that a new paper has been launched on the basis of its own strength of survival to reflect the desires of the rank and file instead of those with money and power is in itself very significant historically.

This newspaper puts up such slogans as "complete realization of democratic values," "secure people's right to life and improve their standard of living," and "overcome the partition consciousness and work toward national unification." It is important to encourage and check upon this paper whether or not it does what its slogans say. The purpose of this work is to examine what the paper is trying to say, how it is said, and for what and whom. For the sake of convenience, the content analysis approach is adopted on the basis of quantitative analysis, and for better understanding of the nature of this paper a comparison is made with TONG-A ILBO. A complete sampling was done on the issues of the HANGYORE SINMUN covering the period from 15 May when it was first published to 14 June as the period of the survey, and as to the contents, primarily editorials and the headline articles on the front page were used as items of analysis.

The items of analysis were confined to editorials and headline articles on the front page, the volume and variety of information in HANGYORE SINMUN and other newspapers were excluded from the analysis. In terms of the volume of information, as compared with other principal dailies which allocate 16 pages daily for information, the HANGYORE SINMUN allocates 8 pages, half of the others. This fact alone suggests an absolute inferiority of HANGYORE SINMUN. As far as the variety of the information goes, according to a recent survey by Professor Yi Kyong-cha (SINMUN YONKU 1988), more than half of the total news volume is occupied by the news on politics and society while news on entertainment, recreation, and sports are almost absent. It is also true that as to news sources HANGYORE SINMUN has a limited number. But I make it clear beforehand that the focus of this analysis is on the determining of the qualitative propensity through the analysis of editorials, the main subjects of the front page headline news, the objects, and the values.

#### Areas of Interest Compared

What does the HANGYORE SINMUN want to express? To find out, its editorials and the themes of headline articles were analyzed by separately categorizing them. On the basis of prior investigations, the categories were divided into "external" (inter-Korean questions included) and "domestic," and the "external" is further divided into "inter-Korean relations" and "others," and the "domestic" into "politics," "economy," and "society."

First of all, as to the subjects of editorials the degrees of interest by category was as shown in Table 1. Of the 26 issues published between 15 May and 14 June, HANGYORE SINMUN and TONG-A ILBO printed 44 and 49 editorials respectively. As to the degree of interest on principal areas, there was not much difference between HANGYORE SINMUN and TONG-A ILBO, and it is noticeable that there was an overwhelmingly higher degree of interest on domestic issues than on the external problems. Since the modernization drive began, newspapers of our country have customarily (?) shown a degree of interest ranging between 15 and 20 percent, however, as for the proposition called the "overcoming of the partition consciousness and the working toward national unification," interest on external issues ought to be heightened.

Table 1. Editorial Subjects

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
External:	6 (13.6)	9 (18.4)
Inter-Korea	4	6
Others	2	3
Domestic:	38 (86.4)	40 (81.6)
Politics	18	17
Economy	13	10
Society	7	13
Total	44 (100.0%)	49 (100.0%)

On the other hand, of the editorials on domestic problems, the editorials on "politics," "economy," and "society" were further categorized by subject and compared. It was discovered that there was a considerable difference between HANGYORE SINMUN and TONG-A ILBO in the areas of politics and economy.

As is seen in Table 2, in the area of politics, while HANGYORE SINMUN generally showed a high degree of interest on such pending issues as human rights, the Kwangju question, and the misdeeds of the Fifth Republic, TONG-A ILBO focused its attention on the activities of the National Assembly (party politics included). The difference between the two papers is that HANGYORE SINMUN persistently tried to pursue issues themselves while TONG-A ILBO placed more weight on the institutional implications of the issues.

Table 2. Editorial Themes on Political Issues

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
National Assembly	3	7
Judiciary	1	1
Misdeeds	3	3
Human rights	5	-
Bad laws	1	1
Kwangju	4	1
Others	1	4
Total	18	17

On the economic questions, a clear difference between the two papers was noticed on the level of interest on the question of capital and labor (see Table 3).

Table 3. Editorial Subjects on Economy

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
Taxation	1	1
Finance	2	2
Capital and labor	7	2
Others	3	5
Total	13	10

On the social issues it is clear that TONG-A ILBO showed a relatively high interest on the problems of college and environmental pollution (see Table 4). On the problem of the college, TONG-A ILBO generally tried to call for self-restraint on the part of students and active role of the professors in dealing with the problem.

Table 4. Editorial Subjects on Social Issues

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
College/education	1	3
Pollution	1	5
Press/media	2	-
Others	3	5

Table 4. Editorial Subjects on Social Issues

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
College/education	1	3
Total	7	13

On the other hand, the results of the comparison of the subjects of the headline news on the first pages revealed that TONG-A ILBO clearly showed a high level of interest on political issues while HANGYORE SINMUN treated a lot more issues related to economy as its headline news articles on the first page (see Table 5).

Table 5. Subjects of Headline News on the Front Page

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
External:	9 (34.6)	7 (26.9)
Inter-Korea	9	7
Others	-	-
Domestic:	17 (65.4)	19 (73.1)
Politics	10	16
Economy	5	2
Society	2	1
Total	26 (100.0%)	26 (100.0%)

As to the level of interest reflected in the subcategories of the headline news on politics and economy, there were also considerable differences between the two papers (see Tables 6 and 7). That is, on the political issues, as was seen in editorials, while HANGYORE SINMUN showed an all-round interest on the issues pending, TONG-A ILBO concentrated on the activities of the National Assembly (party politics). On the economic issues, HANGYORE SINMUN paid relatively closer attention to the capital and labor issues. The three articles published by HANGYORE SINMUN in the "others" category were: one on the stinginess in distribution despite the general business boom, another on the mutual investments by the big businesses, and the third on the opposing of the system of board chairmanship in the government investment organizations. The front page headline news articles on social issues were so few that they were excluded from the object of analysis.

Table 6. Subjects of the Front Page Headline News on Political Issues

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
National Assembly	1	11
Judiciary	2	1
Misdeeds	2	-
Human rights	1	1
Bad laws	1	-
Kwangju	2	-
Others	2	4
Total	10	17

Table 7. Subjects of the Front Page Headline News on Economic Issues

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
Taxation	-	-
Finance	-	1
Capital and labor	2	-
Others	3	1
Total	5	2

### Level of Concentration

Should the newspaper show multifarious interests on daily occurrences or should it concentrate its attention on the key issues of major importance in the historical context? Of course, the answers to these questions could differ depending upon the situations, however, there seemed to be a general agreement that, in the case of the latter, the attitude of concentrating attention on key issues was more positive one.

On the basis of subjective judgment, this study determined that such issues as national unification, democratization of politics, and the realization of justice in distribution (including the capital and labor issue) were the key questions, and examined the level of concentration of interest on these issues.

The study showed that 14 (31.8 percent) out of 44 editorials and 17 (65.4 percent) out of 26 front page headline articles of HANGYORE SINMUN addressed those three key issues as compared to TONG-A ILBO's 11 (22.4 percent) out of 49 editorials and 9 (34.6 percent) out of 26 front page headline articles. According to this quantitative analysis, HANGYORE SINMUN showed a higher level of concentration of interest on the key issues, and therefore, it is clear that this paper showed more positive attitudes on these issues (see Tables 8 and 9). In the case of HANGYORE SINMUN, it was noteworthy that the front page headline articles concentrated on those issues far more than its editorials.

Table 8. Tendency for Editorial Focus on Key Issues

	HANGYORE (n = 44)	TONG-A (n = 49)
National unification	4 (9.1%)	4 (8.2%)
Political democracy	8 (18.2%)	5 (10.2%)
Justness in distribution	2 (4.5%)	2 (4.1%)
Total	14 (31.8%)	11 (22.4%)

Note: Level of concentration = Number of related editorials x 100/total number of editorials

**Table 9. Tendency for Focus of Front Page Headline Articles on Key Issues**

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
National unification	9 (34.6%)	7 (26.9%)
Political democracy	6 (23.1%)	2 (7.7%)
Justice in distribution	2 (7.7%)	-(-)
Total	17 (65.4%)	9 (34.6%)

Note: Total number of articles = 26.

On the other hand, in the selection of subjects for the editorial and the front page headline article, the similarities with other major dailies (KYONG-HYANG, SEOUL, CHOSON, CHUNG-ANG, and HANKUK) were examined. It showed that as far as editorials were concerned, HANGYORE SINMUN and TONG-A ILBO were similar with 1.38 and 1.53 respectively, but as for the front page headline articles, it showed 1.96 for the TONG-A ILBO but 1.27 for HANGYORE SINMUN. That is to say, of the five newspapers—KYONG-HYANG, SEOUL, CHOSON, CHUNG-ANG, and HANKUK—an average of two newspapers used the same subjects as had appeared as front page headline articles in TONG-A ILBO as their front pages headline articles. In contrast, only one newspaper used the same subjects of the front page headline articles in HANGYORE SINMUN as its headline articles on its front page. This study showed that as far as subjects went, there was no big difference between the editorials of the HANGYORE SINMUN and those of other dailies, however, a big difference existed when it came to the subjects of the front page headline articles. At the same time, as to the degree of concentration on key issues, it also revealed that there was a difference with other newspapers.

#### Up or Down?

The objectives of press action, that is, the target, may be largely divided into three: "above," "below," and "others." The press performs the function of passing down the ideas or intentions of the people "above" to the people "below," and at the same time, passing up the ideas or opinions of the people below to the people above. Under more democratic circumstances, its function of transmitting the opinions of the people below to the people above is activated, and the more people-oriented the papers are, the heavier the emphasis is placed on conveying the opinions of the people below to the people above. In order to determine the target of the press actions of the HANGYORE SINMUN and the TONG-A ILBO, this study compared only the editorial targets of the two papers.

As is seen in Table 10, while the HANGYORE SINMUN concentrated on "above" as the target of its press action, the TONG-A ILBO spread its targets considerably in the area of "general/others." As shown in Table 11, when the "above" was divided into subcategories such as executive, judiciary, legislative, political party, enterprise, and

others and examined, HANGYORE SINMUN directed its target primarily on the executive branch while TONG-A ILBO paid much attention to the National Assembly and political parties.

**Table 10. Editorial Targets**

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
Above	33	22
Below	4	5
General/others	7	22
Total	44	49

**Table 11. Editorial Targets for Those "Above"**

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
Administration	22	8
Judiciary	1	1
National Assembly	1	4
Political Party	1	5
Ruling	-	-
Opposition	2	1
Business	3	2
Military	2	-
Others	1	1
Total	33	22

As was seen in the analysis of subjects TONG-A ILBO gave importance to the institutional convergence of the legislature and political parties in solving the pending problems while the HANGYORE SINMUN placed importance on the power itself. In the case of the editorial which targeted the "below," TONG-A ILBO placed more weight on "students" than the HANGYORE SINMUN (see Table 12).

**Table 12. Editorial Targets for Those "Below"**

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
People	2	1
Students	1	3
Labor union	1	1
Total	4	5

On the other hand, an investigation on whether or not the tone of editorials for their targets was critical or defensive or value-neutral revealed that the HANGYORE SINMUN was relatively more critical, and the TONG-A ILBO more often than not took a value-neutral attitude (see Table 13). When the editorial tone was examined by target, while the HANGYORE SINMUN was critical toward the "above," the TONG-A ILBO was in general value-neutral toward the "above" and very critical toward the "below" (see Table 14).

Table 13. Editorial Tones

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
Critical	37	22
Neutral	2	25
Protective	5	2
Total	45	49

On the basis of the survey cited above, it is clear that the HANGYORE SINMUN maintains more a critical attitude and is more people-oriented than the TONG-A ILBO.

A study on the standard of criticism reveals that the HANGYORE SINMUN was critical toward the "above" for the reasons of the suppression of human rights, abuse of power, misdeeds, and inequity (mainly economic), but it was protective toward those "below" primarily for reasons of their being workers and genuineness. In the case of TONG-A ILBO, on the other hand, it was critical toward the "above" for its undemocratic authoritarianism and absurdity, and was critical toward the people "below" primarily for its violence and indiscretion. The TONG-A ILBO was also relatively critical toward the opposition parties in the category of the "above" primarily because of their lack of "joint responsibility consciousness."

Table 14. Editorial Tones by Target

	HANGYORE (n = 44)			TONG-A (n = 49)		
	Protective	Neutral	Critical	Protective	Neutral	Critical
Above	2	31	-	2	7	13
Below	2	1	1	-	5	-
Others	2	3	2	-	5	17
Total	6	35	3	2	17	30

#### End vs. Means

What kinds of values are the HANGYORE SINMUN and the TONG-A ILBO after? To find out, the value subjects reflected in their editorials were examined. While the HANGYORE SINMUN dwelled primarily on such subjects as "political democracy," "national unification," and "justness in distribution," the TONG-A ILBO focused its attention on "political democracy" and "compromise and coexistence" (see Table 15). Among the various values listed in Table 15 if national unification, political democracy, and just distributions are regarded as end values, stability, coexistence through compromise, and efficiency (pragmatism) may be the means values to realize the end values. In this regard, therefore, the HANGYORE SINMUN showed a concentrated interest on the end values whereas the TONG-A ILBO gave more weight on the means values than the other paper.

Table 15. Values Implied in Editorials

	HANGYORE	TONG-A
National unification	8	3
Political democracy	19	11
Just distribution	7	1
Stability	-	2
Compromise/coexistence	-	6
Efficiency (pragmatism)	-	2
Others	10	24
Total	44	49

In summary, whereas the HANGYORE SINMUN stressed concentrated attention on the end values, the TONG-A ILBO while concentrating interest on democratization of politics among the end values, stressed

stability, compromise and coexistence, and efficiency (pragmatism) as means values.

Stressing that "stability," a means value, was the one that is recognized by all four parties, TONG-A ILBO urged that "reform in stability" be pursued. What TONG-A ILBO is specifically and particularly stressing, to that end, seems to be that all the pending issues be dealt with within the institutional framework. The institutions that TONG-A ILBO considers especially important are the National Assembly and the four parties which function as its centripetal forces. This newspaper stressed as follows:

The representative system is the embodiment of the basic principle behind democratic government. We have now secured this representative system. The National Assembly, which is composed of more opposition party representatives than ruling party representatives, is indeed at a noteworthy stage, and is at a point where it can absorb and reflect multifarious voices of our society. At this time when a representative machinery in which the will of the people is reflected has just been born, we should leave (politics) to this organization. This is the basis of the democratic government. Attempts at solving problems through mass demonstrations which are violent were justified at a time when people were walled, but they are still acts that basically reject the democratic government. ("Remembering 10 June," Editorial, 11 June)

In fact, it is interesting that TONG-A ILBO, which was extremely careful in "justifying" mass demonstrations or violent demonstrations conducted "at a time when people were walled in," is now rejecting the justification of mass or violent demonstrations on the grounds of a change of situation.

At any rate, on the one hand, this newspaper stressed that all problems be dealt with in the institutional framework, and on the other hand, it specially urged the government/ruling party to cast off its authoritarianism. According to this paper, although many "in the government and the political community are converted advocates for openness" ("Ability of the Political Community on Test Stand," Editorial, 9 June), the "internal resistance from the bureaucrats" ("Legal Liquidation of the Fifth Republic," Editorial, 15 May) is not to be taken lightly. Therefore, there is a danger that excessive demands from below could provide "the desperate extreme right-wing elements with a tempting opportunity." ("Ability of the Political Community on Test Stand," Editorial, 9 June). Therefore, it is important for the government ruling party to endeavor to cast off their authoritarianism, and at the same time, to help nurture conditions conducive to maintaining the attitude of openness.

With respect to the institutional approach to the solutions of the pending issues TONG-A ILBO considers the role of the opposition parties is equally important. This newspaper especially stressed the "joint responsibility consciousness" for the opposition community. Therefore, they must absolutely stay away from popularity adulation or impatience. On this point, this paper maintained as follows:

At this time, to test the power of the "opposition which controls more seats in the Assembly than the ruling party," cornering the No regime whose power base is still fragile is not a wise move. From the ethical standpoint of those who share responsibility for national politics, and for the good of three Kims whose ultimate goal is to come to power, popular adulation and impatience are harmful. What is more important is the country and the people. From a broader perspective, a high standard political ability that tempers power and promotes cooperation is expected. ("Build Up the Trust," Editorial, 22 May)

The position of TONG-A ILBO which stresses the institutional solution to the pending problems is also directly projected in the campus problems. It urges professors to play a positive role. Addressing the issue of national unification, this paper suggested that the political community come up with new and practical ideas for national unification which could absorb the "students' indiscreet arguments for national unification." ("Campus and Unification Debates," Editorial, 5 June) In this connection, active and dedicated efforts on the part of the professors, it pointed out, must lead the unification debates on the campus.

On the one hand, this paper stresses the search for solutions for pending problems within the institutional framework, and on the other hand, it consistently urges self-restraint on the part of the people (students and workers, etc.). Especially, this paper appeals to the students that they should not close their eyes on the "historical lesson that blind faith, exclusive belief, and

immersion in ideology would eventually harm the people, the masses, and the working class." ("Socialism and Justice," Editorial, 12 June) When the masses fail to restrain themselves, something "dreadful" can happen. This is the point that this paper makes. Speaking of the Kwangju Incident, this paper commented as follows:

There is a possibility that a force that attempts to lead the people in the direction of overthrowing the system by linking the Kwangju question with...an ideology might very well result in a vicious circle of blood. It might once again push the much awaited constitutional political order which is beginning to take root back several decades. ("The Day in Kwangju," Editorial, 19 May)

It is interesting to note that this paper brings up "the dreaded thing" by altering the shape of what it had once tried to reject.

On the other hand, as has been pointed out, HANGYORE SINMUN concentrates its attention on the end values rather than the means values, that is, national unification, democratization of politics and justice in distribution. On the method of realizing these end values, the position taken by HANGYORE SINMUN is considerably different from that of TONG-A ILBO.

The thing that HANGYORE SINMUN has been demanding above all else is "conversion of conception." ("Inter-Korea Summit Conference," Editorial, 22 May) According to this newspaper, the "conception" should have the will of the people as its foundation. Digesting "the powerful popular demands" is the present task not only for the Party for Peace and Democracy but for all political parties and the system. ("Be Discreet," Editorial, 17 May) To this end, according to this paper, a thoroughgoing self-review by the people in power is the first order of business.

Editorials stated: In dealing with such questions as the Kwangju Incident, the release of political prisoners, problem of misdeeds, democratization, and national unification, the government, with "a heart open to make confessions" ("Listen to the Live Public Opinion," Editorial, 21 May), should "first recognize the truth and make amends" ("Rightful Place in History for the May Struggle," Editorial, 18 May), and then "humbly apologize to the people" ("Free All Political Prisoners," Editorial, 19 May), "sever itself from the shameful past" ("The Supreme Court Should Be Born Again," Editorial, 27 May), and "never take a lukewarm attitude" ("Clarify Before the Prosecution Launches Investigation," Editorial, 28 May).

By giving much weight especially to the power of the students and the workers, HANGYORE SINMUN stressed that their opinion must positively be accommodated. With respect to the 10 June Student Conference, this paper commented as follows:

The world today is moving toward the age of openness and compromise. Germany and China are good examples. We believe that instead of blocking the students' march toward Panmunjom, the government should exchange opinions with students, and help the young people of the south and the north start a dialogue. This is a mature and proud attitude. Now is the time for every member of our people to march toward national unification with a positive and creative posture. ("Make It a Movement With the Masses," Editorial, 14 June)

This paper stressed specifically that the government should "absolutely refrain from any attempt to create an opportunity for a new oppression by publicizing the students' untainted intentions with even the slightest distortions...or by spreading baseless delusions of persecution." ("Understand the Enthusiasm for National Unification of Young People," Editorial, 10 June)

On the labor question, too, this paper said that by repealing the provision that bans political activities of labor unions, such activities should be allowed to start anew on based on organizational and political abilities. ("Reorganizing Industrial Structures," Editorial, 1 June) Another editorial commented that "the workers' collective expression for demands should be actively accommodated without physically suppressing them," and "it should be borne in mind that undue pressure could cause their explosive resistance and rock the very foundation of the capitalist system itself." ("Worrying About Excessive Worries," Editorial, 3 June)

But, this paper urged the popular forces never to lose their mass base. With respect to the 10 June Student Conference, HANGYORE SINMUN stressed as follows:

From the bottom of our heart, we appeal to students. Every movement becomes a successful one if more people participate in it. Without dismissing the importance of the cold response displayed by some people at this time...students should work together patiently and conduct public relations." ("Make It a Movement With the Masses," Editorial, 14 June)

This paper went on to point out that "they should absolutely refrain from behaving in an extreme way...blinded by impatient and violent emotions" ("Understand the

Passion of the Young People for National Unification," Editorial, 10 June), and stressed "a healthy optimism for history." (Same editorial cited above)

#### A Superfluity

Through the analyses made so far, we now know that HANGYORE SINMUN concentrates its attention on the end values such as national unification, democratization of politics, and the realization of justice in distribution, and at the same time, it is more people-oriented and progressive in nature in embodying those values than other existing newspapers. Of course, it is difficult to conclude that such positions taken by HANGYORE SINMUN are absolutely correct, and the positions of other existing papers are wrong, or vice versa, that the attitudes of the existing paper are appropriate and those of HANGYORE SINMUN are mistaken.

One thing that is to be made clear here is that there is not just one appropriate viewpoint but multifarious viewpoints coexist, and they go through a process of confrontations and compromises. In this way, the formative process of public opinion should be allowed to develop dialectically. As the classical liberals stressed, when all sorts of opinions are traded on the open market of speech, one can expect to arrive at a truth with less errors. It should be recognized clearly that assuring the process is the most important duty for the government.

On the other hand, on the part of HANGYORE SINMUN, to overcome the limitations on the volume of information and its variety, it urgently needs to take drastic measures. In its present state, HANGYORE SINMUN cannot be much more than a supplementary paper that provides supplementary information on the issues that other papers neglect, or merely another paper to be read along with other papers.

The problems of volume and variety of information could be solved only through the increase of the number of reporters and the expansion of the number of pages. What should precede these is an increase capital. It was quite unreasonable to launch a national paper with a capital of 5 billion won. Therefore, even now, it is necessary to develop a detailed plan for a large-scale increase of the capital by launching a long-term and massive fund-raising campaign among the people.

## Burma

### Diplomatic Relations Established With Colombia

BK2811071588 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese  
0630 GMT 28 Nov 88

[Text] The Government of the Union of Burma and the Government of the Republic of Colombia, desirous of developing friendship and cooperation as well as bilateral relations based on the principles of equality; mutual respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; nonaggression; noninterference in each other's internal affairs; and peaceful coexistence have decided to establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with effect from 28 November 1988.

The announcement was made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today.

### Commission Announces Registration of 147 Parties

BK2811143888 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese  
1330 GMT 28 Nov 88

["Press Release No 112/88 of the Commission for Holding Democratic Multiparty General Elections, dated 28 November—the 5th day of the waning moon of Tazaungmon, 1350 Burmese era"]

[Text] As of 25 November 1988, a total of 146 political parties had registered with this commission in accordance with the Political Parties Registration Law. The following political parties were allowed to register today—28 November:

#### 1. League of New Generation, Union of Burma.

Hence, as of today, a total of 147 political parties have registered with this commission under the Political Parties Registration Law.

### Liberal People's Party Announces Programs

BK2611092088 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese  
1330 GMT 25 Nov 88

["Press Release No 103/88 of the Commission for Holding Democratic Multiparty General Elections, dated 25 November—the 2d day of the waning moon of Tazaungmon, 1350 Burmese era"]

[Text] 1. The following are extracts of the objectives and future programs of the Liberal People's Party, which has registered with this Commission for Holding Democratic Multiparty General Elections in accordance with the Political Parties Registration Law, and which has its headquarters at No 397, Inner Wezayanta Road, Zagwetaung Ward, Thingangyun Township, Rangoon Division.

#### 2. Aims:

A. To produce capable and good persons and perceptive political leaders with management capability;

B. To consult with any political organizations on emergence of a democratic government and a multiparty democratic, peaceful, and united state;

C. To assist public service personnel to work freely and justly within the framework of existing laws;

D. To strive for a Union of Burma where democracy flourishes and for the Union of Burma to take a distinguished place in the world as a place where truth prevails; and

E. To have friendly and close relations and cooperation with countries, especially neighboring countries, which contribute to the progress of the country and the people in accordance with the principles contained in the UN Charter.

#### 3. Programs: Politics.

A. To give priority to the cause of perpetuating the independence and democracy of the Union of Burma which have been achieved after the sacrificing of lives and blood;

B. To find ways which all the nation's peoples could follow and practice in establishing internal peace; and

C. To cooperate with democratic forces according to circumstances in working toward the emergence of a genuinely democratic government which could guarantee basic human rights according to the wishes of the people.

#### Economics.

A. To allow public, cooperative, joint venture, and private sectors in a democratic state and to cooperate with the masses in serving the interests of both human and policy factors proportionately;

B. To strive to educate and organize in implementing economic plans aimed at quickly raising the living standard and narrowing the gap between the rich and poor and for enjoyment of equal benefits by the nation's peoples;

C. To manage so as to ensure that those in agricultural work can meet their needs for food, clothes, and shelter with their income;

D. To strive to give financial and welfare assistance to workers and public service personnel who earn low incomes; and

E. To encourage competition among public, cooperative, joint venture, and public sectors in industry, from cottage industry to heavy industry levels, and to provide sufficient amounts of raw materials, spares, and electrical power and to ensure fairness in the market system.

#### F. Education.

To consult with curriculum specialists to proportionately develop the current education system and to gradually reform it into a system which could guarantee a living. Health.

To provide sufficient amounts of medicines and medical supplies and to provide medical care through personnel with goodwill.

Culture.

To allow freedom of religion, to encourage development of national culture, and to have cultural cooperation with all countries of the world, including neighboring countries.

**Column Discusses Student Absconders**  
*BK2811032588 Rangoon WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY in English 8 Nov 88 pp 4, 6, 7*

[Article by Sann Thu Maung: "Are Their Intentions Sincere?"]

[Text] A broadcast by Radio Beijing at 6 pm on 29 October stated that the XINHUA news correspondent has reported that a combined announcement issued by 43 registered political parties of Burma has requested the government to revoke the deadline for accepting those students who have absconded to border regions without action being taken against them. The broadcast also stated that the said announcement was issued at the meeting held by the National league for Democracy which invited 42 other political parties.

The broadcast further said that the announcement had also claimed that students had absconded after 18 September because the government had sought to resolve the disturbances through violent means and that the announcement denounced the unjustified arrests of students by the government. Furthermore, the All India Radio broadcast at 5:45 pm on 29 October extracts from Indian newspapers concerning current conditions in Burma in which the radio said that the deadline of 18 November be revoked for the return of students from border regions. Is it 43 parties? Or is it 49 parties? Even though the figure is not precisely known, having to learn from foreign radio broadcasts that a so-called joint announcement has been issued by these parties made me raise my brows. And then the broadcast further stated that the 49 parties' joint announcement had claimed that the government's decision to open these reception camps was an unjust and insincere arrangement prompted by ill-intentioned and vindictive aims. When I realized that these allegations amounted to accusations that the reception camps opened by the Tatmadaw [Defense Forces] with all the best intentions were in effect traps, my eyes were wide in astonishment, and I couldn't help uttering "Oh God!"

What the 49-party joint announcement meant to say was that the government was being antagonistic towards the students—that the government was arresting the students who returned and that the announcement by the 49 parties denounced the government of Burma; that was what I heard over the foreign radio broadcasts concerning the so-called joint announcement by the 43 or 49 parties. Students who had been to the insurgent camps in the border regions and who had run away from them in frustration told us that they were totally prohibited from listening to the MYANMA ATHAN [Burma broadcasting service] broadcasts; and they were allowed to listen to only certain foreign broadcasting stations. If this is the case then this so-called joint announcement by these

parties is bound to be heard by the students who are in the hands of the insurgents. And what would the students think on hearing the broadcasts?

It would indeed be a tragedy if the students began to imagine that the reception camps opened with the best intentions of the Tatmadaw are nothing more than traps. It would indeed be tragic if the students began to wrongly believe that the reception camps were opened to arrest them—it would be tragic if they began to believe that there was no way back for them from the insurgent camps and that they could not hope to run away from the insurgents back to safety. Is not the entire attempt a deliberate effort to deter students from trying to run away from the hands of the insurgents back to the bosom of the parents?

On 18 September 1988, the Tatmadaw unavoidably had to intervene in time because of the general deteriorating conditions in the country. After that, the Tatmadaw also gave repeated guarantees that it would successfully conduct free and fair multiparty general elections. It was about this time that students began absconding. Why did this happen? Who were the ones, who instigated that the students with such militant slogans as "Ya-yin-ya Ma-ya-yin-Cha" (Either get what you want or hit if you cannot get it.) and "Ya-ya Ma-ya-ya Cha" (Hit anyway whether you get what you want or not.)? Who were the ones who pushed the young students into running away with such incitement as "Go to the border regions, otherwise you will be arrested; there await all ready for you arms and ammunition procured through foreign assistance"? Who then also are those who gave such guarantees as "You must go on strike; you must create disturbances; it does not matter if everything gets destroyed; in about three months' time everything will become as good as new with foreign assistance"?

When the students were told to continue with the strike, the students asked "there can be much danger for us. If such dangers become a reality what arrangements have you made for protecting us?" Who were the people who answered in reply: "Depend on the strength of your own two feet"? Students in the rural areas elected their representatives and asked what the representatives should do when they got to Rangoon. These representatives from the district were told "Go underground" and there were certain organizations which selected their own people as district representatives and zonal representatives. It would not have been too bad if the students had been merely taken advantage of; but what happened was that the students were actually indiscriminately flung into the flames—now these very people who have committed such viciousness against the students are the very ones who are casting the blame upon the Tatmadaw.

Vice-Chief of Staff (Army) Lt-Gen Than Shwe on 26 September 1988 issued a declaration of the Tatmadaw's view with regard to the students. Moreover, the Tatmadaw's air-dropped leaflets "Invitation to students" stating that 27 reception camps have been opened to take

full care of their needs, to feed them, to provide them with medical treatment and eventually to make arrangements for their return to their parents. [sentence as published] The Tatmadaw also provided all possible assistance to those parents who wish to call back their young sons and daughters. Tatmadaw columns utilized every means to reach and bring back students who were in the hands of the enemy.

All the students who have returned gave accounts of how the Tatmadaw camps and reception camps have welcomed them; how they have been well-fed and well-looked after and how those who have caught malaria and these who were suffering from malnutrition were given treatment and how finally they have been sent back home to their parents as quickly as possible. The names and addresses of all students who had returned were fully publicized through the MYANMA ATHAN broadcasts, the MYANMA YOKMYINTHANGYAR telecasts and through the newspapers. Those parents who have lost their young sons and daughters have all the time been listening to lists read out in such a way. It is difficult to describe the happiness of parents who suddenly hear the names of their sons and daughters on the lists thus publicized. Yet, with all these positive aspects to show there are still some people who say that such and such names are false and that the addresses given are untrue and even that the news being publicized thus is too long.

The existence of culprits who are responsible for the students' absconding is already obvious. Such persons are the ones who caused the students to abscond and it is the Tatmadaw alone which is taking the responsibility of taking these young students back. Which are the organizations that have ever exerted one iota of effort in this purpose? Which other persons at all have issued an announcement to make the students to return? We can find party organizations whose announcements, whatever they may be, are enthusiastically broadcast by foreign broadcasting stations. But whether we listen to the BBC or the VOA there has not been one instance in which any party has issued an announcement calling for the students to return. Now what they are alleging is that the students absconded because of the Tatmadaw.

And they are also saying that the reception camps are actually nothing more than traps; that the students will be arrested and even killed if they return. What they are alleging is tantamount to telling the students never to return. It is equally incomprehensible while demands have been made to close down the reception camps. And now they are also demanding that the deadline of 18 November for the return of the students be revoked. It is important to realize that what they are doing is not asking for an extension of the date. At first glance the general public may be fooled into believing that all such demands are being made for the benefit of the students. But it is very clear that the 43- or 49-parties joint announcement is meant to disrupt the steadfast endeavours being made by the Tatmadaw to bring back these young students to their parents' bosom. The public fully

realize that the Tatmadaw has been endeavouring to restore law and order in the State and to regain peace and tranquillity and to expedite smooth and efficient transportation and to bring about uninterrupted flow of commodities so as to bring down prices besides the efforts being made to recall these young students. It is indeed surprising that there has been so much generosity that no action has been taken against the main culprits.

They were the ones who instigated the disturbances. They were the ones who advised running away. And now they are the same ones who are deterring the students from returning.

Today, news has emerged that students who are now in the hands of insurgents and are meeting a lot of troubles and where reality and their expectations have become totally different as well as those students who have been left in Rangoon without knowing what to do and whom to turn to are increasingly bitter at those who have been the cause of all their problems. Is it because of this that these people are very afraid that the students would return? Or can there be a different reason—it is possible that they are intent upon throwing all obstacles in the path of the successful holding of the multiparty general elections?

I would truly like to ask some questions to those parties which issued the joint announcement.

Was the joint announcement issued because you did not want the students to return to their parents?

Are you not in favour of the smooth progress being achieved towards the successful holding of the multiparty general elections?

Is the content of this joint announcement in accord with the aims, objectives and programmes which you have legally submitted?

### **Brunei, Malaysia & Singapore**

#### **Malaysia**

**Abu Hassan Comments on Cam Ranh Bay Offer**  
*BK2811105488 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English*  
1029 GMT 28 Nov 88

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Nov 28 (OANA-BERNAMA)—Malaysian Foreign Minister Abu Hassan Omar said Monday [28 November] Vietnam should work towards resolving the Kampuchean and refugee problems first before making proposals on the use of its naval base by foreign powers.

Commenting on a recent report that Vietnam was seriously considering allowing other countries besides the Soviet Union to use military facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, he said: "I do not know whether this is in the best interest of Vietnam or the region."

Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co was reported to have said Vietnam would like to open its ship repair and refuelling facilities to all countries including the United States to show the world that Vietnam was a peaceful country.

Abu Hassan told reporters here that as far as he was concerned, Vietnam should show its "good faith" [words indistinct].

"Cam Ranh is Vietnam's internal matter but Kampuchea and the refugees are regional problems," he said. "Vietnam should give priority to what the problems are," he added.

**PRC Minister Identifies Types of Investment**  
*BK2611154588 Kuala Lumpur Domestic Service in Malay 1430 GMT 26 Nov 88*

[Text] The PRC has identified four types of industrial investment in Malaysia. PRC Minister for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Zheng Tuobin said the four are palm oil, (?quinine), timber, and (?iron).

Speaking at a news conference in Penang, he said that the two trade agreements recently signed with the Malaysian Government will increase the volume of trade and investment between the two countries.

Mr Zheng said he was impressed with Malaysia's palm oil industry, rapid economic growth, and low inflation rate. Mr Zheng is leading a nine-man delegation currently visiting Malaysia.

**Hungarian Foreign Minister Arrives 27 November**  
*BK2711130788 Hong Kong AFP in English 1232 GMT 27 Nov 88*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Nov 27 (AFP)—Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi arrived here Sunday for a four-day visit during which he will call on Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed and Malaysian counterpart Hassan Omar.

Mr. Varkonyi will also hold discussions with Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin, Transport Minister Ling Liong Sik and Primary Industries Minister Lim Keng Yaik, the domestic BERNAMA News Agency said.

**Holds Talks With Abu Hassan**  
*BK2811092388 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English 0804 GMT 28 Nov 88*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Nov 28 (OANA-BERNAMA)—Malaysia and Hungary may set up a committee to discuss and exchange views on bilateral and international issues, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abu Hassan Omar said here Monday [28 November].

He said Malaysia had agreed in principle to such a committee, which was proposed by visiting Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Dr Peter Varkonyi and details of the committee will be worked out soon at official level.

Dr Varkonyi, who arrived here Sunday, is on a four-day official visit to Malaysia.

Abu Hassan said Malaysia is also considering Hungary's request for both countries to open diplomatic missions in their respective capitals. Malaysia has agreed to open a mission in Budapest when the financial situation permits, he said.

He also said an agreement to avoid double taxation, and a memorandum of understanding between the Malaysian Finance Ministry and the Hungarian National Bank, will be signed soon in a bid to increase trade.

Abu Hassan said Malaysia has invited the newly elected Hungarian prime minister, Miklos Nemeth, to visit the country. Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamed visited Hungary in July last year.

**Arab Move on Palestine Debate Supported**  
*BK2811091288 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English 0832 GMT 28 Nov 88*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Nov 28 (OANA-BERNAMA)—Malaysia will support an Arab move to have the UN General Assembly debate on Palestine shifted to Geneva from New York following the United States' refusal to grant a visa to PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat, Foreign Minister Abu Hassan Omar said Monday [28 November].

"We hope it won't come to that," he said, but added that if Malaysia was asked to support such a move, "we will certainly support it."

"We have given recognition to the recently proclaimed Palestinian state and 'Arafat should be given the chance to go to New York," he said.

Abu Hassan was commenting on reports that Egypt and Jordan have launched an Arab bid to transfer the UN debate on Palestine to Geneva after the United States denied 'Arafat a visa on the grounds that "PLO elements have engaged in terrorism against Americans and others."

'Arafat had wanted to speak to the General Assembly on Thursday during its annual debate on Palestine and, according to PLO officials, was going to ask the UN for a seat for the Palestinian state, which had only been proclaimed by the Palestinian Parliament-in-exile in Algiers on Nov 15.

Abu Hassan said Malaysia hoped the United States would reconsider and allow 'Arafat to attend the UN session.

To date, at least 54 countries have recognised the Palestinian state.

**Tengku Razaleigh Rejects Cabinet Post Offer**

*BK2211115488 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English  
1131 GMT 22 Nov 88*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Nov 22 (OANA-BERNAMA)—Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamed Tuesday [22 November] said his political rival Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah has rejected his offer of a cabinet post by saying it was a "political corruption".

Tengku Razaleigh's letter responding to the offer was received recently, the prime minister told reporters here.

Asked by reporters whether his offer to the former trade and industry minister is still open despite the rejection, Dr Mahathir said it is still valid and without any time frame.

Dr Mahathir, who is also the president of the nine-month old United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), made the offer to Tengku Razaleigh and former Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam during the UMNO General Assembly last month "for the sake of Malay unity"

The offer to the two ex-UMNO stalwarts to rejoin the cabinet as ministers without portfolio was later formalised through official letters.

Tengku Razaleigh contested against Dr Mahathir for the number one post at the old UMNO General Assembly in 1987 and lost. Musa, who contested for the deputy president post and lost to Ghafar Baba, had earlier rejected the offer.

The old UMNO was declared unlawful by the High Court in February due to the existence of unregistered branches.

**Mahathir Urges Avoidance of Racial Sentiments**

*BK2611091488 Kuala Lumpur International Service  
in English 0800 GMT 26 Nov 88*

[Excerpt] Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir today reminded leaders of the component parties of the ruling National Front not to give in too much to racial sentiments in efforts to secure support for their respective party. He warned that if all the leaders were to follow the sentiments of the different communities in the country, sooner or later, there will be racial riots.

The prime minister said this when opening the Gerakan [Party] 17th annual delegate conference in Penang. Gerakan is a component party of the ruling National Front. He urged leaders of the front to give the [words indistinct], which aim at reducing misunderstanding and friction among the races. However, he regretted that (?leaders) of some component parties no longer practice

the National Front spirit, but are set to follow the style of opposition parties. They were doing this perhaps thinking that they also should occasionally act like opposition party leaders to obtain the support of the community they represented. [passage omitted]

**Mahathir Approves Flood Aid to Kelantan**

*BK2411114788 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English  
1105 GMT 24 Nov 88*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Nov 24 (OANA/BERNAMA)—Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamed today approved immediate aid of \$200,000 (US\$76,000) to the state government of the northern state of Kelantan, the state worst hit by the current floods in peninsular Malaysia.

He said the floods this time were abnormal and the federal government was giving serious attention to the plight of the flood victims.

Mahathir spent the whole day touring the flood-stricken areas in Kelantan Thursday to have a first-hand look at the situation of the thousands of people who had to flee their homes.

Twenty-five people have died since the floods hit Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Kedah, Perlis, Johor and some parts of Melaka, Negeri Sembilan and Pulau Pinang five days ago.

**Singapore**

**Chinese Trade Minister Arrives 26 November**

*BK2611141688 Hong Kong AFP in English 1355 GMT  
26 Nov 88*

[Text] Singapore, Nov 26 (AFP)—China's Minister for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Zheng Tuobin arrived here Saturday for a five-day visit to discuss trade and economic issues.

Mr. Zheng will begin his programme Monday with visits to the Trade Development Board, Jurong Town Corporation which oversees the Jurong Industrial Complex, the science park and the Economic Development Board.

On Tuesday, he will meet his host Minister for Trade and Industry Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong for talks focussing on bilateral trade and economic matters and areas where mutual cooperation can be enhanced.

Mr. Zheng will also pay a courtesy call on First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong Tuesday.

The Chinese minister and the five officials accompanying him were met on their arrival by Minister of State for Trade and Industry Mah Bow Tan.

### **Calls on Deputy Prime Minister**

*BK2911112988 Singapore Domestic Service in English  
1100 GMT 29 Nov 88*

[Text] The visiting Chinese minister of foreign economic relations and trade, Mr Zheng Tuobin, today called on the first deputy prime minister and minister for defense, Mr Goh Chok Tong. He also met the minister for trade and industry, Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong. Mr Zheng is in Singapore at the invitation of Gen Lee.

Accompanied by seven officials, [words indistinct] the Jurong Industrial Estate, and the Science Park. He also met officials of the Trade Development Board and Jurong Town Corporation. Mr Zheng returns to Beijing tomorrow.

### **Cambodia**

#### **Hun Sen Interviewed by Soviet Weekly**

*BK2911123988 Phnom Penh SPK in English  
1110 GMT 29 Nov 88*

[All quotation marks as received]

[Text] Phnom Penh SPK November 29—Under the title "The Worst is Over," the Soviet weekly "NEW TIMES" recently published an interview of its special correspondent in Phnom Penh with Hun Sen, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

On the international position of the People's Republic of Kampuchea over the last ten years, Hun Sen said: "The West and China have tried hard to isolate our country, to ostracize it, so to speak. I think it is for this reason that Kampuchea's external ties are not as broad now as they could be. Nevertheless, we have close relations not only with socialist countries but also with several developing and nonaligned states.

In all, we maintain relations with 36 countries and four national liberation movements. Now that the prospect of a Kampuchean settlement has become real, the process of recognition will clearly develop more rapidly. In any case, the representatives of a number of Asian countries spoke with me on this subject in Indonesia.

About the present economic situation in Kampuchea, Hun Sen said: "I don't think it can be described either as very good or very bad. The hardest times are over, in my opinion, and the prospects are favourable. The last year or two have perhaps been the most auspicious for our economy.

First, the price of foodstuffs and most articles of prime necessity have been stable for over a year. Supply has improved thanks to the introduction of a free open market last year. The gap between supply and demand is narrowing. However, there are still shortages of popular goods and foodstuffs. Secondly, the gap between government expenditure and revenue is gradually diminishing,

but it has not yet been closed, as our resources are rather limited. Thirdly, the gap between imports and exports is perhaps especially wide, though it has reduced to some extent. We are modest in this respect. Fourthly, the correlation between the incomes of the population and the level of prices.

Some of the main foodstuffs are distributed in limited quantities among government employees and workers of state owned enterprises at fixed low prices. But their wages and salaries are not high enough to buy other goods on the free market. We are trying to raise pay little by little."

Hun Sen continued: "We estimate the present shortage of rice in the country at 100,000 tons. However, if maize, grain and other food crops are taken into account, food supplies will be adequate. So it can be said that we have achieved self-sufficiency in this respect—at a modest level, of course. The state purchases rice from peasants in the quantities set by the plan. Enough rice is left in their stores for personal consumption, while many peasants are even able to sell some of their rice on the free market. I can say with certainty that there is now enough food everywhere in every province."

Asked about his assessment of the Soviet-Kampuchean relations, Hun Sen said: "Our relations are characterized by close friendship and brotherhood. The all-round assistance given by the Soviet Union and Vietnam has enabled our republic to survive. We are deeply grateful to the Soviet Union, its government and people.

Our economic relations, or more precisely, Soviet aid and assistance to Kampuchea, considering the volume of this help, have been and remain very important to us. A great many installations in our country, especially soon after liberation when we felt an acute need to rebuild the country disrupted by the Pol Pot regime, have been constructed, restored and commissioned: with the help of Soviet experts and thanks to the delivery of Soviet goods, machines and other equipment.

#### **Commentary Condemns 'Vietnamization' Scheme**

*BK2911015588 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic  
Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 28 Nov 88*

[Station commentary: "The Vietnamese Enemy is Launching an Abject Scheme by Changing the Nationality of Vietnamese Settlers to Khmer Nationality in an Attempt To Further Occupy Cambodia"]

[Text] According to documents captured by our National Army of Democratic Kampuchea [NADK], reports by our people, and confessions by Vietnamese and Cambodian soldiers who have fled to join our NADK, the Vietnamese authorities in Cambodia are changing the nationality of Vietnamese nationals who were sent successively to settle in Cambodia during the past 10 years to Khmer.

According to the latest statistics, there are now more than a million Vietnamese civilians who have been sent to settle in Cambodia by the Hanoi authorities. A large number of these Vietnamese settlers hold Khmer identity cards as a result of this naturalization process. The Vietnamese authorities who are occupying and controlling Cambodia are continuing to give Khmer nationality to these Vietnamese nationals so that these more than 1 million Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia have legal rights to own land and farms that they have confiscated from the Cambodian people and enjoy the right to vote as all Cambodian people if a political solution to the Cambodian problem is reached.

According to reports by our people and confessions by Vietnamese and Cambodian soldiers who defected to the NADK, the Hanoi authorities are currently sending more Vietnamese nationals to Cambodia. Immediately after their arrival, these Vietnamese nationals are given Khmer nationality.

According to secret documents captured by our side, this attempt by the Vietnamese authorities to give Khmer nationality to Vietnamese nationals is aimed at making this process in line with their successive statements and announcements that they will withdraw all their troops from Cambodia by 1990. This attempt to give Khmer nationality to Vietnamese settlers is carried out simultaneously with the process to disguise the Vietnamese aggressor troops in Cambodia as Cambodian puppet soldiers and to introduce Vietnamese agents disguised as puppet personnel into the puppet administration.

All this evidence clearly proves that the Hanoi authorities have not planned to withdraw from Cambodia, neither in 1990, 2000, nor any other years to come. On the contrary, they are launching all kinds of criminal schemes to totally annex Cambodia as they did Kampuchea Kraom and the Champa Empire in the 17th century and are doing to Laos at present.

We appeal to all peace- and justice-loving countries to raise their voice in condemnation of this new abject scheme of the Hanoi authorities and to increase pressure on them so as to force them to quickly withdraw their troops from Cambodia, thus preventing them from implementing their Vietnamization policy in Cambodia.

We also appeal to all Cambodian people and all fraternal Cambodian soldiers and administrators who have been installed to serve the Vietnamese enemy to jointly oppose, strive to smash this scheme of the Vietnamese aggressors, and join hands with the NADK in fighting even more vigorously against the Vietnamese aggressors so as to force them to quickly withdraw from our Cambodian territory.

Experiences gained in the past 10 years attest that only after our entire Cambodian nationals both inside and outside the country jointly struggle arduously and persistently against them, thus causing all-around difficulties to them, will the Vietnamese aggressors consent to

abandon their design to annex Cambodia by withdrawing all their aggressor troops from Cambodia, thus allowing the Cambodian people to decide their destiny by themselves.

## Indonesia

### Government 'Regrets' Denial of 'Arafat Visa

BK2911104088 Jakarta ANTARA in English  
1016 GMT 29 Nov 88

[Text] Jakarta, Nov 29 (OANA-ANTARA)—The Government of Indonesia deeply regrets that Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was denied an entry visa to the United States to attend the 43d UN General Assembly in New York.

The Foreign Ministry in a press statement issued here [words indistinct] to the UN Headquarters agreement and the obligations of the United States Government as the host country.

The Government of Indonesia, the statement said, is of the view that the presence of Yasir 'Arafat at the UN General Assembly will indeed facilitate and accelerate the solution of the Middle East conflict which has persisted for over 40 years.

For that reason, the Government of Indonesia calls upon the United States Government to issue the entry visa, the statement concluded.

### Suharto Opens Journalists Association

BK2811111588 Jakarta ANTARA in English  
0958 GMT 28 Nov 88

[Excerpt] Samarinda (East Kalimantan), Nov 28 (OANA-ANTARA)—President Suharto has stressed the importance for the national press to maintain its prestige and authority although it is presently entering an era of business. Addressing the opening of the 18th National Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI) here on Monday, the head of state further stated that since the national press has been entering the business world so the national press is not only developed on the basis of idealism, but should also be managed in a businesslike manner. [sentence as received] According to the president, the national press development has demanded a greater responsibility.

"The most important thing is that the national press should be able to maintain its prestige and authority bestowed upon its shoulder by the people," President Suharto insisted.

The president also emphasized that if commercial consideration defeated the idealism of the national press, (it was) entering a "dangerous zone."

Such a development, he went on, is detrimental to the national development programs and to the life of the national press itself.

In this connection, President Suharto insisted that all parties, particularly those of the press circle, should be able to promote the national press into a sound, free, and responsible institution.

The national press responsibility would be more higher in the year to come since the country is entering a decisive era for the future of the nation.

President Suharto further stressed on the importance of the press the national development and on the need for the enhancement of the role of the press in the next fifth 5-year national development plan (Repelita V) as outlined in the guidelines of the state policy (GBHN).

"It means that the national press is demanded to make introspection in order to make a concrete solution on its role in the nation building," he insisted.

In this regard, the chief executive emphasized that the national press should strengthen its role in the national development, and on the other hand refrain from reporting news which are detrimental to the national development. [passage omitted]

**Petition of Jamaah Imran Leader Rejected**  
*BK2811143388 Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian*  
21 Nov 88 p 3

[Excerpt] Jakarta, KOMPAS—A petition for pardon filed by Ashar bin Safar, a leader of the Jamaah Imran [Islamic fundamentalist] group, has been rejected by President Suharto. Therefore, the man with four children currently being detained at the Cirebon jail will face the execution squad in line with the verdict passed by the South Jakarta High Court and later upheld by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

According to data compiled by KOMPAS, Ashar was sentenced to death by the South Jakarta High Court on 25 September 1982. In passing the verdict, a panel of judges headed by Pitoyo, with Suroso Bagio and Endang Sutardi as panel members, stated that Ashar was found guilty of subversive charges.

The panel of judges said among other things that Ashar was found guilty of illegal possession of a revolver and that his house in Menteng Pulo in Jakarta had been turned into a training place to assemble and disassemble weapons. Ashar was also involved in the plan to murder members of the Jamaah Imran who were accused of deviating from teachings. In addition, he also endorsed and even took part in planning the hijacking of a Garuda Indonesian Airways plane in 1981. He was among those Jamaah Imran leaders who endorsed the attack on the Cicendo Police Station in Bandung which killed several

policemen on duty. Ashar also went to see the Iranian ambassador in Jakarta for approval to kidnap the Iraqi oil minister who would attend the OPEC meeting in Bali. [passage omitted]

**Suharto Inaugurates LPG Refineries 28 November**  
*BK2811115988 Jakarta ANTARA in English*  
1014 GMT 28 Nov 88

[Excerpt] Bontang, East Kalimantan, Nov 28 (OANA-ANTARA)—President Suharto Monday inaugurated LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) refineries in Bontang, East Kalimantan, and in Acun, Aceh in which he said strengthened the position of the chemical industry in the entire industrialization process in Indonesia.

The president said in the inaugural ceremony which took place here, that Indonesia's experience in the running and management of this type of industry has brought forward skillful manufacturing personnel who are most important to embark on the industrialization era as a whole in the future.

For Indonesia, he added, industrial development not only means to increase the number of industrial enterprises in the country, but that such industries must be built and run by Indonesians themselves. [passage omitted]

**AFP Reports Golkar 'Anticommunist Witch Hunt'**  
*BK2811045088 Hong Kong AFP in English 0219 GMT*  
28 Nov 88

[By Alain Boebion]

[Text] Jakarta, Nov 28 (AFP)—Indonesia appears more intent than ever on ridding itself of former followers of the banned PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party, analysts here say.

Last week, a member of the executive committee of the ruling Golkar political group had to resign after press reports said he had belonged in the 1960s to a group close to the PKI.

Sartoyo Prawirosurojo had been named last month, with the approval of the country's top authorities, to join the leadership of Golkar, the politico-military group that has run Indonesia since 1967.

Officially, the 58-year-old Mr. Sartoyo resigned for "health reasons," but Golkar Secretary-General Rakhmat Witular said he would be replaced by someone "ideologically healthier."

Another Golkar member said Mr. Sartoyo's replacement should not soil "the clean political environment."

Mr. Sartoyo, who since October had led the Golkar-affiliated Federation of Farmers and Fishermen, had been besieged by rumors.

Press reports said he had belonged in the 1960s to groups close to the PKI, which is held responsible for a September 30, 1965, coup attempt and has been banned for the past 21 years.

His election to the executive committee sparked strong reactions among retired military officers who, although a minority in the executive committee, still control its key posts, including the chairmanship, observers said.

But Mr. Sartoyo's candidacy had been backed by former Golkar Chairman and Indonesian Vice President Sudharmono, and ratified by President Suharto on Mr. Sudharmono's recommendation, they said.

Members of Mr. Sudharmono's inner circle deny this.

"It was Mr. Sudharmono who pointed a finger at Mr. Sartoyo and told the head of state: 'That man is a communist,'" a Sudharmono aide said.

Mr. Sartoyo was in jail after the attempted coup but was never tried because of insufficient evidence, informed sources said.

"We are seeing a real anticommunist witch hunt ... It is probable that others will be found in the next few weeks inside Golkar or elsewhere," one Indonesian political observer said Sunday.

Mr. Sudharmono's past too has been the subject of rumors, only one month after he was replaced at the head of Golkar by retired General Wahono, who is close to President Suharto.

Three days before congress opened, Mr. Sudharmono told journalists that, contrary to what an anonymous letter making the rounds in Jakarta said, he had never belonged to PKI-linked groups.

Infiltration by former PKI sympathizers or members of their families into Golkar was the subject of debate during the last session of congress.

The Armed Forces' chief of general staff, General Tri Sutrisno, called on the party leadership to clean out its ranks.

Official sources said 37 employees of the Information Ministry were fired after being accused of having had ties with the PKI.

Probes are reportedly under way at other ministries and in the press, where the history of journalists—and articles they have written—are being gone through with a fine-tooth comb, they said.

Zulharman, head of the Indonesian Journalists' Association, will also be replaced, several newspapers reported last week.

He is expected to be replaced by retired General Sugeng Wijaya, publisher of the daily BERITA YUDHA (WAR NEWS), who will become the first former soldier to occupy the post.

In 1965, the PKI was Asia's second largest communist party after that of China, with an estimated 1.5 million members and more than twice as many sympathizers.

Several human rights organizations have put the number of communists killed in the days that followed the coup attempt put down by General Suharto at 200,000 to one million.

## Laos

**Paper Hails Joint Communique With Thailand**  
BK2811150788 *Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao*  
0000 GMT 28 Nov 88

[PASASON "article": "A Very Significant Step Toward Improvement and Strengthening of Lao-Thai Relations and Cooperation"—date not given]

[Text] On the afternoon of 25 November, the official friendship visit to the LPDR by the Thai delegation, headed by His Excellency General Chatchai Chunhawan, at the invitation of His Excellency Kaysone Phomvihane, chairman of the LPDR Council of Ministers, ended with a glorious success. This visit to the LPDR by the delegation from the Kingdom of Thailand resulted from the positive efforts of both sides, particularly from the efforts of the two heads of government who devoted themselves to seeking ways to promote and develop in an appropriate manner in accordance with the requirements of the present situation and in conformity with the common benefits of the two countries, the time-honored relations, cooperation, and fraternal friendship between the two peoples of Laos and Thailand.

During the visit, His Excellency Chatchai Chunhawan paid a courtesy call on His Excellency Phoumi Vongvichit, acting president of the LPDR, and received a courtesy call from His Excellency Khamtai Siphandon, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of national defense of the LPDR. He also visited some historic and other significant places in Vientiane municipality where he was welcomed with pleasure by officials and people.

During the visit, consultative meetings were held between the government delegations of the two countries to form agreements on various issues of common interest. The consultations between the two sides proceeded in a spirit of responsibility and sincerity.

His Excellency Kaysone Phomvihane and His Excellency Chatchai Chunhawan also signed a joint communique; a communique marking a milestone in the promotion and improvement of the fraternal relations, cooperation, and friendship between the two peoples of Laos and Thailand.

The major contents of the joint communique note: The two sides reiterated that the principles contained in the two joint Lao-Thai communiqués of 1979 still remain valid and conform to the aspirations of the peoples of the two countries to strengthen relations, understanding, and close cooperation. The heads of the two governments unanimously agreed that the current world situation has changed from confrontation to consultation and compromise in the settlement of international conflicts through political means for development and peaceful coexistence. That is why the visit to the LPDR by Chatchai Chunhawan and his delegation on this occasion constitutes a new, important turning point in the relations between the two countries. The communique continues: The heads of the two governments, therefore, agreed in principle on the building of a bridge across the Mekong River. The Thai side agreed to render cooperation in developing the communications network, electric power enterprises, and agriculture, and to promote joint investment in production of goods for export to Laos; agreed to appoint government-level joint cooperation committees to serve as channels for promoting and strengthening relations in various fields; and agreed to support the establishment of joint friendship associations in each country. With regard to the problem of Lao refugees in Thailand, the communique says: The two sides agreed to cooperate with each other and with the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] in resolving this problem.

In addition, to further promote mutual understanding and to strengthen the good relations between the armies of the two countries, it was agreed to assign military attaches to each other's capital. The communique further notes: The heads of government of the two countries expressed gratification on the concrete fruits borne from the meetings, and on cooperation between the joint military committees in the past. To prevent undesirable incidents from occurring in the disputed area, which would again affect relations between the two countries, and to advance toward normalizing the situation in the said area, the two governments have agreed to appoint a joint Lao-Thai border committee and to instruct it to promptly hold negotiations to settle this problem. The two government heads have also reiterated their common intentions that the implementation of the aforesaid measures will result in turning the border between the two countries into a border of peace, friendship, good relations, and mutual prosperity and happiness. Regarding the Cambodia issue, the communique notes: The heads of the two governments have pledged to do their utmost to contribute to the political settlement of the Cambodian problem.

It can be said that this visit to the LPDR marks a new, significant turning point in relations between the two countries. The visit has emphasized national development and the promotion of well-being of the peoples of the two countries by establishing mutual cooperation, both in the governmental and private sectors, through economic and trade exchanges, exchanges in the fields of science, technology, culture, and education; and the exchanges of visits

at various levels on the basis of the spirit of mutual understanding and trust, mutual assistance in a fraternal manner, equality, and mutual benefits.

The Lao Government and people pledge to do everything possible to translate into reality the contents of this joint communique with a view toward promoting, expanding, and strengthening, with every passing day, the fraternal relations, cooperation, and friendship between the two peoples of Laos and Thailand for the benefit of the two countries and in the interest of the cause of peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the world.

### Prospects for Relations Viewed

BK2911043388 *Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao*  
0000 GMT 29 Nov 88

[Feature: "Atmosphere Of Lao-Thai Relations"]

[Text] Respected listeners: It can be said that late 1988 marks the time of a new turning point, next to 1979, in the relations between the two countries—Laos and Thailand—which have been known as fraternal countries since ancient times. This new turning point has emerged following the fruitful official friendship visit to the LPDR by His Excellency Chatchai Chunhawan, prime minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, from 24-25 November during which a joint communique was signed between the two countries.

In 1979—the time during which His Excellency Kriangsak Chamanan was prime minister of the Kingdom of Thailand—Laos and Thailand also signed two joint communiqués which were aimed at improving the neighborly relations and promoting peace and mutual trust between the peoples of the two countries. But, not long after that, the fraternal promises were obstructed and destroyed by a number of ill-intentioned elements in Thailand. As a result, many undesirable incidents occurred which affected the relations and fraternal friendship between the Lao and Thai peoples. One example of these was the incident involving three Lao villages, which brought about great loss of life and property to both sides.

Nevertheless, though the political settlement of the latter problem has been delayed until present, the Lao-Thai joint communique of 25 November 1988 clearly notes measures for a settlement. It says: To advance toward making the situation in the disputed area return to normal, the two governments have agreed to set up a joint Lao-Thai border committee and to have it promptly hold negotiations to find ways to settle this problem. If the said problem should be settled as stipulated in the joint communique, the various obstacles which, in the past, thwarted the promotion, expansion, and strengthening of Lao-Thai relations, cooperation, and friendship will certainly be removed. Translating into reality the contents and spirit of the Lao-Thai joint communique of 25 November, as well as the fruitful

expansion of the success of the visit to the LPDR by His Excellency Chatchai Chunhawan, will certainly serve the aspirations of the Lao and Thai peoples.

Laos and Thailand have been well known as fraternal countries. In his remarks made during the courtesy call on Phoumi Vongvichit, acting president of the LPDR, on 24 November, His Excellency Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan firmly reiterated that no other country is closer to Thailand than Laos and that no other people are closer to the Thai people than the Lao people.

For the Lao people, they also share the same feelings and always wish to see the relations between the two countries be daily improved. The Lao and Thai peoples also believe in the same religion and share the most similar traditions and customs. Our Lao people also agree to the words of His Excellency Chatchai Chunhawan who said: Our common enemy is poverty. Laos and Thailand must join hands together to fight against this common enemy.

The aforesaid spirit and contents completely conform to the trend of the present era in which the movement for peace is expanding vigorously. This can be seen clearly through the movements against the arms race and accumulation of weapons; the movements which propose to use the money spent to serve the arms race for economic development so as to improve the living conditions of the people in their respective countries.

Laos and Thailand also share the same views that the accumulation of arms runs counter to the aspiration of the peoples and the armies of the two countries. The Lao and Thai armies have already promised each other that they will no longer fight each other and that they will end disputes in the airs, waters, and land along the entire Lao-Thai border in order to turn the Lao-Thai border into a border of eternal friendship, peace, and cooperation.

Based on this spirit, the Lao leader, His Excellency Kaysone Phomvihan, chairman of the LPDR Council of Ministers, in his speech at the banquet held in honor of the delegation of the government of the Kingdom of Thailand on the night of 24 November, said: I am convinced that following the visit by Your Excellency and delegation on this occasion, the relations and cooperation in many fields between Laos and Thailand will certainly be crowded with new, ever brighter steps of developments.

**Kaysone Phomvihan on People's Councils Elections**  
*BK2011130888 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao*  
*1200 GMT 20 Nov 88*

[Text] General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihan said that the election of people's representatives showed that democracy belongs to the people and makes them love their country and further enhances their right to mastery. The general secretary mentioned this during his chatting with local and foreign mass media correspondents this morning. He was visiting a polling booth at Ban Dan

Sang Agricultural Cooperative in Saithani District to exercise his voting right as a good Lao citizen to elect people's city municipal-level representatives to the People's Council of Vientiane Municipality.

Today, more than 1,700,000 eligible multiethnic Lao citizens went to the polls to elect their own representatives to the provincial- and city municipal-level people's councils. Kaysone Phomvihan said:

[Begin Kaysone Phomvihan recording with local interference] Today is a very important day. We do not simply come here to cast votes to elect people's representatives. This election allows our people to understand and to love their country more profoundly.

Our people now come to cherish more deeply what we call democracy. Democracy means that our people can consult with one another. It is not what we call nepotism. Our people, be they old or young or of either sex, have the right to consult with one another. Anyone can express his own opinion. Any sound, good views are always acceptable to all. You can see an example today when our people (?enjoy their right to vote). Our democracy is extremely sound and [words indistinct] and is based on our culture.

First of all, we must have unity. The Lao people must unite and love one another. This is the characteristic of the Lao-style democracy. For instance, in selecting a village headman, our villagers must discuss among themselves first whether they will elect a person to be their leader by scrutinizing the background of that person, including his knowledge and other qualifications. If there are three or four candidates, they will select only the most suitable person. That is what we are doing in Laos today. We do not do it noisily. [end recording]

## Philippines

**Senate Resolution on Bases Treaty Expiration**  
*HK2911051188 Manila Far East Broadcasting*  
*Company in English 2300 GMT 28 Nov 88*

[Text] The Senate unanimously approved a consolidated resolution expressing its support and acclamation of President Aquino's pronouncement that the Philippines-United States Military Bases Agreement should expire on September 16, 1991.

The Senate has been urging the president to serve the formal notice to the U.S. Government on such expiration date when she didn't accept [words indistinct] not later than September 16, 1990. The resolution states that in ratifying the Constitution on February 2, 1987, it is clear that the people's intent or understanding is that the RP [Republic of the Philippines]-U.S. agreement expires in 1991 as indicated in the Constitution. The article provides that after the expiration of the bilateral agreement in 1991, foreign military bases, troops or facilities should not be allowed in the Philippines.

**Aquino 'Agrees' With Senate**

*HK2911133788 Hong Kong AFP in English 1330 GMT  
29 Nov 88*

[Text] Manila, Nov 29 (AFP)—President Corazon Aquino said Tuesday that she agrees with the Senate that Manila should serve notice to Washington to terminate the bilateral bases agreement in 1990 if there is no new treaty by then.

Mrs. Aquino, in a reply to write-in questions from reporters, said she agrees "with the Senate that the notice of termination should be sent not later than September 16, 1990, or one year before the expiration of the agreement."

The Philippine Senate passed a resolution Monday calling on Mrs. Aquino to serve notice of termination of the treaty on Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base by the 1990 date.

This action would be in accordance with a provision of the bases agreement that notice of termination should be served by either nation one year before the actual termination date.

However, Mrs. Aquino did not say whether she was going to issue such a notice of termination or seek a new treaty on the bases. She has repeatedly said she will "keep her options open" on the bases after 1991.

Any extension of the bases lease would require a full-fledged treaty approved by at least three-fourths of the Philippines' senators, a majority of whom have declared themselves against the presence of the U.S. bases.

Meanwhile, about 75 left-wing students demonstrated outside the U.S. Embassy here Tuesday and demanded the immediate removal of Clark and Subic, the two largest U.S. overseas military installations.

The demonstration lasted about 30 minutes. The protesters later continued the rally at the nearby Senate to pressure senators to act in expelling the bases.

**Senate Bans Entry of Hazardous Waste Material**

*HK2911022388 Manila Far East Broadcasting  
Company in English 28 Nov 88*

[Text] The Senate unanimously approved, on third and final reading, Senate Bill 255 which bans the importation or bringing into the Philippines even in mere transit of nuclear and other hazardous wastes. Under the bill, nuclear or toxic wastes are defined as goods that are without any safe commercial, industrial, agricultural or economic usage that are shipped abroad from the country of origin for dumping or disposal into or in transit through any part of the territories of the Philippines. Any violation of the act is punishable by imprisonment from 12 to 20 years. If the offender is a foreigner, he will be deported and barred from any subsequent entry into the

Philippines after serving his sentence. In case of corporations or other associations, the penalty will be imposed by the managing partner, president or chief executive in addition to an exemplary damage of at least P [pesos] 5,000. The persons or firms responsible for bringing the banned items will be under obligation to transport and send back the prohibited waste.

The measure will be enforced by the Department of Health upon consultation with the Departments of Environment and Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs, and National Defense.

**Manglapus Returns From Hanoi 29 November**

*BK2911112588 Manila PNA in English 1055 GMT  
29 Nov 88*

[Text] Manila, Nov 29 (OANA/PNA)—Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus returned home Tuesday [29 November] from a three-day official visit to Hanoi, the first by a senior cabinet official since Vietnam came under communist rule in 1976 [year as received].

Manglapus left Sunday for Hanoi where he held bilateral talks with top Vietnamese officials, including his counterpart, Nguyen Co Thach. He was accompanied by a nine-man delegation.

Mutual cooperation prevailed in various informal conversations with Vietnamese officials, officials disclosed.

The two countries signed Monday an air transport agreement providing for air services on specified routes for the designated airline of each nation and for the opening of airline offices at the point of call of each carrier.

**Aquino Warns ASEAN on Regional Economy**

*HK2911104188 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan  
in Tagalog 1000 GMT 29 Nov 88*

[Text] President Corazon Aquino said the Association of Southeast Asian Nations may be split if it attempts to speed up and unify the economies of its member nations. The president made the statement in her speech at the 6th ASEAN Federation of Accountants Conference during the 42d anniversary of the Philippine Certified Public Accountants Association held at the PICC [Philippine International Convention Center]. She said ASEAN dreamed of setting up a regional economy within the association, which has a population of 300 million.

[Begin Aquino recording, in English] It is ASEAN's dream to have a regional complementary economy. That dream has eluded us up to now. The reason is that, we know, without grasping the details, the obvious fact that our countries have developed unevenly. As a result, if we were to push the complementation of our economies, all we would achieve is a subordination of some of them to the others. Rather than link ASEAN more tightly together, this unequal relationship will be the force that will finally split

ASEAN permanently apart. Worse, we do not even understand sufficiently each other's economy. As a result, our plans are at best vague aspirations that are too risky to implement as they are. As a further result we begin to lose faith in the ASEAN dream. [end recording]

**PLO 'Grateful' for Government Support**

*HK2911103588 Hong Kong AFP in English 1002 GMT 29 Nov 88*

[Text] Manila, Nov 29 (AFP)—A representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) said here Tuesday that the PLO was grateful for the Philippine Government's support for its cause.

"We express our gratitude to the Philippine government for its consistent support for positions in favor of the Palestine question in the United Nations," PLO representative Muhammad Hamdun' told an academic forum here.

Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus has said that the PLO proclamation of an independent state three weeks ago was a "positive development," but it was still "somewhat premature" to let the PLO open an office in Manila.

Mr. Hamdun' said the PLO understood Manila's position.

"We also realize that there are still realities and difficulties surrounding the immediate translation of this specific position into concrete foreign policy towards us," he said.

The Philippines has been courting Arab support for its campaign to end a 16-year-old rebellion by members of the Moslem Moro minority in the south.

Diplomats said that by backing the PLO in international forums, Manila could get Arab patrons of the Moros to induce the rebels to accept a settlement.

Arab powers, especially Libya, are the main backers of both the PLO and the Moro rebels.

**Agreements Signed With Belgium on Cebu Projects**

*HK2611083988 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0800 GMT 26 Nov 88*

[Text] The Philippines and Belgium have concluded two agreements which provide P [pesos] 160 million for two social welfare projects in Cebu. The agreements were signed by Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus and Belgian Ambassador Alain Reis.

The agreements fall under the 1987 Philippine-Belgian economic and technical cooperation agreement.

Meanwhile, the Belgian ambassador has expressed confidence that President Aquino will be able to overcome all challenges to her administration.

**Aquino Stresses 'Stability', Development**

*HK2811050788 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0400 GMT 28 Nov 88*

[Text] President Aquino said that her administration has regained stability and that she is now focusing more attention on the implementation of the government's livelihood development programs.

In an interview with **NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL** magazine, the president said she no longer considers the communist insurgency or the right wing coups major threats. She added that the government troops have weakened the rebel forces following the capture of several communist leaders.

According to the president, her administration has in the past repelled several coup attempts, thus the rightists will find it difficult to stage another coup.

Meanwhile, the president declined to comment when asked whether the U.S. military bases will be allowed to stay in the country.

**Overseas Workers Said Biggest Dollar Earners**

*HK2811095588 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 28 Nov 88 p 49*

[By Carlos C. Rabago]

[Text] Filipino overseas contract workers (OCWs) have emerged as the country's biggest dollar export earners, with total remittances of P [pesos] 2.5 billion in 1987, more than half of the country's export earnings of \$4.9 billion in that year.

The sum came from 2.5 million overseas workers, 450,000 of them sent abroad just last year, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration records show.

The main bulk of these workers are employed in Saudi Arabia and neighboring Middle East countries.

The remittances, however, could have been bigger had they been coursed through regular banking channels. Unfortunately, only about \$700 million or a measly 28 percent passed through the banks last year.

Overseas workers prefer to avail themselves of the services of unlicensed money couriers who deliver the money to the workers' respective beneficiaries many times faster than the banks.

The money couriers, likewise, offer higher conversion rates which undoubtedly could be the prime factor that entices the workers to seek the services of this unlicensed group.

This scheme, while beneficial to the overseas workers, does not help the government raise its foreign exchange earnings because the money remitted usually goes to the black market.

Some instances, the foreign exchange, sent under this procedure usually remains in its country of origin. Right there, it is converted into local currency for remittance to the Philippines. This is made through the black market.

To remedy the situation, a Cabinet committee on industrial development has asked Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez, Jr. to set up an international network of legitimate Philippine foreign exchange couriers.

Nothing has been heard of about the matter since then, it was disclosed.

**Congressmen Back 'Radical' Debt Service Bill**  
*HK2811105188 Hong Kong AFP in English 1023 GMT 28 Nov 88*

[Text] Manila, Nov 28 (AFP)—Ruling party members of the Philippine House of Representatives are backing a draft bill limiting foreign-debt repayments to 15 percent of annual export earnings, aides said Monday.

The proposal is more radical than a Senate bill passed last week which limits interest and principal payments on the country's 28.9 billion dollar external debt to 20 percent of export earnings.

Edcel Lagman, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Debt Service, proposed the 15 percent ceiling in a draft bill expected to be among the priorities of the ruling party in the coming weeks, aides said.

Philippine export earnings are forecast at 6.8 billion dollars this year. Twenty percent of this would amount to 1.36 billion dollars and 15 percent would be 1.02 billion dollars—well below the projected three billion dollars in debt service payments due to foreign banks and institutions.

The ruling Struggle for a Democratic Philippines party and its allies control three-quarters of the 200-member house which will have to work out a compromise act for President Corazon Aquino's signature.

Mrs. Aquino last week called for flexibility in dealing with the debt problem following the Senate bill's passage.

Observers saw this as an indication that she would veto a radical bill or try to intervene with her followers in Congress to soften the final version.

Some government officials, businessmen and economists have warned that a radical debt solution could invite retaliation from creditors and derail the country's economic recovery.

But backers of a tougher stance say the debt problem left behind by deposed president Ferdinand Marcos require more radical and innovative solutions.

The Senate passed the bill the day after the suspension of talks with the International Monetary Fund on Manila's request for a 1.3 billion-dollar new facility to help close a financing gap over the next three years.

The suspension came after both sides reached a deadlock on the matter of government expenditure, with the IMF insisting on a reduced budget deficit, which Manila defended as a necessary measure to fuel economic growth.

**Official on Differences in Growth Targets**  
*HK2811055788 Manila BUSINESS WORLD in English 28 Nov 88 p 2*

[By Angelina Sy Tan]

[Text] There's a big difference between six percent and six and a half percent growth, says Economic Planning Secretary Solita C. Monsod.

Mrs. Monsod was speaking at a forum of the Freedom from Debt Coalition and the National Council of Churches of the Philippines, held at the Little Green House in Tomas Morato Ave. last Saturday.

Mrs. Monsod said 6.5 percent is consistent with employment creation of more than a million new jobs a year. This would, in turn, cause a reduction in poverty incidence so that by 1992 the country will achieve a target of 45 percent Filipino families living below the poverty line from the 59 percent in 1985, she said.

To the extent that we do not achieve 6.5 percent is the extent to which our unemployment will remain high ... We are targeting 5 percent and 25 percent unemployment and underemployment rates in 1992. These are modest targets but are two necessary conditions for sustainable growth. One is internal structural reforms that will allow the country to use its resources sufficiently and equitably, and two, debt management," she said, adding that one without the other is useless.

The main bone of contention in the recently adjourned debt negotiation, she said, was the International Monetary Fund Review Board condition for the country to change its macroeconomic framework. "We can negotiate all we want, but the ones who pay are the people themselves. Let's not ever forget that."

She said the IMF macroeconomic framework calls for a reduction of the public investment program over the next four years to the tune of P [pesos] 17.4 billion. This is equivalent to (price increases computed) 169,204 linear meters of bridges; or 46,001 kilometers of barangay roads; or 226,475 classrooms; or 204,455 deep wells; or 122,675 communal faucets.

A change will also affect projected public savings, which is the difference between public expenditures and public revenues. Government, after putting in all the required internal structural reforms, figured it could save P34.1 billion over four years. A reduced growth rate will either force a reduction in public expenditures or obliterate the savings.

Mrs. Monsod asked: "Can we stay the course that we have set for ourselves?"

She said, "there are tremendous pressures in form of a veiled threat. The IMF will not give us a program (extended facility), if we do not agree with them. And, if they won't give us a program, the official creditors the Paris Club—will not even come to the negotiating table." She said the IMF is capitalizing on this tremendous leverage.

The Philippines, she said, has its own leverage. She said: "How will IMF look to the world if they refuse to give a program to the most successful performer among all debt-crisis countries in the world?"

The Philippines, by using its macroeconomic framework, has succeeded in May 1987 and 1988 to meet its targets ... Why wouldn't it succeed in the future? The only reason it won't is that it did not get the necessary financing."

After convincing the IMF, the Philippines still has to negotiate with the creditor banks. If the banks say "no," then there is still a chance that the IMF won't sign an agreement with the Philippines.

Fortunately, according to Mrs. Monsod, there were two instances when the IMF signed with debtor countries even if they did not come to terms with creditor commercial banks. These are Costa Rica and Bolivia. "It took time but they got it."

The question, she said, is, "Do we have enough will to take that route?"

"We should start with the premise that this country is committed to achieving its social and economic goals ... And that it is committed to the policy that growth must take precedent over debt," she said.

#### **Senate To Summon Ramos, De Villa on Charges**

HK2911051788 Manila Far East Broadcasting  
Company in English 2300 GMT 28 Nov 88

[Text] The Senate will summon Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos and Armed Forces Chief General Renato de Villa to answer charges of mounting human rights violations by the military.

Senator Wigberto Tanada, chairman of the committee on human rights said Senator John Osmena requested that the military officials be summoned after seeing a

report by the London based Amnesty International on torture. The report said torture may be becoming common practice by some units involved in the investigation of suspected communist rebels or sympathizers.

#### **Ramos Orders 'Curb' of Illegal Activities**

HK2911050188 Manila Far East Broadcasting  
Company in English 2300 GMT 28 Nov 88

[Text] Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos ordered Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] Chief General Renato de Villa to strictly intensify an AFP wide campaign in the country to prevent and curb gunrunning and other illegal activities involving military personnel.

Ramos issued the order to De Villa in the light of the arrest of Air Force Technical Sergeant Placido Pacunayan for alleged gunrunning activities. Pacunayan was arrested by PC Criminal Investigation Service agents headed by Colonel Aurelio Medina. Pacunayan was caught with nine M-14 rifles and (ammunitions) during a raid in his house Friday.

In his directive, Ramos ordered De Villa to submit again as soon as possible an inventory of such similar cases involving military personnel on gun running activities. Ramos also told De Villa to formulate and make the necessary directive to implement such guidelines.

#### **Local Government Secretary on Zones of Peace**

HK251115388 Quezon City Sports Radio 738  
in English 1100 GMT 25 Nov 88

[Text] Local Government Secretary Luis Santos today said he is against the creation or declaration of some areas of the country as zones of peace. Santos was reacting to a proposal to create zones of peace in selective local areas in the country notably the Negros provinces and the Bicol region. The proposal was made by the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines. The idea of having zones of peace is to ask both the military and the New People's Army not to operate on these declared areas so that the people can go about their daily lives unmolested. Santos said that the idea needs a lot of serious study and consideration before it becomes a reality.

#### **Health Groups Tagged Communist Fronts**

HK2811053388 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY  
GLOBE in English 28 Nov 88 p 7

[By staff writer Dionision Pelayo]

[Text] Constabulary authorities identified yesterday several health workers' groups which are allegedly heavily infiltrated by the Communist Party of the Philippines [CPP].

Citing documents captured from arrested CPP personalities, Col. Gerardo Flores, PC intelligence chief, identified the organizations allegedly infiltrated by the communist movement as the Alliance of Health Workers (AHW), the Medical Action Group (MAG), and the Health Alliance for Democracy (HAD).

But health groups have consistently denied any allegations that they are CPP fronts.

The three groups, Flores said, operate under the Makabayang Samahang Pangkalusugan [National Health Movement] (MASAPA), a national democratic underground mass organization which, in turn, is under the CPP National Health Bureau.

Flores said the recently formed Juan Escandor Brigade of the New People's Army serves as the armed component of the CPP health organizations.

Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Ramon E. Montano, PC/INP chief, dismissed reports that escaped communist leader Romulo Kintanar and his wife were released in exchange for soldiers earlier released by NPA rebels in Quezon. He said reports about the swap were "pure speculation and without basis in fact or in truth."

Reports on the alleged swap, Montano said, are part of a bigger campaign to discredit President Aquino and the military leadership.

Montano did not identify the persons behind the group spreading the rumor, however.

"There is no connection whatsoever that can be deduced from the facts of Kintanar's and (Gloria Asuncion) Jopson's escape and the release of the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] hostages last August in Quezon Province. The reason behind the escape is plain and simple lapse of security on the part of the PC/INP jail personnel," Montano stressed.

However, Montano said the authenticity of the alleged letter of Gregorio Rosal, alias Ka [Comrade] Roger, spokesman of the NPA Melito Glor Command, which held hostage four Army lieutenants and a PC soldier from June to August this year, is being looked into.

Rosal claimed in his letter that Kintanar and Jopson were "allowed to escape" in exchange for the release of the soldiers last August.

The AHW, Flores reported to Montano, has an estimated 4,000 members and has chapters in nine government hospitals in Metro Manila and Rizal Province, nine provincial chapters and six local chapters.

All of the AHW chapters, Flores said, are capable of conducting propaganda and mobilization campaigns.

AHW plans to organize chapters in labor unions, Flores also said.

The MAG, Flores said, is the CPP-led "legal institution" in the health sector. He identified personalities running the group by their aliases as "Alicia," "Roman," "Bien," "Mar," "Cecil," "Raul" and "Willy."

Under the MAG, Flores said, are its Education and Membership Committee run by a certain "Au" and "Ben" and the Philippine Action Concerning Torture run by alias "June" and alias "Vic."

The HAD is an organization of medical professionals, while MASAPA is the national democratic underground organization which is directly working under the CPPNHB, Flores said.

#### Misuari Said To Deliver Arms in August

HK2811100788 *Quezon City MALAYA in English*  
27 Nov 88 pp 1, 7

[By Joel Paredes]

[Text] Moro National Liberation Front chairman Nur Misuari slipped into the country last August to deliver 9,000 firearms and consult with field commanders on preparations for the declaration of a Bangsa Moro provisional government, Datu Ray Ibrahim Uy, MNLF spokesman, said yesterday.

Misuari stayed for 10 hours in a coastal village in Cotabato on Aug. 19, but was forced to leave again for Sabah, Malaysia because of a military blockade in the South, Uy said.

Uy, who is MNLF representative to the Organization of Islamic Conference [OIC—Islamic Conference Organization] and civilian coordinator, said Misuari brought in the firearms and ammunition, including ground-to-air missiles, on three boats from nearby Sabah.

Misuari conferred with top MNLF commanders on the setting up of a provisional government in 13 Mindanao provinces recognized as Muslim dominated under the 1974 Tripoli Agreement, Uy said.

He said Misuari told his field commanders the MNLF would be upgraded from observer to permanent member of the OIC when the pan-Islamic body holds its ministerial conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in March next year.

Uy said, however, there was no need for the MNLF to wait for full membership in the OIC before declaring a provisional government. He said Islamic nations friendly to the MNLF had already given it equal status with the Philippine government in gatherings abroad.

Misuari visited the country to assess the situation so he could give a report to the OIC secretary general [on the] cease-fire forged with the government in 1986, but expressed concern over the recent deployment of more government troops in Mindanao.

MNLF field commanders have reported that about 85,000 government troops are positioned near rebel strongholds, Uy said.

"If there is a war, Misuari will come and lead it," Uy said.

Misuari has warned that the MNLF will reject the Organic Act for Mindanao Autonomy should the government insist on implementing it.

Misuari last Nov. 9 appealed anew to the OIC for help in breaking the impasse in negotiations for an autonomous Muslim Mindanao.

### Thailand

#### Minister on Moves To Protect U.S. Patents

BK1711022588 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English  
17 Nov 88 pp 1, 3

[Text] Thailand will state its position on pharmaceutical patents, copyrights and import tariffs for certain products with United States representatives in a December 12 meeting three days before the deadline for review of the country's GSP [generalized system of preferences] status.

Commerce Minister Subin Pinkhayan said yesterday he would lead a delegation for talks with US Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter to clarify these issues. Thailand hopes the clarification would show sufficient progress had been made in these areas to merit maintenance of GSP privileges.

Mr Subin said Thailand will propose "temporary measures" be implemented to protect US calls for patent protection of pharmaceuticals. [as published]

The Thai delegation would say it is not ready to pass a patent law amendment, but can promise "temporary measures of protection" to the same effect.

Mr Subin did not specify what these "temporary measures" would be although the US has asked Thailand to use the regulations of the Thai Food and Drug Administration to equip US firms with a monopoly right for the production of new pharmaceutical products or products in the pipeline.

On copyrights, Mr Subin said the delegation will tell US officials it does not think an amendment bill is necessary since the law already provides protection for intellectual property and also since the US has joined the Berne Convention.

"We will clarify that our copyright already suits US interests now they entered the Berne Convention. The US therefore need not press for an amendment," he said.

Mr Subin said the US was satisfied following a meeting with Thai officials in Honolulu this month.

Following the meeting, the US has said, however, it is still awaiting clarification on a number of issues, such as translation rights and the length of protection.

The US has also called on Thailand to open her markets for freer trade, Mr Subin said, particularly for further reduction of import tariffs.

Although Thailand has already lowered import tariffs on US wheat, apples and soybean, Mr Subin said the US demands a further reduction exclusively for the US since the move is applied to other countries.

The Honolulu meeting enabled the Thai side to sound out "points in which we share the same view as theirs", said Mr Subin.

"There exist a few points that are yet awaiting bilateral agreement," he said, refusing to elaborate on the points of conflicting interest.

Thailand has fulfilled US demands on these issues, said Mr Subin, who felt the Thai performance will satisfy the US and bring about a favourable GSP review.

The Thai-US sub-committee of the International Economic Relations Policy Committee will meet today to plan the delegation's trip.

Meanwhile, US Senator Robert Dole met Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan and Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila yesterday to discuss a number of issues, including trade.

Mr Dole asked Gen Chatchai to prevent piracy of US intellectual property and to continue narcotics suppression.

Deputy government spokesman Likhit Hongladarom said Mr Dole, the Senate minority leader, made his calls during a meeting with Gen Chatchai at Government House.

Gen Chatchai said Mr Dole had conveyed US concerns over violations of US intellectual property in Thailand.

Dr Likhit said that among the issues Mr Dole had raised was the violation of US drug patents by Thai pharmaceutical manufacturers.

The senator, he said, also reminded the prime minister of the December 15 deadline when the US is scheduled to start reviewing trade privileges extended to its trading partners under the Generalised System of Preferences.

The deputy spokesman said Mr Dole praised Thailand's narcotics suppression activities and urged the kingdom to keep up the good work.

The prime minister told the senator Thailand needed more helicopters for use in the operations but stopped short of requesting them.

He said that Gen Chatchai asked Senator Dole for increased transfer of US technology and increased US investment, especially in chemicals.

Meanwhile, Mr Dole asked Foreign Minister Sitthi to brief him on Kampuchea, Laos and Burma.

Sen Dole pledged the US will continue to support Thailand's assistance for refugees. He also told ACM [Air Chief Marshal] Sitthi that President-Elect George Bush "feels good" about bilateral relations.

#### **Adviser Views U.S. Trade Tactics**

*BK2411014488 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English*  
*24 Nov 88 p 6*

[Excerpt] The United States has displayed poor understanding of trade matters by pressuring its trading partners, an adviser to the prime minister said yesterday.

Addressing a seminar organised by the Thai Chamber of Commerce, Dr Chuanchai Atchanan said Washington would get nowhere with its pressure tactics.

US pressure on Thailand on intellectual property rights, pharmaceutical patents protection and opening its market for certain American products reflected Washington's "superficial view" on trade issues, said Dr Chuanchai.

"The US has failed to notice the fact that in trade circles only the fittest survive," he said.

US pressure on Thailand to open its market to cigarettes and reduce import tariffs for soybean protein will not benefit the US as much as it expects.

"Although Thailand will open its market, it doesn't necessarily mean we will buy from the US alone," he said.

In the meantime, trade partners that suffer from similar pressure would form an alliance against the US, he said.

"The government has made clear it is going to comply with all US requests. For instance, intellectual property protection; it needs to take careful steps in the right direction that suit the country's context and interests," he said.

Dr Chuanchai said Washington's clouded trade vision was apparent in its attempt to pressure the government, whereas the legislative decision here functions at the Parliament.

"The US Embassy that feeds information to the federal government should revise its role due to their misled perspective on the nature of Thai politics," he said.

The US Trade Representative, he said, should be satisfied with the progress Thailand has made ahead of the Generalised System of Preferences status review on December 15.

"Now the US has further revealed its lack of wisdom by pressuring for a free market for cigarettes without realising that once the market's open, we can welcome products from other countries as well," he said. [passage omitted]

#### **Chatchai Postpones Patent Decision**

*BK2911020788 Bangkok THE NATION in English*  
*29 Nov 88 p 2*

[Text] Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan yesterday postponed a decision on the US Administration's demand for computer software patent protection, an informed source said.

He is expected to study the position adopted by the International Economic Relations Policy Committee tomorrow. The committee is headed by Deputy Prime Minister Pong Sarasin and had accepted the US demand for software patent protection, based on the Thai-US relations.

Chatchai's delay also led to a postponement of talks between high-level Thai-US officials in Washington, earlier scheduled for yesterday, to tomorrow.

The postponement also caused confusion among senior Thai officials, including Commerce Minister Subin Pinkayan, who are leaving for Washington to pursue an agreement on the Generalized System of Preferences [GSP] on Dec 15.

The US has demanded that the Thai Government show some progress on protection for US intellectual property rights before the Dec 15 deadline, when Washington will decide whether to continue Thailand's GSP status.

Representatives of various universities are expected to hand a letter of protest, addressed to President Ronald Reagan, to the US Embassy at 2.30 pm today.

Mana Teerayaphiphat, deputy secretary of the Student Federation of Thailand, called on the Thai Government not to overemphasize the GSP, which he called "rather unpredictable".

**Foreign Ministry Officials To Lower Profile**  
*BK1611011988 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English*  
16 Nov 88 p 1

[Text] Senior Foreign Ministry officials admitted yesterday that Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan has the right to play an active role in charting the country's foreign policy and the ministry should reduce its public role.

Ministry sources said this general opinion was agreed upon during a meeting of the Foreign Ministry's director-generals.

The director-generals were commenting on a statement by Gen [General] Chatchai's advisor M.R. Sukumphan Boriphat that the premier would assume a more active role in foreign policy, rather than leaving it in the hands of the Foreign Ministry.

Sources said the director-generals agreed that the country's foreign policy does not belong to the ministry but is the responsibility of the government.

They agree that Gen Chatchai has the right to become "fully involved," sources said.

"It should be that way because the premier, as government leader, already controls the policy of every ministry, including the Foreign Ministry," another source said.

The ministry is the machinery through which the government executes foreign policy, the source added.

The director-generals recognised that changes have been under way since Gen Chatchai assumed leadership of the government.

The senior officials agreed that under former Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon, the ministry was given more freedom, but under the present government, Gen Chatchai has given his advisers a considerable role, and the military is also trying to play role.

Sources said those at the meeting agreed that the ministry should adjust its public role and adopt a lower profile.

This did not mean the ministry would not perform its duties. Instead, it would redouble its efforts behind-the-scenes since more parties are now involved in foreign policy formulation, they said, referring to the premier's advisers and the military.

One ministry source noted, however, that since the ministry would not be playing a dominant public role, the blame for foreign policy problems would have to be shared as well.

The source said that if problems crop up during the premier's advisers' advance visit to Laos or if information for the delegation is not complete the ministry could not take full blame.

Sources said the ministry has considered keeping in contact with the premier's advisers but had not done so.

"We have long thought about consulting the advisers on certain occasions, at least to show our respect for them," one ministry source said.

But formal communications still have not been opened because the advisers have busy schedules.

The source said active participation of the advisers in ministry affairs may not be possible because of their legal status.

On major foreign policy issues, such as ASEAN and the country's policy towards the new US President, "there should be discussion and exchange of views between the two parties (ministry and advisers)," the source said.

"The Foreign Ministry welcomes views and initiatives from other sources," the source said.

The ministry primarily decides policy on issues such as Burma, but the collective responsibility always lies with the government, the source added.

"It is therefore justified that we heed views from various parties, despite the constraints," the source said.

"In criticising shortcomings of our foreign policy, one should also consider how this looks to the international community," the source added.

**Paper Views Closer Military Links With China**  
*BK2811011588 Bangkok THE NATION in English*  
28 Nov 88 p 2

[By Phongsak Sisot]

[Text] The Thai Armed Forces' decision to buy more Chinese military hardware and their sudden interest in Chinese jetfighters are seen as a readiness to commit themselves to a long-term military cooperation with the communist country, informed military sources said.

The sources said the steps are likely to significantly alter Thailand's traditional dependence on the US for arms supplies in the future.

The interest in the Chinese F-7 aircraft, an adapted version of the Soviet-made MiG-21, was officially expressed by Army Commander-in-Chief Chawalit Yongchaiyut during his visit to China last week during which he signed a major arms deal to buy a large number of tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APC's).

Though Thai and Chinese military leaders have refused to disclose the exact amount of arms purchased, Chawalit's second visit to China serves to confirm the closest ever military ties the two countries have ever had.

The Royal Thai Army had already bought between 50 and 60 T-69 tanks, 400 APCs and a number of anti-aircraft artillery pieces and 130mm artillery pieces.

The Thai-Chinese military relations took a major turn in 1986 when Beijing offered to supply Thailand with a number of 130mm and 105mm artillery pieces free of charge.

That led to Thailand's first purchase of military hardware from China a year later. What makes the Chinese arms attractive to the Thais is their cheap price coupled with easy payment terms and low interest rates.

"But it came as a big surprise for those monitoring the Thai-Chinese military relations when Chawalit bargained for a squadron of F-7 fighters and three submarines during his visit to Beijing," one army source said.

"The fact that the three armed forces are going to have Chinese arms show Thailand is becoming closer to China than it is to Europe or America."

The F-7 was commissioned in the Chinese military in 1970 and is said to have capabilities comparable to the US F-5E but is three times cheaper. The Chinese have offered to stage a demonstration of their jet fighter in Thailand in January.

"After the Thai Army expressed its interest in the aircraft, China responded swiftly by offering to display its capabilities in Bangkok early next year," the source said.

While the Thai-Chinese arms stockpile proposal is yet to be concluded, buying more military hardware from China will definitely bring Thailand into even closer military relations with China, especially in terms of training and maintenance, observers say.

Chawalit also told Chinese military leaders the Thai Army wants 30 more T-69 tanks and 800 more APC's, according to the source.

"If Beijing sells arms to Thailand according to the requests, the country's westernized arms system will undoubtedly become Chinese in the long-run," the source said.

Chawalit has declined to comment on the question of F-7 and Chinese submarine, though source said Chinese Chief of General Staff Gen Chi Haotian had informally accepted the Thai request.

"There is a limit to the Army's purchase of arms. However, we should welcome China's friendly offers. It's good that a country cares for Thailand and is willing to help (Thailand)," Chawalit said.

The source said the Thai Army was "impressed" by Beijing's swift response to Thai requests for arms during the 1986 Thai-Vietnamese border clash at Chong Bok and the Ban Romklao battle with Laos last winter.

"We received the weapons soon after we had asked for them, while American weapons always came after fighting ended and the transportation was costly," the source said.

But he added that the US and Chinese reactions to the border battles had nothing to do with the growing Thai-Chinese military ties. "The cheap price is the only reason," he said.

"The Thai Army chief has brushed aside criticism that Chinese arms are outmoded and inefficient. "We have made a right decision. Chinese arms are modern and suitable for Thailand considering the country's (financial) situation," Chawalit said.

The Thai Foreign Ministry so far has made no official comments on the flourishing relationship between the Thai and Chinese militaries. But some insiders say opposition to the Thai Army's move does exist.

Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry has come out to defend the military against Vietnam's charges that the proposed war reserve stockpile will hinder attempts to solve the Kampuchean conflict.

The ministry argued that the war stockpile is meant for self-defence and criticized the Vietnamese for "interfering" with Thailand's internal affairs.

Chawalit was given a red-carpet welcome during his week-long visit to China, where he met several top figures of the communist nation.

The acting-supreme commander said Chinese leaders pledged support for the army-led Green I-San project. "The support will highlight our relationship," he added.

**Rangoon Drops Leaflets Urging Students To Return**  
BK2611012988 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English  
26 Nov 88 p 9

[Text] Tak—Burmese military aircraft dropped hundreds of leaflets along the Thai-Burmese border this week urging students and others taking refuge with rebels to return to their homes.

The leaflets, signed by Burmese Deputy Commander-in-Chief Lt-Gen [Lieutenant General] Than Shwe and acting Education Minister Dr Pe Thein and endorsed by

four Burmese student leaders offer amnesty to the escapees provided they return by December 31 and that they have not committed other offences.

The leaflets also ask parents and teachers to prevent their children and students from fleeing into the jungles to join the rebels.

At present, about 7,000 Burmese are taking shelter with the rebels after fleeing the military regime in Rangoon.

Meanwhile, Tak provincial authorities have expressed reservations about plans to open a camp for Burmese refugees.

Mae Sot district officer Punchai Niamwattana said yesterday he personally disagreed with the granting of asylum to Burmese students and others in the district.

Mae Sot, he said, had to deal with the problem of feeding and sheltering 2,000 Thais displaced by fighting along the border between Burmese and rebel forces.

Tak Deputy Governor Hukhan Tomonsak said he did not want to see the area become a refugee centre, like the northeast and the east.

The provincial Red Cross did not have the funds needed to assist the Burmese, said Mr Hukhan, who was awaiting instructions from Bangkok as to how to deal with the fugitives.

**Premier Chatchai Visit to Laos Assessed**  
*BK2911023388 Bangkok THE NATION in English*  
29 Nov 88 p 8

[By Kawi Chongkitthawon]

[Text] Premier Chatchai Chunhawan's trip yielded rather dramatic results. It has brought back Thai-Lao friendship almost to the 1979 level when their relations reached the zenith.

Although the 30-hour visit was symbolic by nature, it did provide a badly needed new impetus for both countries to break away from a vicious cycle of stalemates, inane accusations and other diplomatic shenanigans. The premier must be credited for reaching out to Laos and for his ability to recognize the political reality there.

Most importantly, the trip has restored once again the amiable political atmosphere between Thailand and Laos which is extremely crucial for future negotiations on border demarcation problems. For one thing, nagging territorial disputes are not political but essentially technical ones, which need legal evidence, skill and excellent cooperation.

Now the foreign ministries of Thailand and Laos can coordinate anew and begin working on the technical side of existing borderline problems. After months of deadlock, both sides finally agreed in the joint communique that two new joint bodies would be established to handle all bilateral aspects.

The joint Thai-Lao national committee, patterned after the joint Thai-Malaysian committee, has yet to be finalized. Another committee will focus exclusively on the settlement of demarcation problems.

But let us have no illusion. The easing up of Thai-Lao friendship does not mean future negotiations to settle border conflicts will be less difficult. Major issues, particularly disputes at Ban Rom Klao and at the three border villages in Uttaradit, would require further negotiations and mutual tolerance.

Without such understanding, any of more than 40 ambiguous spots dotting the 1,750 kilometres of Thai-Lao boundary—especially at Tung Nong Bua, Ubon Ratchathani—can potentially be blown up into a major dispute. Consequently, it is important that Thai-Lao leaders, notably their premiers, keep in touch and know how to manage their relations well.

Since 1979 this type of leadership rapport was completely missing. The absence of communications between top echelons of both nations worsened the brotherly ties almost to the point of no return during the preceding nine years.

From his Vientiane visit, Chatchai was able to develop a good working relationship with Laotian Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane. "This is only the first round of toast," Chatchai told Kaysone after the signing of the joint communique. They will meet again for sure.

Given his diplomatic acumen, it is without doubt that the direction of Thailand's foreign policy in the coming months—notably the policy toward Thailand's neighbours—must be strongly endorsed by him.

On other bilateral issues, both sides have not been completely satisfied with the refugee problem. Some 200 Laotian refugees have returned home voluntarily in the past 24 months. Yesterday 72 refugees were handed over to the Laotian authorities at Chiang Khong, Chiang Rai. But so far only 40 out of 2,800 screened-out refugees have been repatriated to Laos.

The Thai side was unable to obtain further Laos commitment to increase the intake of screened-out refugees, but Vientiane agreed to cooperate with Thailand and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. A total of 90,000 Laotian refugees are now living in Thailand.

Another sensitive issue is the allegation that both sides have interfered with each other's internal affairs. Thailand has accused Laos of assisting remnants of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), which is increasingly hard to prove. In a similar vein, Laos has named Thailand as the main culprit supporting the estimated 8,000-member right-wing resistance groups against Laos from Thai territory.

Both Chatchai and Kaysone discussed this issue during their private meeting, according to his aides. They ensured that confidence-building measures are needed to eradicate this mutual mistrust.

At the moment, two former CPT leaders, Bunyen Wothong and Wichai Sewamat, who is a former MP from Ubon Ratchathani, are still inside Laos. A Thai Embassy official said Wichai has been in touch with the embassy to work out conditions for his return. Bunyen's fate is unknown.

In the new joint communique, Thailand also pledged to help Laos to expand its communications network, electrical power, agriculture and promote Thailand's investment in the export-oriented industry. Both sides also agreed to set up Thai-Lao friendship associations in their respective capitals and exchanged military attaches.

For the time being, both countries will have something to look forward to. The proposal to construct a friendship bridge linking Nong Khai's Tha Sadet and Laos' Vientiane will represent the utopia of their future cooperation. Although Laos is less than sanguine about the Thai plan, the Laotian leaders, however, agree unanimously that it is a noble idea to uphold.

Laotian acting-President Phoumi Vongvichit expressed strong support for the idea saying that conditions between the two countries have improved and are conducive to undertake this project. Other Laotian leaders here were optimistically cautious.

Both Kaysone and Laotian Vice Foreign Minister Souban Salitthilat said bilateral trade must increase to the point that the proposed bridge is indispensable to facilitate cross-border trade. Officially, Thai exports to Laos go through three check points in Nong Khai and Mukdahan. In Nong Khai's Tha Phae Khananyon, two ferries carry trucks and goods across the Mekong River.

To promote Thai-Lao trade, Thailand has agreed to open soon two more checkpoints—Muang district in Nakhon Phanom and Chiang Khong, Chiang Rai—and allowed more banned goods to be sent to Laos.

But one impediment to border trade has not been solved—the monopoly exercised by the Express Transport Organization (ETO), which solely handles the transportation of goods destined for Laos and its exports to the outside world via Thailand.

In Vientiane, both Thai businessmen and Lao authorities have openly complained about ETO's inefficiency and overcharged freights amid increasing trade volume. They said freer competition to transport goods to Laos by the private sector would not only dramatically increase the border trade but will cheapen Thai goods there as well.

Beyond the bilateral plane, the premier's visit could render some regional implications. For good or for worse, his trip has helped to single out the Thai-Lao affairs from the labyrinth of larger regional problems, especially the Kampuchean conflict—the policy in which the Prem administration vehemently refused to pursue.

Analysts said if the Thai-Lao ties can be improved without tying up with other external issues, Thailand's relations with Vietnam, even Kampuchea, can also follow a similar direction.

Some of them expressed concern that dramatic improvement of Thai-Lao ties could weaken Thailand's position on Kampuchea and send a wrong signal to the international community. They argued that Thailand has given in too much to Laos. "Bangkok should be more firm with Laos. Vientiane has to depend more on Thailand," said a Western analyst.

Thai officials pointed out that Laos wants good ties with Thailand to improve its economy and attract more international aid. "All Western and international material assistance has to go through the Thai soil. Thai authorities can cause unnecessary delay," said an Asian diplomat based in Vietnam.

Others said that the improvement of Thai-Lao ties is possible now simply because of the East-West rapprochement and relaxation of regional tensions. "Chatchai is fortunate, he comes at the right time," said another Western diplomat in Bangkok.

## Vietnam

### Further Reportage on Manglapus Visit

#### Meets Nguyen Co Thach

BK2811114688 Hong Kong AFP in English 1111 GMT  
28 Nov 88

—[By Jean Claude Chapon]

[Text] Hanoi, Nov 28 (AFP)—Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus met his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Co Thach here Monday for talks on bilateral and regional affairs including Cambodia and the Spratlys, an official source said.

The first round of talks between the two men centred on the Cambodian problem, the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, foreign military bases in the region, Vietnamese refugees in the Philippines and bilateral relations, the official Philippine source said.

Mr. Manglapus, who arrived here Sunday on a three-day visit, was later to sign an air transport agreement with Mr. Thach, a Vietnamese official said.

(In Manila, the Philippine Foreign Department said the agreement would provide for airlines from each country to provide services between Manila and Southern Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh City and between two other destinations subject to mutual agreement.)

(The department said the agreement would come into force following an exchange of diplomatic notes though full details had yet to be finalised.)

The agreement will allow the Philippines Airline to take part in the Orderly Departure Programme, organised by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), which allows some Vietnamese to emigrate legally.

Mr. Manglapus quoted Mr. Thach as saying that 94,000 Vietnamese wanted to go to the United States, which would require "a lot of jumbo jets".

The Philippine minister told reporters after meeting Mr. Thach that Vietnam had shown a "very positive attitude" towards informal meetings on the Cambodian problem held in Indonesia in July and October and had expressed "no reservation" about attending the next round of talks scheduled for early 1989.

The July talks were attended by representatives from Vietnam, Laos, the Phnom Penh government, the three factions of the Cambodian resistance and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which groups the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei.

Vietnam invaded Cambodia in late 1978 to oust the Khmer Rouge, now the main military muscle in the resistance coalition battling an estimated 100,000 to 120,000 Hanoi troops in Cambodia to prop up the Phnom Penh government. The Khmer Rouge did not attend the October talks.

On Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's recent offer to stop Soviet vessels using facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, in southern Vietnam, if Washington pulled out of the Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines, Mr. Manglapus quoted Mr. Thach as saying that it was up to Moscow to decide if it wanted to use the base.

He added that Mr. Thach had stressed Vietnam's sovereignty over the base.

Mr. Manglapus said that both a superpower withdrawal and a solution to the Cambodian problem would be necessary before an Indonesian proposal for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPEAN) in the region could be achieved.

He added that Hanoi's proposal to open Cam Ranh to other foreign powers could hinder such plans.

Mr. Manglapus said that both sides had agreed that any decision on the strategic Spratly Islands must be peaceful and allow recourse to an international conference or arbitration from an international court.

The Spratlys, straddling vital sea lanes linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, are claimed in part or in whole by Vietnam, China, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan.

Mr. Manglapus said he had invited Mr. Thach to come to Manila.

The Philippine minister was due to meet the Vietnamese Head of State Vo Chi Cong later Monday, followed by a second meeting with Mr. Thach and talks with Premier Do Muoi, an official Vietnamese source said.

#### Role of Philippines Discussed

HK2911043788 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY  
INQUIRER in English 29 Nov 88 pp 1, 10

[By Chay Florentino]

[Text] Hanoi—The Philippines and Vietnam should try to "get away" from the influence of superpowers to be able to solve problems between them, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach told Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus here yesterday.

During the talks which lasted close to three hours yesterday morning, Manglapus and Co Thach dwelt mostly on the "conditions of peace in the region" as well as the roles both Vietnam and the Philippines could play in maintaining regional security.

Thach said that while Vietnam respects the sovereignty of the Philippines and its decision to allow the U.S. to maintain military bases in its territory, it does so on the condition that the bases would not be used against neighboring countries.

Manglapus said he reassured Co Thach the Philippines will "never allow the bases to be used to attack Vietnam."

The proposal made by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on a Soviet withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay, directly west of Subic naval base, provided the U.S. pulled out from the bases in the Philippines was "touched upon" during the talks, according to Manglapus.

"The position of Co Thach has not changed. In their view, Cam Ranh is a Vietnamese installation which they are permitting the Soviets to use and it is up to the Soviets to continue using it or not to use it at all," Manglapus said.

Manglapus also said the goal of establishing a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia requires not only the mutual withdrawal of forces by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but the solution of the Kampuchean problem as well.

The goal of neutrality, he said, involves not only countries in the region, but the superpowers as well, hinting at the difficulty of realizing the ZOPFAN.

But Manglapus said: "All of a sudden, it might be possible. Things are developing in such a way that it might be possible, that it is hard to predict." But the question of when to start working toward the realization of ZOPFAN remains an "open question," he added.

Thach told Filipino reporters the resolution of the nine year-old Kampuchean problem cannot be used as a precondition for considering Gorbachev's proposal and American military withdrawal from the region.

There is no link between the two, the history of these two is different, Thach said.

Manglapus is the first Philippine Cabinet official to visit Vietnam since diplomatic relations were established in 1976. Both governments had expressed optimism the visit would serve to strengthen RP [Republic of the Philippines]-Vietnam relations which have remained lukewarm over the years.

The continued presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea, strongly opposed by the Association of South-east Asian Nations of which the Philippines is a member, has been consistently cited as a reason for the "abnormal" relations between Manila and Hanoi.

Vietnam had pledged to withdraw the remainder of its 50,000 troops in Kampuchea by December this year, in preparation for a total pullout by 1990.

In other developments:

Manglapus and Co Thach signed the RP-Vietnam Air Services Agreement which will help ease the traffic of outgoing Vietnamese. Some 94,000 Vietnamese are estimated to leave for the U.S.

Groups in the Philippines have expressed interest in developing trade with Vietnam. Private groups, according to Manglapus, are interested in importing soybean, coal, scrap iron and rattan.

#### Air Transport Accord Signed

BK2811164888 Hanoi VNA in English 1527 GMT  
28 Nov 88

[Text] Hanoi VNA-OANA Nov. 28—An agreement on air transport between Vietnam and the Philippines was signed here today.

Signatories were Nguyen Co Thach, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and foreign minister, and Raul Manglapus, Philippine foreign secretary, currently on an official visit to Vietnam.

The ceremony was witnessed by Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co, Director General of Vietnam Civil Aviation, Hoang Ngoc Dieu, and Philippine Ambassador Cipriano Leron.

#### Joint News Press Conference Held

BK2811162288 Hanoi VNA in English 1530 GMT  
28 Nov 88

[Text] Hanoi VNA-OANA Nov. 28—Nguyen Co Thach, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and foreign minister, and Raul Manglapus, Philippine secretary for foreign affairs, now on an official visit here, held a press conference at the Government Guest House this evening.

Opening the event, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach introduced Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus as a noted politician, the only Philippine senator who protested against the Philippine authorities' sending a combat battalion to the Vietnam War, and an outstanding activist for democracy in the Philippines.

Answering questions by Vietnamese and foreign correspondents, the Philippine foreign secretary designated his visit to Vietnam as a "breakthrough" in the relations between the two countries. He said while in Vietnam he felt he was right in objecting to the sending of a Philippine combat battalion to the Vietnam War.

On the relations between the two countries, Foreign Secretary Manglapus said that the two sides had "frank, open and fruitful" talks on bilateral issues, and had a closer look at other areas. He noted that the areas of agreement are large and could be larger." [no opening quotation mark]

On the signing today of the air transport agreement between the Philippines and Vietnam, he said its is "a landmark in our bilateral relations and a fitting highlight of our visit."

"It is hoped that with this agreement, greater interaction between our two countries will ensue, thus promoting understanding and goodwill our two peoples," he added.

On peace and stability in Southeast Asia, Foreign Secretary Manglapus said that the prospect has been substantially improved over the years, and he appreciated the "Vietnamese positive attitude towards peace and stability in the region."

**Manglapus Meets With Vo Chi Cong**

BK2811164688 Hanoi VNA in English 1516 GMT  
28 Nov 88

[Text] Hanoi VNA Nov. 28—State Council President Vo Chi Cong received at the Presidential Palace here this afternoon a visiting Philippine delegation led by Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus.

President Vo Chi Cong welcomed the visit of the Philippine foreign secretary, the highest-ranking official of the Philippines to Vietnam, since the two countries established diplomatic relations. He spoke highly of the Philippines' policy of expanding relations with neighboring countries and the major achievements the Philippine people recorded in economic restoration since President Corazon Aquino came to power.

President Vo Chi Cong expressed his satisfaction at the fine results of the talks held here this morning between Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and his Philippine counterpart Raul Manglapus, describing this as an important factor to opening a new chapter in the friendly and cooperative relations between the two nations. Vietnam and the Philippines, the president said, are close to each other geographically.

There is no problem between the two countries. Our two countries share the same long-term goal of building Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability, friendship and cooperation. Vietnam hopes and deems it necessary to settle all disputes between countries in the region through peaceful negotiations, particularly the questions of Kampuchea and the Truong Sa [Spratly] Islands. President Vo Chi Cong expressed his hope that Vietnam and the Philippines would cooperate closely with each other to reach that goal and that Vietnam is ready to cooperate with the Philippines in many fields—economic, social, scientific and technical—for the mutual benefits of the two peoples.

For his part, Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus expressed the Philippine Government and people's admiration for the Vietnamese people's struggle for national independence and freedom. He said he shared the same view with President Vo Chi Cong in the matters discussed. He welcomed Vietnam's stance for settling the questions of Kampuchea and the Truong Sa Islands and other disputes in the region.

The Philippine secretary for foreign affairs said that though the Philippines and Vietnam have different political and economic systems, the Philippine people regard the Vietnamese people as a bright example of national pride and self-reliance. We hope, he continued, that the

friendship and cooperation between our two countries will certainly be developed, which has found a vivid manifestation in the signing of an agreement on the promotion of those relations during this visit.

**Nguyen Van Linh on Joining ASEAN**

BK2911105588 Hanoi International Service in English  
1000 GMT 29 Nov 88

[Text] General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh highly valued the results of the talks between Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs Raul Manglapus and considered it a new manifestation of the development of the relations between the two countries.

He was speaking while receiving Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs Raul Manglapus in Hanoi on Tuesday [29 November]. Mr Nguyen Van Linh said: The signing of an agreement of air transport between Vietnam and the Philippines is an important landmark in the (?multi) cooperation between the two countries. He affirmed that the Vietnamese people will do their best together with the Philippines and other countries in the region to contribute to the peaceful settlement of all disputes including the Kampuchea issue. General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh pointed out that we are neighboring countries and that there are many favorable conditions to develop their friendship and cooperation for the interests of each country. The Vietnamese people hope that on the basis of the new relations the ASEAN can be broadened and Vietnam, like other countries in the region, is ready to join that organization.

Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs Raul Manglapus expressed his satisfaction at the visit to Vietnam and welcomed Vietnam's principle to respect to independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of each country and noninterference in others' internal affairs.

Earlier, on Monday [28 November], Vietnamese State Council President Vo Chi Cong received Filipino Secretary Raul Manglapus. The same day, an agreement on air transport between Vietnam and the Philippines was signed in Hanoi between Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and his Filipino counterpart Raul Manglapus.

**Manglapus Ends Visit, Departs**

BK2911112388 Hanoi International Service in English  
1000 GMT 29 Nov 88

[Excerpt] Filipino Secretary of Foreign Affairs Raul Manglapus left Hanoi on Tuesday [29 November], concluding his official friendship visit to Vietnam.

The farewell ceremony took place in the Vietnamese Government Guesthouse. Present at the farewell ceremony were Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and many other Vietnamese high-ranking officials. [passage omitted]

**Joint Press Statement Issued**

*BK2911080188 Hanoi VNA in English 0720 GMT  
29 Nov 88*

["Joint press statement" issued upon the conclusion of a visit by Raul Manglapus, foreign affairs secretary of the Republic of the Philippines, to the SRV—dated 29 November; issued in Hanoi]

[Text] Hanoi VNA November 29—The following joint press statement was released here this morning at the end of an official visit to Vietnam by Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines Raul Manglapus:

At the invitation of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the secretary of foreign affairs of the Philippines, H.E. [His Excellency] Raul S. Manglapus, and Madam made an official friendship visit to Vietnam on 27-29 November 1988. He was accompanied by other high ranking officials of the government of the Philippines. During their stay in Vietnam, the secretary and other officials paid tribute to the late President Ho Chi Minh at his mausoleum and visited his residence. They called on H.E. Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, and H.E. Vo Chi Cong, president of the State Council, with whom they had cordial talks.

H.E. Raul S. Manglapus had talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, H.E. Nguyen Co Thach. Present at the talks on the Vietnamese side were: Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co, Assistant Foreign Minister Vu Khoan, Director of Asia 3 Department Nguyen Can, Director of the General Economic and Cultural Affairs Nguyen Trung, and other senior officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Present on the Philippine side were: Philippine Ambassador to Vietnam H.E. Cipriano Leron, Assistant Secretary Edgardo Kalaw, Office of International Economic Affairs and Development of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Brig. [Brigadier] General Feliciano Gacis, assistant secretary for plans and development department of national defence, Director General Rora Navarro Tolentino, Office of Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and other senior officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The two sides briefed each other on developments in their respective countries. The two sides exchanged views on bilateral relations, and regional and global issues of mutual interest. The talks took place in an atmosphere of friendship, cooperation, mutual respect and understanding.

The two sides reiterated the undertakings that have governed the relations between the two countries, namely respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs including subversion, and non-use of force

or threat of force against each other. The two sides confirmed their desire and willingness to solve all differences and disagreements which might arise between the two countries, including territorial and jurisdictional claims, by peaceful means. In this regard, the two sides agreed to hold regular annual political consultations between the two foreign ministries, the level, time frame, and agenda of which shall be determined by mutual agreement through diplomatic channel.

The two sides expressed satisfaction at the continued improvement of the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries, and agreed to expand long-term, multi-sided cooperation in the economic, trade, scientific, technical and cultural fields. The conclusion of the air transport agreement between the two governments is an important landmark in this regard.

The two sides are of the view that the regional and world situation is changing rapidly from confrontation to dialogue and the peaceful settlement of existing regional problems and this development holds prospects for a new period in Southeast Asia conducive to peace, security, stability and development for all countries in the region including the peaceful settlement of the Kampuchean question and other existing regional disputes. In this spirit, the two sides expressed their desire to contribute to building Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, freedom, neutrality, friendship and cooperation. Both sides called upon all countries, whether inside or outside the region, to support all efforts for the achievement of these ends.

The two sides noted with satisfaction that the Kampuchean question is being resolved through negotiations. They attached great value to the results of the Jakarta informal meeting [JIM] held in July, 1988 and agreed to consult and cooperate with each other and the parties directly involved and other concerned parties to ensure the success of the second JIM expected to be held early next year. They welcomed the meetings among the Kampuchean parties in Paris. A comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean question and other regional disputes will contribute to the establishment of a zone of peace in Southeast Asia.

Both sides expressed concern over the Indochinese refugee problem and were of the view that this is a complex matter which should be resolved through joint efforts by all parties concerned on a humanitarian basis. The Vietnamese side, therefore, welcomed the ASEAN initiative to convene an international conference on Indochinese refugees in early 1989, to seek a comprehensive and durable solution to the refugee problem in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese side informed the Philippine side of measures it has taken to stop illegal departures, the expansion of expedited departures under the orderly departure programme, and its readiness to accept Vietnamese refugees who voluntarily want to return. Both

sides called on other countries to accelerate resettlement of refugees, and to extend assistance to help returnees reintegrate into Vietnamese society.

The Philippine side elaborated on its initiative in the United Nations for the creation of an international debt and development commission. The Vietnamese side expressed full support for the Philippine idea as an appropriate arrangement to promote cooperation between debtor and creditor countries.

The two sides expressed satisfaction at the success of the visit to Vietnam by H.E. Foreign Secretary Raul S. Manglapus. On behalf of the Philippine delegation and on their own, H.E. Foreign Secretary Raul S. Manglapus and Madam expressed gratitude for the warm welcome and hospitality accorded during their stay in Hanoi by the Vietnamese Government and people.

**VNA Rejects 'Allegations' on Cam Ranh Bay**  
*BK2911102688 Hanoi International Service in English*  
*1000 GMT 29 Nov 88*

[Text] VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY has rejected foreign news agencies' allegations on Vietnam's policy toward the Cam Ranh Bay. In a statement the agency said: Cam Ranh is a bay of Vietnam. It is within jurisdiction to let its friendly countries' naval forces to call at the port for material and technical supplies. Proceeding from the friendship relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, Vietnam has allowed Soviet naval forces to use Cam Ranh Bay as a station for material and technical supplies.

**Nguyen Co Thach on Improved PRC-USSR Ties**  
*BK2811144888 Hong Kong AFP in English 1439 GMT*  
*28 Nov 88*

[Text] Hanoi, Nov 28 (AFP)—Vietnam called Monday on the Soviet Union to work for improved ties between Hanoi and Beijing in the event of a normalisation in Sino-Soviet relations.

Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach told a press conference here "we welcome a normalisation between China and the Soviet Union."

He added that he was convinced that improved Sino-Soviet relations would be followed by a rapprochement between Hanoi and Beijing.

The Vietnamese minister said that he had told Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev, during his recent visit here, that Hanoi wanted Moscow to promote a Sino-Vietnamese normalisation and if possible contribute to a possible dialogue between the two countries.

**Delegate Condemns Khmer Rouge at UN Debate**  
*BK2911025288 Hanoi VNA in English 1507 GMT*  
*28 Nov 88*

[Text] Hanoi VNA November 28—"The genocidal Pol Potists must be banned from playing any part in international political life and be brought to the international tribunal of Nuremberg," said Vietnamese representative Nguyen Bich Lien at the United Nations' November 25 debate.

On the 40th anniversary of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, Nguyen Bich Lien recalled the atrocities suffered by mankind at the hands of the Nazis during World War II and the equally brutal carnage that took place in Kampuchea from 1975 to 1978 under the rule of the Khmer Rouge. She noted that during that short period of time, the Kampuchean people were deprived of their most elementary human right—the right to life.

"What the Kampuchean people now need first and foremost," the Vietnamese representative said, "is to live free from the nightmare of the genocide that ravaged them during the 75-78 period. Certainly the Kampuchean people and the international community cannot allow any return to Kampuchea of the genocidal Pol Pot regime."

Ms Nguyen Bich Lien denounced the Khmer Rouge for increasing its stockpiling of weapons and supplies, and forcing thousands of Kampuchean refugees out of camps inside Thailand to areas of combat to be used as cannon fodder.

"The international community should more than ever undertake resolute and effective measures to ensure that the Kampuchean people and their land of Angkor will never again be subjected to the nightmare of that genocidal regime," said Nguyen Bich Lien in conclusion.

**Paper on Hardship Facing Workers in East Europe**  
*BK2911024688 Hong Kong AFP in English 1758 GMT*  
*28 Nov 88*

[Text] Hanoi, Nov 28 (AFP)—Vietnam must defend the rights of its citizens working in Eastern Europe, who sometimes have to work alongside prisoners in forced-labour conditions, the Army newspaper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said Monday.

In a sharp attack, the newspaper said the workers, who are paid in non-convertible roubles, earn a monthly rate of 160 to 200 roubles in the Soviet Union, 850 to 1,000 marks in East Germany, 1,800 to 2,000 crowns in Czechoslovakia and 160 to 180 levas in Bulgaria.

The newspaper estimated that this was equivalent to only 20 percent of the salaries offered to foreign workers in the Middle East and Western countries who earn between 800 and 1,500 U.S. dollars a month.

Agreements drawn up with other socialist countries were not based on equality and mutual respect and contain "irrational points," the newspaper said, adding that additional talks suggested by Vietnam had failed to fully address the problem.

It suggested that the next round of talks keep in mind the principles of equality and respect for each other's interests by defending the legitimate interests of the workers.

This could be achieved by paying part of the salaries in convertible roubles and providing for holidays and visits by relatives, the newspaper said.

It also said the workers must have the right to either put money aside for their families or spend it as they wished. They should also be able to buy consumer goods and benefit from lower rates on customs duty.

It also says they should not be given arduous work in dangerous or toxic areas, nor should they have to work alongside prisoners from the host country under forced labour conditions.

Host countries should improve living conditions, particularly health and housing, it said.

The newspaper said that between 1980 and 1988, 80,000 workers went to the Soviet Union, 30,000 to Czechoslovakia, 60,000 to East Germany and 25,000 to Bulgaria.

Between 1980 and 1986, the Vietnamese Government was paid 230 million non-convertible roubles for the laborers' work which was used to pay-off part of the debt Vietnam owes to the host countries, the newspaper said.

## Australia

**Yugoslav Consulate Refuses To Hand Over Gunman**  
*BK2911094688 Hong Kong AFP in English 0913 GMT  
29 Nov 88*

[Text] Sydney, Nov 29 (AFP)—Yugoslavian authorities Tuesday refused to surrender a consular security guard accused of shooting a teenage boy during a demonstration here Sunday.

Two Sydney detectives entered the consulate Tuesday afternoon to question the Yugoslav security guard, Matijas Zoran, and inspect the weapon allegedly used in Sunday's shooting.

They left the consulate one hour later without the gunman and would not give details of the interrogation.

Yugoslavia only agreed to an Australian demand for police to be allowed to interview Mr. Zoran after two days of diplomatic wrangling.

Mr. Zoran has been blamed for firing the shot which hit 15-year-old Josef Tokic in the throat during the demonstration.

Hospital officials said the youth was taken off the danger list on Tuesday although the bullet was still lodged in his neck.

He was among 1,500 Croatians who took part in a Yugoslavia national day protest outside the consulate, calling on Belgrade to set up an independent state of Croatia.

Police said several shots were fired when a handful of demonstrators broke into the compound. One ricocheted, hitting Mr. Tokic, who was out on the street at the time.

Police claim there is sufficient evidence to charge Mr. Zoran over the shooting.

However Consul-General Stanojlo Glisic told reporters Tuesday he would not let police question Mr. Zoran outside the consulate grounds.

Australian authorities in Canberra said it did not appear there would be any early resolution of the issue, which has strained relations with the Yugoslav Government.

Yugoslavia has not apologised for the incident and has blamed Australia for not providing adequate police protection during the demonstration.

Australian authorities claim Mr. Zoran does not have consular status and is not therefore entitled to diplomatic immunity, which means he could face prosecution.

## Vanuatu

**Lini Rejects Call for General Elections**  
*BK2911060088 Melbourne Overseas Service in English  
0500 GMT 29 Nov 88*

[Text] Vanuatu's prime minister, Father Walter Lini, has rejected a call from President Sokomanu for a general elections. In rejecting the call, Father Lini told the president that he should not compromise his position as head of state by becoming involved in politics.

The president had asked the prime minister not to go ahead with his plan to hold by-elections on 12 December to fill 18 of the vacant seats in the 46-seat Parliament. By-elections for the other five vacant seats will be held at a later date.

He said the opposition's refusal to contest the by-elections means that Vanuatu was facing the prospect of becoming virtually a one-party state and, in his opinion, this did not amount to democracy. The president said that after the events of the past 6 months, he did not want to see any more departures from the principles enshrined in Vanuatu's Constitution. The only solution, he said, was for the government to call general elections.

However, the spokesman said the prime minister was concerned that President Sokomanu appeared to be falling in with the demands of Father Lini's main rival, Mr Barak Sope, and the opposition leader, Mr Maxime Carlot.

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